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The North Caucasus region of Russia is certainly one of the world’s most ethnically, 
culturally, and linguistically diverse.  The region’s landscapes reflect legacies of Russian 
imperialism and Soviet rule, along with contemporary Russian federal administration.  The North 
Caucasus also constitutes a zone of religious transition between Christianity and Islam.  These 
qualities, all of which may potentially serve as markers of identity among the region’s local 
population, have long constituted a challenge for ethnic Russian, and/or Russian state 
dominance, and thus have promoted state-led efforts and policies (namely “ethno-federalism” 
and “federal district reform”) that attempt to achieve a cohesive sense of regional identity for the 
North Caucasus.  This dissertation examines empirical understandings and perceptions of 
regional and territorial identity as expressed through the collective experiences, attitudes, and 
opinions of young adults in the contemporary North Caucasus.  The project aims to investigate 
how “the region” ranks among other identity markers of North Caucasus’s many ethno-national 
and socio-cultural groups, recognize how residents of the region understand it in terms of 
territorial composition and meaning, and discern any nuances among the population regarding 
the use of regional policy by the Russian state so as to influence perceptions and discourses on 
identity, security, and economic development (efforts which I term “constructive 
regionalization”).  The research methodology includes analysis of survey data, as well as a GIS-
based cognitive mapping exercise, to indicate statistically significant differences of opinion on 
the importance of identity markers and their territorial salience. These differences are explained 
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Chapter I: Introduction, Background, and Project Goals 
 
 
The concepts of “the region” and regional identity have traditionally played an important 
role in geography (Paasi, 2003).  Although emphasis on meanings, origins, uses, and 
applicability of “the region” as a concept have changed over time, regional issues continue to be 
relevant for geographers in many subsets of the discipline.  For example, issues of regionalism 
and separatism are of interest to political geographers, who study identities and how populations 
divide themselves (Agnew et al., 2003).  Concepts like “new regionalism” and “re-scaling” 
appear in the work of economic geographers, who are interested in the impact of global 
capitalism on development (Harvey, 2005).  For cultural geographers, who are interested in 
peoples and their attachments to place and the landscape (Anderson et al., 2003), regional 
narratives and designations can represent voices of defiance and cultural distinctiveness.  A 
prominent political geographer, Ansi Paasi (2009), has called for more research on markers of 
regional identity, how regional distinctions and classifications are produced and reproduced, how 
they express relations of power, how regional identities are manifested, and the purposes of 
articulating regional identities.   
In this project, I approach the topic of regional identity by applying theory from multiple 
sub-fields of geography specifically to the case of the North Caucasus region in the Russian 
Federation where definitions of “the region” are utilized by the state to address issues of 
governance and development and to promote geopolitical agendas. Through field work and 
analysis of empirical data, I will examine how people perceive the importance of various identity 
markers in regional context, testing whether or not associations with “the region” (the North 
Caucasus) can serve as a marker of identity in comparison to other place-based and socio-
cultural identity markers.  I aim to address the prospective value of emphasizing “the region” as 
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a marker of identity in cultural and political geography, as it has the potential to work for or 
against state goals (Paasi, 2003).  I will address the role of the region as it functions within the 
greater meta-geography (Lewis and Wigen, 1997; Paasi, 2002; Murphy, 2008) of the state, and 
measure cognitive perceptions of regional context and cohesion. Finally, in hope of shedding 
light on any contested notions of identity in the regional context, and the particular sets of power 
relations they reflect, I approach regional identities as social constructions and products of 
discourses, reified through relations with other territories and identities via power dynamics and 
geopolitical strategies (Murdoch, 2006).    
 
Constructive Regionalization and the Importance of Regional Identity 
In this project, I refer to forms of state territoriality and policy that emphasize “the 
region” and regional identity-building, facilitated through the discursive dissemination of state-
produced knowledge (Hakli, 2001) for the purposes of solving potential problems (Sack, 1986) 
as constructive regionalization.  I suggest that states may choose to practice constructive 
regionalization to address three major themes: stability/governance, economic development, and 
geopolitical strategy.  I want to demonstrate that in each case, the success of constructive 
regionalization is ameliorated by the local population’s recognition and compliance with state-
approved notions of the region, including the proliferation of “the region” as an identity marker.  
To address issues of stability and governance, constructive regionalization serves to 
mediate perceived scalar notions of identity and place in the context of a greater state meta-
geography (Lewis and Wigen, 1997; Paasi, 2002, Murphy, 2008).  The association with a region 
as an identity marker constitutes a way to create commonality among unrelated groups, giving 
them a reason to build a cohesive sense of identity, which is especially important in diverse areas 
3 
 
and multi-ethnic states (Murphy, 1989).  Because people are apt to identify with more localized 
territorial constructs due to lived experience and familiarity (Knight, 1982), regional identities 
constitute a more localized and culturally identifiable sense of cohesive belonging that do not 
force populations to rely solely on state-scaled identity constructions.  However, maintaining 
emphasis on a region’s role within the greater state structure is vital for the prevention of 
centripetal regionalism, where regional organization is based on contested politics of identity 
(Jones and MacLeod, 2004). Therefore, approaching how states seek to manage regional 
identities, or promote state-approved regional identities, is important for understanding why 
problematic regionalism and separatism are issues in some regions and not others. 
Constructive regionalization can play a role in dealing with issues of uneven state 
economic development.  Evidence from economic geography has suggested that both states and 
the regions can benefit from regionalization economically (Scott and Storper, 2003).  Through 
processes like re-scaling (Swyngedouw, 1996) and the branding of regions (Vainikka 2012), 
regional economies come to develop specialized agglomeration economies that compete at the 
global scale.  Such processes can be state-initiated or “state-driven,” where the state plays a role 
in initial investment and infrastructural development in the region, and works to create an 
environment in which foreign direct investment will enter the region (Scott and Storper, 2003).  
State-sponsored discourses work to establish notions of economic identity, ‘branding’ the 
developing region with a particular economic identity, which can be crucial for attracting foreign 
direct investment (Vainikka, 2012).  Through constructive regionalization, regions become 
associated with a particular economic sector and compete at the global scale, which brings in 
revenue and ultimately turns previously poor performing areas into state revenue generators 
(Scott and Storper, 2003).  Therefore, if they are successful, these discourses’ impact on notions 
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of “the region” as an identity marker should be evident in that they promote and project 
optimistic feelings about the region’s economic future.  In the case of the North Caucasus, if 
residents of the region can understand the specialized economic role that their region has taken 
on, and believe that efforts at constructive regionalization will create economic opportunities, 
they should be motivated to remain in the region as opposed to seeking opportunities outside.     
Successful constructive regionalization can also play an important role in a state’s 
geopolitical strategy, especially when applied in border regions (Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999), 
which can be thought of as gradual zones of transition from one territory  to another, where 
governments tend to focus attention on political and military aspects of control (Popescu, 2012).  
How states choose to frame and represent their actions in border regions in terms of resource 
allocation, security strategies, and the identification and resolution particular localized issues or 
threats demonstrates their commitment to dealing with issues of security to the rest of their 
citizenry. Border regions, which stand somewhat removed from central state territory, can 
therefore be used as discursive showpieces for the state.  Because states have a monopoly on 
official statistics and how these statistics are represented (Foucault, 1991; Hakli, 2001), states 
can use these representations in sets of geopolitical discourses, which work to promote their own 
versions of truth and advance their geopolitical agendas (Ó Tuathail, 2006).  Representation and 
geopolitical discourse, along with other aspects of constructive regionalization, can thus result in 
regions becoming associated with certain trends that work toward promoting state strategy.  For 
example, border regions can become understood as buffers between a state’s core areas and 
perceived outside threats  (Tuncer, 2000), which can work to isolate problematic characteristics 
in regional context and keep them separated from other parts of the state.   
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Discourses on regional identity may be presented by the state in attempt to associate 
people with regional territory, and broadcast characteristics regarding these people. Through 
their dissemination, these discourses can work to promote positive attributes associated with the 
region and its inhabitants (economic opportunity, security, cultural, and values) and discourage 
negative attributes (terrorism, corruption, and crime).  Such discourses may be disseminated 
through various means, such as though formal state or regional level policies, institutions, or 
though state-produced/approved media.  Because these discourses are presumably broadcast 
within ‘the region’ in question, people living within ‘the region’ are forced to confront these 
discourses in comparison to their own lived experiences when considering their own personal 
constructions of identity.  Contested notions of identity, where the “identity of the region” (Paasi, 
2003) classified by the state is not congruent with people’s experience-based “regional 
consciousness” (Paasi, 2003), are reflective of power relations and may be indicative of potential 
problems for the implementation of state policies.  This idea is important for examining why 
some regions perform integrated roles in the greater state, and why others exhibit a lack of trust 
(Bourdieu, 1998) for the state and resist integration.   
 
The Case in Question: The North Caucasus  
A case where issues of governance, development, and geopolitics are being addressed 
through constructive regionalization is the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation, 
located on Russia’s southwestern periphery.  Due to this region’s historically isolated 
populations, along with their reactions to attempts at submission by various incantations of the 
Russian State, the North Caucasus is often cited as a major obstacle to Russian governance, 
territoriality, and security (see Cornell, 1997; Taylor, 2007; O’Loughlin and Witmer, 2011). The 
6 
 
contemporary North Caucasus is a landscape of great geographic and socio-cultural diversity, 
where many of the region’s local peoples’ identities are firmly rooted in their relations with 
Russian governance (Richmond, 2008).  
Contemporary Russian governance operates under a system known as “ethno-
federalism,” where provincial territories are under the authority of the federal center, and are 
defined based on the allocation of territory to particular ethno-national groups.  The Soviets first 
implemented ethno-federalism to mediate issues of national self-determination with the goal of 
creating a cohesive Soviet-identity for the entire state (Wixman, 1980). Contemporary Russia has 
continued this system, but focused on consolidation, putting emphasis on civic-Russian 
nationalism as a cohesive identity among its functional regions (Hughes, 2001). According to 
ethno-federalism, certain territories are afforded varying degrees of autonomy from the federal 
center, according to their territorial statuses.  There are six types of federal territories (provincial 
scale) in contemporary Russia, three of which can be observed in and around the North 
Caucasus: krays, oblasts, and republics.  Krays, such as Stavropol Kray, and Oblasts, like Rostov 
Oblast, are fully integrated federal subjects with majority Russian populations.  Republics, like 
Karachay-Cherkessia and North Ossetia-Alania, tend to be majority non-Russian and have 
autonomous status that allows them official languages other than Russian, the establishment of 
their own legal codes, separate constitutions, and named ethno-national (titular) recognition and 
status.1      
Politics in Russia’s Post-Yeltsin era have generally focused on unity, conservation, and 
consolidation, particularly in respect to “vertical power,” streamlining control from the president 
through lower scales of government (Pomeranz, 2009), “federal district reform,” creating 
                                                          
1 Article 63 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation 
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regionally based constellations of provincial territories under direct control of Moscow (Hahn, 
2003), and the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) aimed at promoting regional 
economies and attracting foreign direct investment (Litwack and Qian, 1998).  I suggest that all 
of these changes could be seen as evidence of constructive regionalization, as each of these 
policies has worked to change the definitions and identity markers associated with the North 
Caucasus in particular.  Many scholars have theorized that in order to maintain control and 
stability, Moscow must control the extent to which regionalisms are allowed to become salient 
(Nunn and Stulberg, 2000).  Therefore, these strategies have resulted in increased emphasis on 
regional identification, where regions function as integrated entities in relation to the federal 
center, with the ultimate intention being that regions collectively understand their role as part of 
an integrated Russian federal whole (Chebankova, 2008).  
The changing policy on issues of nationality and ethno-national identity in Russia, along 
with the associated territorial implications connected to national territory, population dynamics, 
and administration, have been an important topic for geographers focusing on Russia (Kaiser, 
1994).  Such issues are especially evident in Russia’s formal geopolitics (Ó Tuathail, 2003, 
2006) today, namely in the form of a new version of state nationalities policy crafted by four 
Kremlin advisors and signed into law on December 19, 2012.  The status of the North Caucasus 
is cited as motivation for the new policy, namely in terms of “an outburst of ethnic mobilization, 
ethno-territorial separatism, and religious-political extremism.” The advisors also claim that 
Russia faces a “the threat of disintegration,” which they suggest has come about due to “a high 
level of social inequality in society and regional differentiation, ethno-politicization of various 
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spheres of life” along with  “corruption, failings of the law-enforcement system, and the distrust 
of citizens in the organs of power.”2 
Moscow has shown great willingness to devote attention to and become deeply involved 
fiscally and militarily in the North Caucasus (O’Loughlin et al., 2008). This allocation of 
financial resources (subsidies) from the federal center to the region demonstrates concern for the 
region by attempting to keep it financially stable so as to prevent discontent.  Such discontent has 
manifested in separatist movements, which are still active to some degree in many of the 
republics.  The republics in the North Caucasus are commonly cited as cause for concern in 
terms of disintegrating qualities due to their problematic history, relatively weak economies, 
isolated peripheral location, and interest from Islamist factions from outside Russia (Richmond, 
2008).  Functionally, dealings within the region tend to be heavily influenced by regional elites 
and nationalist, religious, and sub-regional political and economic actors who respond to 
Moscow according to their own territorial and socio-cultural agendas (Hanson, 2006).  These 
power dynamics have enabled the forging and construction of many possible identity markers to 
which the various peoples of the North Caucasus may self-ascribe when participating in various 
contexts.   
The relationship between the North Caucasus and the Russian State demonstrates how 
regions can become a showpiece for policy.  The fact that Moscow approaches the North 
Caucasus as a contextualized territorial construct, and as a target for specialized attention, allows 
Moscow to demonstrate what it is willing to do in order to solve problems, and how it is willing 
                                                          
2 Globe, Paul “Window on Eurasia: New Nationalities Strategy Paper Offends Russian Nationalists.” 





to go about promoting its will among its many geopolitical relations.  The North Caucasus is 
therefore presented as an example of what happens when the rules are followed, and when they 
are not, such as in cases like the destruction and rebuilding of Grozny.  The region is also an 
anomaly in post-Yeltsin territoriality in that it seems to run contrary to the contemporary 
strategies of centralization and consolidation.  It is the only region of Russia being uniquely 
defined and singled out, rather than brought under a greater territorial umbrella, which is perhaps 
evidence of the state’s desire to promote a specific sense of North Caucasus regional identity.  If 
people in the North Caucasus accept a formalized, regionally-based homogenizing marker of 
identity, its constructive regionalization could arguably be seen as successful.    
A cohesive and state-approved regional identity in the North Caucasus, acknowledging 
the region’s integrated place in a greater Russian meta-geography, is important for the Russian 
state.  Economically, a cohesive and integrated North Caucasus would form a successful 
agglomeration based on tourism, which would ultimately not only support the region itself, but 
also create revenue for Moscow and possibly benefit the rest of Russia.  In terms of governance, 
a cohesive North Caucasus would theoretically be less corrupt and more apt to act in the interests 
of the region, and ultimately the rest of Russia, rather than for the interests of individual 
provincial territories and/or actors.  Culturally, a cohesive North Caucasus would embrace the 
region’s various ethno-national and religious groups as part of a unique regional manifestation of 
civic-Russianness, lessening the potential for social cleavage, violence, and terrorism.  In a 
geopolitical sense, a cohesive North Caucasus would mean stability on Russia’s southwest 
periphery, and a buffer zone between Russia proper and perceived threats from outside, such as 
growing Islamist movements, NATO encroachment, or instability along Russia’s southern 
borders. In contrast, cleavages in identity could point to contested power relations, which have 
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the potential to work against constructive regionalization in regard to any of these aspects.  In 
this project, I work to examine whether or not such cleavages exist among residents of the North 
Caucasus, in which segments of the population they exit, why they are pronounced, and their 
significance for constructive regionalization. 
         
 
 Stavropol’s Importance 
Stavropol is a uniquely important place in Russian and the wider region due to its 
position at the crossroads of social, political, security, and resource agendas, often serving as a 
lynchpin of Russian control and stability. Stavropol can be understood as the most advanced 
Russian outpost in the North Caucasus region, based on its military history and role in ethnic 
relations and confirmed by its firm inclusion within the North Caucasus (Foxall, 2013). Its 
geopolitical significance for Russia is often noted by geographers from Russia itself, such as 
Belozerov (2005), who argues that Stavropol Kray is one of contemporary Russia's most 
strategic locations.  Few of Russia's provincial areas have received as much attention as the 
North Caucasus in regard to strategic importance, and ethnic relations are not the only critical 
element in its significance. As Ware (1998) suggests, the Caucasus region receives much 
strategic focus due to resource reserves and its critical geographic location for the transport of 
said resources, primarily in the form of pipelines that can bring oil and gas west from Central 
Asia; those powers concerned include Russia, Turkey, Iran and the United States. Stavropol's 
perceived role in regional stability certainly makes it a key factor, or perhaps an indicator, in the 
function of the wider region. 
Stavropol has received much attention among geographers and other social scientists 
interested in issues of regional, civic, and ethno-national identity. Stavropol is also important for 
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those interested in contemporary Russia and its territorial administrative policies and the roles 
that the North Caucasus plays at various geopolitical scales. Stavropol has come to constitute a 
frontier area through its historical and contemporary location and utilization, serving as a 
conceptual area of division between Russian and non-Russian ethno-national territory.  
Markedonov (2009) has termed the Stavropol region a distinctive border line that separates “the 
Russian World” from the “Caucasus World.” As the only primarily ethnic Russian territory 
included in the recently state-defined North Caucasus, via the institution of the North Caucasus 
Federal District, Stavropol is positioned to play a key and unique role in ethno-territorial 
discourses in Eurasia (Foxall, 2012). Studying identity in Stavropol is also useful for greater 
social science applications. It constitutes a place to gather integral regional scientific knowledge, 
which supports research based on the agendas of world socio-political knowledge, such as that 
promoted by Mann (2004).  Understanding territorial identity in Stavropol also has specific 
implications for political geography.  Prominent political geographer Ansi Paasi (2009), has 
called for new research regarding markers of regional identity, how regional distinctions and 
classifications are produced and reproduced, how they express relations of power, how regional 
identities are manifested, and the purposes of articulating regional identities.  Stavropol and the 
North Caucasus represents a laboratory in which to further study each of these ideas.  
Studying Stavropol, with its multi-ethnic landscape and its role in the contexts of Russia 
and wider Eurasia as a cultural and religious transition zone, presents an opportunity to 
investigate the various forms of identity to which its population associates.  Therefore, by 
studying and interacting with the local population through fieldwork and observation, I was able 
to gain insights into this particular case of regional identity, which may prove useful to other 
researchers working in political geography in multi-ethnic landscapes, those studying issues of 
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regional identity and regionalism, or scholars working more broadly with populations in Eurasia 
more broadly.  
Geopolitical implications of multi-ethnic regions like Stavropol serve to showcase 
interactions and expressions of complex territorial identities at varying spatial scales.  
Understanding such identities, along with how they are manifested socially and politically, is 
important because the social processes that aid in their construction and maintenance, often 
reflective of state-level policy, regularly serve to indicate and affect geopolitical stances of their 
particular state's leaders and institutions (O'Loughlin et al. 2007).  In this study, identities present 
in Stavropol and the rest of the North Caucasus could be understood as a direct reflection of such 
policies (ethno-federalism, federal district reform, etc.). Therefore, empirical research and 
methodologies that work to clarify important markers of identity, quantify their importance to the 
population, and understand their impact on regional social dynamics from qualitative analysis, 
are potentially useful to further understand a region’s geopolitical role within state context.  
In Russia, empirical studies have suggested that Western theories of inclusive 
nationalism, based on civic behavior and imagined groups or countries, are lacking in their 
explanation of national identity, as Russians are faced more with issues of institutionalized ethnic 
identification, hierarchical territorial identification, and self-identification that are often affected 
by issues of freedom and civil rights (Chernysh, 1995).  This study’s examination of how local 
people map markers of identity allows for an analysis of identity that takes into account these 
kinds of hierarchical identities. 
Stavropol, along with the rest of the North Caucasus, constitutes a landscape of social 
consciousness formed and presented as the manifestation of ethno-separatism, nationalism, 
xenophobia, and competing claims, or "memory wars" in regard to nations, ethnic groups and 
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subgroups (Astvatsaturova and Chekmenev, 2013).  However, where these narratives are defined 
and the territorial contexts in which they are understood, are not necessarily consistent.  
Empirical research on how territorial consciousness is represented among the local population 
has the potential to further understandings of how the groups involved in these narratives see 
territory in terms of their own identity constructions.  In the North Caucasus, ethnic renaissance 
in the post-Soviet context has become institutionalized, partly through the promotion of myth-
like interpretations oriented into social belief and practice; the resulting interpretations on ethno-
national identities take up meaning as identity markers, which have an impact on global, regional 
and local living ability (Astvatsaturova and Chekmenev 2013).  These ideas are important for 
understanding the effects of post-Soviet ethnic awareness and its territorial implications. 
Finally, literature on Stavropol and the North Caucasus is dominated by work on security 
and conflict, as the Caucasus been perhaps even over-represented in certain circles going all the 
way back to the geopolitics of the Russian Empire (Funch, 1998).  However, there is a need for 
empirical data and analysis from 'inside' the region to better understand its geography beyond the 
themes of ethnic conflict, center-region dynamics or growing religious fundamentalism 
(O'Loughlin et al. 2007).  Stavropol is a place where new methodologies and research techniques 
could potentially benefit the body of literature already produced, taking into account Stavropol 's 
location, symbolic significance, front and center position in several interrelated discourses.  For 
example, most of the demographic and socio-economic research conducted on Stavropol has 
tended to follow widely accepted methods of quantitative and qualitative data analysis, focusing 
on several categories of identity, such as civic versus ethno-national association, language use 
and inequalities among groups in post-Soviet development and ethnic conflict (O'Loughlin, 
2007; Foxall, 2010). However, as  Tishkov (1999) argues, existing categories used to study the 
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former Soviet Union, such as language and socio-economy, and resources bases, fail to look at 
strategies of individuals, social and political disorder, power and status aspirations, elite 
manipulations, and outside interventions. Therefore, viewing spatial awareness and group 
cohesion among groups that exist in these terms provides a new way to explore conceptions of 
identity, through an overtly territorial focus. An analysis of group territorial perceptions in 
Stavropol shows whether groups and territories that are treated as cohesive units in political 
discourse and actually understood in such terms by the local population. Since the Stavropol 
region is often treated as a focal point of competing regional, ethno-national, and religious 
identities, it presents the chance to examine several factors of identity among the diverse 
members of its population, and analyze how territorial identity is understood in terms of these 
other factors.  
 
Potential Impact  
Through my work on regional identity and constructive regionalization in the North 
Caucasus, I hope to show the relevance of studying intra-state territorial relationships and 
identity dynamics in regional context, using this region as a laboratory to gain insight into how 
regional identity is manifested in the midst of constructive regionalization and lived experience.  
Through my methodology, I focus on measuring group affinity for ideas of civic, place-based, 
ethno-cultural, religious, and linguistic markers of identity.  I also gathered data on participants’ 
cognitive spatial perceptions regarding the territorial manifestation of identity markers and 
present visual representations of these perceptions.  I compared groups of participants so as to 
analyze cleavages and commonalities in how they view the North Caucasus region, gaining 
insight into power relations and issues of trust among groups in regard to the Russian state.  
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Trends in the data revealed how cohesively group members responded in regard to the various 
identity markers, providing insight into which groups either have or lack a strong sense of 
collective identity.  I also seek to uncover nuances in collective beliefs of various socio-cultural 
groups in the region, which may or may not be in agreement with official sets of statistics. 
Because groups with contested regional identities might be problematic to the process of 
constructive regionalization, the propensity for them to exert their identities may influence how 
they come to be represented discursively, and also how state policy is applied to them in the 
future.  I also interviewed participants in order to gain insight into people’s perceptions of their 
region’s role within greater Russia, along with their opinions regarding the relationship between 
Moscow and the North Caucasus, and core-periphery relations more widely.  My hope is that my 
findings and research techniques could help guide scholars working on issues of regionalism and 
regional identity in other post-Soviet regions, and those researching other parts of the world, in 
developing their methodologies and research projects.    
More broadly, I believe that my project may be useful for learning how identity markers 
are ascribed meaning spatially and how these meanings are dealt with discursively.  I aim to 
make a contribution to the growing literature on contemporary regional geography by gaining 
insight into the salience of regional identity markers, providing clarification on how regional 
identity is manifested among diverse populations, and by examining the purposes and strategies 
for articulating regional conceptions in geopolitical discourse.  My research methodology and 
potential findings could be useful for examining cognitive conceptions of regional territory and 
identity in other regions of the former Soviet Union and Europe, such as Ukraine, Catalonia and 
the Basque country, Belgium, or Northern Italy, and in other places where regional identities 
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play a role in state discourses of economic development, governance, and geopolitical 






Chapter II: Theory 
 
In this project, I draw on three major theoretical themes.  First, I approach the literature 
on territory, territoriality, and scale to explore how constructive regionalization factors into to the 
contemporary territoriality of the Russian state, specifically Russia’s ethno-federal system of 
governance, nationalities policy, and recent polices regarding federal district reform.  Here I will 
focus on how state territory is made in Russia, using the North Caucasus as an example to 
explore issues of unevenness and varying degrees of territorialization exercised by the state, how 
regionalization fits into to Russia’s territorial and geopolitical strategy, and the role that territory 
is perceived to play in solving problems in Russia.   
Second, I focus on theory regarding identity and place, concentrating on the territorial 
attachments of participants in terms of how they perceive organizations of social codes, 
resources, and communication spatially (Knight, 1982).  I am interested in people’s sense of 
place (Tuan, 1974) as it pertains to issues of consciousness and territorial affinity, which could 
have effects on their cognitive conceptions of the region.  I also want to examine how 
participants’ emotional connections to their environments affect their opinions regarding their 
attachment to the North Caucasus, and how these attachments fit with other identity constructs 
existing in the greater Russian context.   
Finally, I will incorporate the concept of discourse as it applies to the North Caucasus and 
suggest how the discursive construction of a region can play a role in identity-building, as well 
as to accomplish geopolitical and organizational goals for the state.  When attempting to analyze 
feelings and attitudes it is important to understand the kind of communication, information 
exchange, and formalized literature to which a population is exposed.  In the case of the North 
Caucasus, I am interested in the local population’s take on policies that work toward constructive 
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regionalization in terms of how these policies are communicated, the attitudes that are produced 
toward the region itself, and the expectations help by people in the North Caucasus regarding the 
various discursive themes presented to them from the Federal Center.   
 
Scale 
Scale is extremely important for understanding political geography because scalar 
conceptions, regardless of whether or not they are, constructed, or imposed, are reflective of 
political and cultural dealings and accentuate relations between different constellations of 
political organization (Paasi, 2004).  For this project, I will be examining sub-state and regional 
scales in Russia, particularly in terms of how these ideas are manifested in group constructions of 
territorial identity.  I approach the scaling of the Russian Federation as reflective of state 
territoriality, governance, and power relations.  I recognize scale as socially constructed and 
promoted to facilitate presumed requirements, or as Agnew (1995) suggests, ‘scaling-up’ or 
‘scaling-down’ in terms of infrastructural power according to political economies of scale to 
meet scalar geographical needs. The post-structural turn in geography has focused away from 
traditional conceptions of scale, due namely to the fact that approaching scale as rigid, given, and 
inherent limits the understanding of flows, networks, and relations, which are more appropriate 
ways to theorize spatial processes in the face of increasing globalization (Allen, Massey, and 
Cochrane, 1998).  I approach scale as being constructed in an attempt to organize, control, or 
limit flows and networks and to contextualize relations and access in the state structure.  Howitt 
(2003, p. 142) suggests that scale’s real value is that it indicative of contest, referring to scale as 
a “co-constituent of complex and dynamic geographic totalities.” I see scalar notions as being 
evidence of this contest, and as reflective of historically contingent moments in their resolution 
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process.  Therefore, there is no universal, regionally fixed scale.  Instead, regional scale is a 
process of scaling practices and discourses that produce and reproduce various conceptions of 
the region (Paasi, 2009). 
O’Lear and Diehl (2007) argue that the concept of scale has multiple aspects, including 
the observational scale, which describes the spatial extent of an area, the measurement scale, 
which reflects the resolution of data, the operational scale, which reflects the spatial extent of 
processes, and the cartographic scale, which deals with the visualization of phenomena.  All of 
these elements of scale are products of human practice.  O’Lear and Diehl (2007) note that scale 
should be problematized as it relates to various processes, not taken as a given container for 
these processes.  Scale should not be seen as preexisting, as it is in a constant state of 
construction.   Therefore, scale in and of itself, is not necessarily meaningful, but it becomes a 
way of understanding social interactions when it can be understood relationally in terms of 
specific places, processes, and actors (O’Lear and Diehl, 2007).    For the purposes of this 
project, I treat scale as a discursive tool which, by various means of representation, is used to 
convey particular spatial and territorial messages.  These messages are never objective, as all 
regional ways of knowing claim area for the purposes of exclusion and or consolidation to serve 
some interest.  Contemporary Russia has undergone scalar regionalization on purpose, and scalar 
representations of territory and place are relevant to the formation of place identities among the 
population.  Because scales can be viewed epistemologically, affecting the ways we know the 
world (Jones, 1998), scalar knowledge has the potential to affect place identities. Russia is 
known in scalar terms that reflect centuries of historically contingent strategies of territoriality 
and power relations (Paasi, 2002).  Russia is known regionally, and how places and people are 
20 
 
identified in terms of their belonging to a region has both a social and potentially material impact 
on how they participate in various flows and networks within Russian society.   
 
Territoriality  
Territoriality as a means for solving problems is a major concept in my research.  As a 
foundation for understanding territoriality, I draw on Robert Sack’s (1983, 1986) work on 
“human territoriality.” Sack (1983) suggests territoriality to include strategic actions intended to 
enhance or impede interaction which, via contact, extends the details of these actions.  According 
to Sack (1983), territoriality, as a process, takes place when ‘x’ (persona, group, or class) 
attempts to exert influence on ‘y’ (persona, group, or class), thus inferring a transfer of energy 
between ‘x’ and ‘y.’ Types and severity of energy exchange are manifested in contact, where 
contact events occur along a continuum.  Occurrences of contact can range from the exchange of 
information to direct physical interactions. 
Sack (1983) also proposes degrees by which space is territorialized, giving the example 
of a maximum security prison as being territorialized to a more severe degree than a half-way 
house.  This example also fits when thinking of Russia’s federal structure, which exhibits 
territories that are more territorialized (Oblasts, Krays, Federal Cities) and less territorialized 
(Republics).  For Sack (1983; 1986), territoriality brings order into space according to a number 
of possible methods of assertion, including: legal rights to land and cultural norms, or the 
restriction or legal repression of these elements.  Therefore to have territory implies that there is 
an established order in space.  This order is often manifested through the establishment of spatial 
hierarchies, which come to represent the relationships between those controlling and those being 
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controlled; these relationships become defined within the social context according to uneven 
access to people and materials (Sack, 1983).   
Territoriality works through hierarchical forms of knowledge transfer, where the power to 
carry ideas is easily communicated through the establishment of boundaries that symbolize and 
define spatial positions and ideas of belonging versus exclusion (Sack, 1983).  Contemporary 
Russian territoriality can thus be thought of in terms of relations between those controlling, 
Moscow, and those being controlled, federal territories.  Designations, like status as a Special 
Economic Zone, or types of autonomous status, constitute defined spatial position and exclusion, 
which are communicated via the federal relationship.  
Understanding Russia as a metageography, or a set of spatial structures and frameworks 
though which knowledge is organized (Lewis and Wigen, 1997), is helpful for understanding 
contemporary Russian territoriality and constructive regionalization.  Although the concept of 
metageography is often applied in regard to the study of supra-state relations, Murphy (2008) 
argues that it is also useful for understanding regions.  Ansi Paasi’s (2002a) view of 
metageographies is also appropriate to consider for Russian regional territoriality.  According to 
Paasi (2002a), in order for a shift in metageographic understanding to occur “a transformation is 
needed in the existing forms of state territoriality and in the key institutions that engender this 
transformation” (p. 199).  Implementation of Special Economic Zones and federal district reform 
constitutes new territorial arrangements for Russia.  These arrangements demonstrate a shift in 
Russia’s internal territorial strategy, prompting changes in the state’s overall metageographic 
understanding.  Russia has undergone a metageographic evolution, whereby the promotion and 
building of regional identities serves the support an integrated federal body.   
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John Agnew’s (2005) concept of sovereignty regimes is also useful for understanding 
state territoriality.  Agnew describes sovereignty regimes as styles of rule, though which states 
are able to combine central authority and political territoriality, gaining the ability to practice 
sovereignty from within their borders and outside of them, maintaining internal order and 
protecting themselves from outside threats.  Sovereignty regimes are contingent on internal 
authority, which Agnew (2005) identifies as the legitimate exercise of power administered via 
networks of apparatus.  He notes that no state has absolute power, and there are always sources 
of competing authority, such as religious organizations, social movements, business, and so on.  
Sovereignty regimes, according to Agnew (2005), exist in various forms that may or may not be 
predicated on states.  Russia is what Agnew refers to as a “classic sovereignty regime,” where 
authoritarian control and infrastructural power are mainly utilized within a bounded state 
territory, exhibiting a high degree of effective and centralized state political authority.  In 
contrast, a supra-national arrangement like the European Union is an “integrative sovereignty 
regime,” where the practice of sovereignty is more complex because it coexists at different 
levels, ranging from EU-wide sovereignty, to state-sovereignty, to various manifestations at the 
sub-state and regional scales.  The differences between these two sovereignty regimes are 
important when considering regionalization and re-scaling.  In Russia, distinctive economic and 
political regions and re-scaling efforts are ultimately decided via streamlined authority from 
Moscow.  These decisions are made according to the presumed good of both the regions and the 
Russian state.  In Europe many scalar actors and economic processes are necessary to negotiate 
regional issues, typically for reasons other than simply the benefiting the EU.    
 Establishing political legitimacy over territory is an important factor for state 
territoriality.  O’Lear (2007) suggests that one way to gain political legitimacy over territory is 
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by establishing “the right to make rules.”  How states go about establishing political legitimacy 
can provide insight into state-stability, allowing us to measure the acceptance of political actors 
based on how well they are able to gain public acceptance, and in some cases approval (O’Lear, 
2007).  Political legitimacy also has impacts on internal state sovereignty, which is often 
indicative of a state’s ability to establish and consolidate notions of national identity (O’Lear, 
2007).  Political legitimacy is a critical element for the North Caucasus, as the region has 
undergone several major structural changes in its ruling political regimes in the post-Yeltsin era, 
none of which have been democratically prompted by the local population.  How people view 
their provincial governments, federal district leaders, and ultimately federal authorities may have 
an effect on how they quantify the territorial aspects and extents of their identities, and to which 
scale of territory they associate legitimacy.   
Murphy (2008) says that we take territoriality seriously by looking at how and why 
particular territorial strategies are pursued, and how the results of these strategies may be 
affecting how said actions are understood.  In Russia, efforts at state territoriality have sought to 
produce an integrated geographical hierarchy of territories, which includes regional notions.  The 
identities that the state supports for its regions are linked to a greater conception of their place 
within the federal whole.  However, the eventual formation of territories and their associated 
identities represent a resolution between state-sponsored territoriality and localized identities.  
Therefore, we should see the map of Russia as the culmination of contested territorial strategies 
and actions that have been successful in their attempt to define territory, and impact how places 
and institutions are organized, and how people perceive their surrounding environments.  
Murphy (2008) notes that national identity and state identity play a role in territoriality, 
differentiating nationalist and non-nationalist forms of identity, where nationalist identity is 
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based on factors of language, ancestry, and peoplehood, and non-nationalist identity is based on 
economic, social, and political identity.  This distinction is important when looking at the 
promotion of civic Russian identity versus ethno-national identity. 
 
Identity and Place  
The concept of “sense of place” plays an important role in forming territorial 
consciousness and emotional connection to one’s contextualized surroundings.   Yi-Fu Tuan’s 
(1974) book Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes, and Values, deals with 
the various aspects of sense of place and how humans perceive and form opinions based on their 
interactions with places.  According to Tuan (1974), one’s surroundings can become the basis for 
emotional bonds, formed through an overlapping convergence of ascribed values, attitudes, and 
observations that people experience in their environments.   People are stimulated by basic 
interactions with their environments, where they gather perceptions which develop into to 
attitudes over time.  These attitudes then overlap, eventually developing into cultural stance and 
world view.   People rely on their sense of place when establishing opinions regarding where to 
(and where not to) conduct various activities when they have place-based choices. How people in 
the North Caucasus feel about their environment, the attitudes they hold about their place in the 
region and at other scales, and their opinions regarding qualitative elements and affect-related 
aspects of their region are critical for understanding what regional identity means in a cognitive 
sense.  Because people associate qualities with territories, and various elements that those 
territories come to stand for, they may draw upon these opinions when asked to answer spatial 
questions, or make territorial value judgments when classifying territory according to the 
variables in this study.   
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The idea of group attachment to territory is also vital to understanding regional identity.  
Knight’s (1982) work addresses some geographic elements of regionalism and nationalism in 
terms of how territory is regulated.  He argues that territory is delineated with boundaries 
according to scale, where boundaries range from localized territorial constructs, to regional, to 
the state level, and so on.  Rules exist within such boundaries that work to differentiate said 
territory from others, helping to distinguish places.  States, according to Knight (1982), are 
essentially bounded spaces with legal systems of government.  States constitute bounded 
containers for their contents, including people, resources, and means for communication.  States 
provide both a sense of security and opportunity for their citizens, which work to foster a sense 
of belonging.  However, Knight (1982) argues that this sense of belonging can differ as scale 
becomes more localized, and regions or certain groups of people become emphasized in the 
greater state context.  In Russia, territories at all jurisdictional scales exhibit their own distinctive 
rules to some extent, but republics have become more distinguished in terms of difference, due to 
their autonomous status in Russia’s federal structure.  Organization of territories within a federal 
district also presents a situation where Knight’s (1982) notion of emphasis on identity can be 
directly applied at the regional scale.  If differing amounts of autonomy means different relations 
between people and territories, then grouping different kinds of federal territories (Krays and 
Republics) together under unified meso-level governance (federal districts) presents potential 
discord among the citizens of these territories who are used to functioning with greater autonomy 
in regard to their distinct sets of laws and cultural norms.  A major challenge for regional 
identity-building in Russia is manifested in the necessary integration of distinctive territorial 
identities.      
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  Agnew (1987) associates the concept of “sense of place” with his notion of “subjective 
territorial identity,” or how one feels about an area.  Agnew argues that it is through subjective 
territorial identity that meaning and place are associated.  These associations are driven by 
emotion and experience, but also in response to the construction of the place in question.  
Therefore, before people can personally identify with a place, or said place can be used in the 
formation of group identity, it must be signified both geometrically, in terms of defined space, 
and through social action that associates space with meaning.  Agnew (1987) suggests that for a 
place to exhibit meaning, it needs to be clearly defined, thus answering the question of ‘where?’  
Agnew (1987) further suggests that within defined territories (locales), organized activities such 
as politics, work, and everyday life happen. Through these activities, associations to a place-
based context can be established.  Therefore, once a place has been contextualized both spatially 
and socially, emotional activities of those who experience meanings associated with said place 
work to affect their identities.  Issues of identity and place in the North Caucasus are thus 
affected by how people understand the region in terms of its spatial properties and locative 
qualities, its association with social activities that are contextually predicated on the region, and 
the subjective emotions of those who use the North Caucasus as context for their own lives.   
Relations among the many ethno-national groups in the North Caucasus, their constructs 
of territorial identity, as well as their potential to exist in cohesion are key pieces for identity-
building and regional integration.  Murphy’s (1989) work focuses on sub-state scale legal rights 
for ethnically defined (regional) populations, particularly in regard to identity and interaction.  
He notes that territorial policies in multi-ethnic states are mediated by four main factors: issues 
of intent, relative power, spatial distribution, and preexistent development of ethnic 
consciousness.  These issues are all heavily involved in Russian territoriality and regionalization, 
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as political leaders, elites, and various institutions work to achieve spatial goals.  Russia’s federal 
structure is full of inherent power relationships, and the balance of power between Moscow and 
the North Caucasus is a major relational factor.   
The role of ethnic Russians in the North Caucasus is a critical part of this research, and 
their role in the North Caucasus can be understood in terms of Rogers Brubaker’s (1995) work 
on “nationalizing states.”  Brubaker (1995) defines nationalizing states as acting like nation-
states, while at the same time exhibiting a great degree of ethnic heterogeneity.  In situations like 
Russia, Brubaker (1995) argues that elite individuals emphasize citizenship within the state, in 
this case civic Russianness, though the trappings of a “state-bearing nation,” ethnic Russians.  
Therefore, if national minorities do not have an active sense of self-awareness and organization, 
their participation in the state ultimately leads to their assimilation into the state-bearing nation.  
The ethnic Russian population in the North Caucasus, based on Brubaker’s (1995) notions of 
nationalizing states and state bearing nations, can be thought of keeping civic and vis-à-vis 
ethnic Russian society dominant among the various non-Russian groups of the region.  
Therefore, the departure of ethnic Russians from Stavropol Kray and the various North Caucasus 
republics could be indicative of resistance to the state-bearing nation, which could constitute 
challenges for Russia as a nationalizing state.   
Ansi Paasi’s work on territory, regionalization, and institutionalization is also important 
for this project.  Paasi (2003) cites the regionalization of political desires as the most crucial 
question for understanding regional differentiation.  These desires are sought out through 
institutions used in “region-building,” namely economy, governance, language, media, and 
literature.  He notes that how regions are institutionalized, and continually shaped through 
discourses, has a large part in determining how their regional identities are formed.  Thus, Paasi 
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(2003) suggests that the “identity of a region” exhibits features of nature, culture, and people that 
are manifested in discourses and definitions of nature, culture, activism, business, governance, 
and political and religious distinctions that define a region in contrast to other regions.  If people 
identify with practices, institutions, discourse, and symbols that represent “structures of 
expectations” that work to define a particular region, they exhibit what Paasi (2003) refers to as 
“regional consciousness.”  Therefore, in regions where the “identity of a region” and “regional 
consciousness” are congruent, these regions tend not to be at odds with the state.   
Paasi (2003) suggests a dialectics in regional identity between the action from the top 
down by factions of territorial governance, and actions from the bottom up through forms of 
territorial identification and resistance.  He argues that although regional identities are different 
from state-level identities, they do not necessarily have to run contrary to the will of the state.  
However, Passi (2003) notes that regional identities always have the potential to challenge 
hegemonic conceptions of state identity.  This dynamic is visible in the North Caucasus, where 
state-sponsored notions of Russian civic and appropriate regional identity are presented from the 
top down, and may be contested via local groups and individuals with identities that do not 
match hegemonic attributes.   
Paasi (2009) focuses on the meaning of regions in regard to contemporary globalization 
and global capitalism, acknowledging the literature on new regionalism and re-scaling in terms 
increased regional economic competition.  However, Passi (2009) notes that issues of regional 
identity are also important for examining regional agglomeration because identity constitutes a 
way to indicate social cohesiveness in a region.  Paasi (2009) argues that cohesiveness, founded 
in established regional identity, is important for mobilizing investment.  He then draws on 
Romanelli and Khessina’s (2005) concept of regional industrial identities, which suggests that 
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sets of social expectations emerge from commonly held beliefs of regional residents and external 
observes in regard to a region’s for particular kinds of economic and investment activities.  
Therefore, for the North Caucasus to be a successful tourism agglomeration, a tourism-based 
identity has to be established both from outside the region and among the local population.     
 Paasi (2009) also emphasizes that while new regionalism tends to treat regions as 
administrative units, it must also be understood in terms of functional units vis-à-vis institutions 
such as labor markets.  He argues that development or ‘region-building’ is more than an 
economic undertaking, necessarily encompassing politics, culture, and media.  According to 
Paasi (2009, p. 133), regions are “complicated constellations of agency, social relations and 
power.”  
Drawing on the work of the aforementioned scholars on identity and place is critical for 
researching how participants in this study understand idea of the “North Caucasus” as an identity 
marker, which is necessary for contextualizing “the region” among other potential elements of 
identity two which participants might associate.  As I have suggested, successful constructive 
regionalization depends on the state building and formalizing a strong sense of regional identity 
among target populations in a defined intra-state territorial context.  Theory on identity and 
place, as applied to participant data on the North Caucasus, will help to explain trends in identity 
markers in terms of their meaning in the contexts of territorial and social associations in Russia, 
and help to view the extent to which “the region” factors in to how people understand their place 





Discourse, Production of Knowledge, and Critical Geopolitics 
 In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Michel Foucault (1969) presents his view of the 
concept of discourse and how discourse is regulated, utilized, and altered in society.  For 
Foucault (1969), discourses are most simply understood as ways of speaking, which in order to 
be socially comprehensible, operate according to a series of socially defined regulations.  The 
main themes and ideas that come out of discourse come to constitute Foucault’s view of 
knowledge.  According to Foucault (1969), knowledge is accepted in society only when based in 
“true discourses.”  Therefore the idea of ‘truth’ is not constant but in a state of flux, being 
legitimized by social institutions.  Truth needs to be understood through its socio-historical 
context, to reflect the changing character of social institutions (Foucault, 1969).   Truth is 
interconnected with systems of power that produce it while at the same time shape it, resulting in 
a ‘regime of truth,’ or the sorts of discourse that are accepted and thus function as true (Foucault, 
1980).  Foucault (1969) provides educational systems as an institutional example in that they 
have the political capital to affect and disseminate discourse, along with knowledge and power 
associated with it.   
 Foucault (1980) suggests that state power networks relate in the form of a ‘meta-power,’ 
which is focused on exclusion.  One such form of exclusion is the power to represent data, which 
is produced via science and therefore a form of knowledge based in true discourse.  Foucault 
(1991) notes the association of ‘population as datum,’ as an ‘objective of governmental 
techniques,’ having implications on the government’s ability to project statistics as reality.  In 
Russia, the state has control of data collection, and ultimately the representation of those data.  
Therefore, the government, which is qualified by “science” and “true discourse,” has the power 
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to create facts concerning the populations as datum and present those facts as part of a body of 
state-produced knowledge, which is inherently exclusive.   
 Bruno Latour’s (1986) concept of “optical consistency” builds on the idea of state-
knowledge production.  Latour (1986) suggests that “visualizing devices,” such as maps, make 
observation possible because they present images of space and objects in perceived consistent 
relation to how they appear in reality.  According to Latour (1986, 8) through optical 
consistency: “Not only can you displace cities, landscapes, or natives and go back and forth and 
to and from them along avenues through space, but you can also reach saints, gods, heavens, 
palaces, or dreams with the same two-way avenues and look at them through the same 
‘windowpane’ on the same two-dimensional surface.”  As long as the ratio is believed to be true, 
those who create visual representations via optical consistency are able to present grand-scale 
meanings according two dimensional representations they construct.  Therefore, all state 
representations (namely maps) of the North Caucasus based on data exhibit and benefit from 
optical consistency to some degree.    
Murphy (1990) suggests that disputed territory, such as a region, must be understood as 
the product of relations between an area and the ideologies and social processes that give it 
meaning, shaping the organization and implementation of territorial goals.  He emphasizes the 
importance of language and discourse when examining how territories are contested, and argues 
that it fosters beliefs that ultimately lead to political action, suggesting that language constitutes 
the primary means of constructing reality (Murphy, 1990).  Because representation of the North 
Caucasus via language and discourse is heavily controlled by the state, primarily through 
Russia’s major Moscow-based broadcasting and journalism outlets, the North Caucasus reality 
that most of Russia receives is the reality that Moscow presents.  Print media, along with 
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television and radio broadcasts, can be edited for content, meaning that the particular themes can 
be applied to the North Caucasus in the form of selective broadcasts.  Visual aids, maps, and 
descriptions can also be framed in a manner that promotes a formalized sense of the region.  For 
example, maps of the region that highlight the North Caucasus Federal District could be used in 
place of maps that highlight only state borders, or the borders of Russia’s sub-federal territories, 
thus presenting the North Caucasus Federal District, a regional definition defined by the Russian 
state, as the “North Caucasus.”  Because such representations also broadcast in the North 
Caucasus, the relationship between regional identities, in terms of lived experience versus 
outside representation, constitutes a major factor for regional understanding. 
Theory on state-knowledge production is important for understanding regional discourse, 
and how territorial opinions are influenced by Moscow’s end of the center regional relationship.  
To better understand these issues theoretically, I draw on the work of Jouni Hakli (2001), who 
seeks to address interrelationships among governance, knowledge, and territory through his work 
on state production of knowledge.  Hakli (2001) argues that the production of knowledge in a 
society is a critical element in the exercise of territoriality, where instead of presenting ‘reality-
as-it-is,’ knowledge is utilized in the construction of social relations.  This knowledge, which 
ultimately comes to represent social space, is never objective; it is always representative of some 
point of view that foregrounds various social features while backgrounding others.  For Hakli 
(2001) modern states, which dominate spatial analysis due to their strong political role imagine 
themselves as territorial units through the organization of practices and defined sovereignty.  He 
argues that state territoriality has become hegemonic because it has established “unconscious” or 
“taken-for-granted spatiality.”  Social scientists have (perhaps also unconsciously) worked to 
reify state scale dominance through state-to-state comparative analysis.  Hakli (2001) also 
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suggests that state agencies have a monopoly on statistical and visual production of knowledge, 
or “visualizing devices” like maps and graphic representations of statistics, such as tables and 
charts.   
The production of regional knowledge by the Russian state resembles Hakli’s (2001) 
theory at the sub-state level.  For constructive regionalization to be effective in solving the state’s 
problems, regional knowledge must be produced, and ultimately become spatially unconscious.  
The Russian government’s monopoly on statistical and visual knowledge production, as well as 
major media and journalistic outlets, allows for the production of knowledge about the North 
Caucasus that does not have to account for reality-as-it-is but rather forms of social knowledge 
that work to further the objectives of the state.  Through the implementation of federal districts, 
the state has created a firmly defined regional unit of analysis, which when used for the purpose 
of scientific comparison via state-monopolized knowledge production, works to reify federal 
districts (regions) and thus advance a regionalized form of Russian territoriality.  A high 
propensity of the population to ascribe to state-defined regional parameters should indicate 
successful state production of knowledge and effective dissemination via visual representation.   
Ó Tuathail’s (1996; 2003; 2006) work on critical geopolitics is important for linking 
states with knowledge production, strategy, and identity, and for uncovering agendas and 
interests through organizing a critical version of geopolitics.  Ó Tuathail (2003) suggests formal, 
practical and popular geopolitics are three sets of discourses that can reveal a state’s identity, role 
and agenda.  According to Ó Tuathail (2003), formal geopolitics consists of work by intellectuals 
and strategists, manifested though political doctrine, government reports, and strategic studies.  
He argues that practical geopolitics is delivered through official state action, legal frameworks, 
diplomacy, and political speeches.  He classifies popular geopolitics as discourses communicated 
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through mass media, public opinion and state ritual.  These discourses are ways of presenting 
geography through culture and politics, which work to establish project new versions of truth (Ó 
Tuathail, 2006).  These versions of truth are not objective but likened to the agendas of the 
intellectuals, organizations, politicians, or other actors that work to produce them (Ó Tuathail, 
2006).   
Through his work on the concept of “internal orientalism,” David Jansson (2010) 
suggests that regions can come to be understood as binaries of imagined spaces, which he 
demonstrates by presenting internal orientalism as it pertains to the example of the American 
South.  According to Jansson (2010), people living in spaces that become defined via internal 
orientalism may develop identities based on resistance, resulting in the discursive affirmation of 
ideas that present such spaces as substantively different.  In Jansson’s (2010) example, both 
constructs of “America” and the “South” are labeled as white spaces through racializing 
discourses.  By virtue of theses discourses’ thematic focus on racism and segregation, whites 
living in the South are faced with the choice of whether to accept or reject southern identity. 
Although someone’s individual conception of identity certainly does not fully match the 
discursive definitions constructed by internal orientalism, individuals can be associated with the 
binary by virtue of perceived group belonging or membership vis-à-vis social identification and 
behavior.  Although some work to promote alternative identities in internally orientalized space 
(Jansson 2010), rejecting Southern identity may have social consequences in localized Southern 
contexts, accepting it can mean admitting to social complacency by association with its 
discursively defined characteristics.   
Jansson’s (2010) example of internal orientalism in the United States is useful for 
understanding the relationship between “Russia” and the “North Caucasus.”  Just as “America” 
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and the “South” are racialized as white spaces according to Jansson (2010), the “Russian 
Federation” and the “North Caucasus” are both nationalized as “Russian” spaces.  Ethno-national 
politics in Russia, although differing in many respects from racism and segregation in the United 
States, has resulted in a similar binary understanding of the federal population that oversimplifies 
Russia’s citizens into Russkiye (ethnic Russians) and ne Russkiye (non-Russians).  Ethnic 
Russians living in the North Caucasus face similar issues of identity to those experienced by 
white Southerners in America.  Through discourses of internal orientalism, the North Caucasus 
has received connotations of being wild, uncivilized, and inherently different than Greater 
Russia.  Based on the region’s history of colonialism and contested relations between non-
Russians and the Russian state, elements of North Caucasus identity are in some part founded on 
resistance.  Ethnic Russians living in the North Caucasus could identify with their ethno-national 
identity, which brings with it connotations of domination and imperialism.  They could also 
identify with the North Caucasus, which suggests connotations of difference in regard to the 
Russian state.  Thus, ethnic Russians may choose not to associate themselves with the North 
Caucasus.  Such an attitude could encourage them to look outside of the region when making 
employment, educational, or residential choices.  The resulting flows of ethnic Russians out of 
the North Caucasus, along with their perceived connections to greater ideas of Russian culture 
and identity, constitute a challenge in terms of constructive regionalization.   
While many aspects of discursive regionalization rely on internal orientalism to some 
degree, presenting the North Caucasus as a buffer zone for example, keeping ethnic Russians in 
the region is also important.  The presence of ethnic Russians in the region demonstrates 
cohesion between the North Caucasus and the rest of Russia and provides justification for 
Moscow to take action in the region on behalf of the perceived well-being of ethnic Russians.  
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Therefore, how discourses of internal orientalism are affecting the regional identity constructions 
of ethnic Russians in the North Caucasus has the potential to work against efforts to create a 
cohesive North Caucasus identity, especially if such an identity requires that regional 
understandings actively emphasize an integrated role within the Russian Federation.       
Tilo Felgenhauer’s (2010) work on regional identity in Germany highlights how 
processes of symbolic regionalization, the use of performed social language, and discursive 
construction, can be used to create and define a region.  Felgenhauer (2010) suggests a linguistic 
and material contingency among space, place, and regional identity, as well as the need for 
‘reflexive’ understanding of the construction of regions in public discourse.  He states that 
discourses on symbolic regionalism are usually reliant on geographic determinism to connect 
multiple notions of meaning with a particular limited region.  These discourses come to stipulate 
implicit preconditions and myths regarding historic regional character and present sets of social 
practices as naturalized elements that are observable within defined regional boundaries.  
Felgenhauer (2010) presents territory as a key element to regionalization because regularly 
occurring reference to territorial units turns a region’s existence and social importance into a 
“fact.”  Through discursive reference to territory, people infer meaning from a region’s name, 
and according to Felgenhauer (2010), it is at this moment when “celebration” becomes “routine,” 
when the region is reified.  Regions are the most reified when the name of the region sparks a 
specific meaning rather than contested arguments about what defines it (Felgenhauer, 2010).    
Though his work on Finish regionalization, Joni Vainikka (2012) focuses on regions as 
both processes and discourse, but also as “brands” that various stakeholders use in marketing.  
Vainikka (2012) states that regions are promoted via discourses, governmental bodies, planning 
organizations, and media.  These organizations draw on supposed collective regional identities, 
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which are constituted in former and contemporary cultural practice and social discourse.  
According to Vainikka (2012) everyday conceptions of regional identity, within the regions 
themselves, may not reflect discourses promoted from above.  Therefore, there is inherent 
inconsistency between the spatial ‘imaginaries’ of everyday life and conceptions of regional 
identity that are institutionally produced.  Residents of the North Caucasus do not necessarily 
live their lives with tourism and terrorism at the heart of their identity constructions.  However, 
these are important elements of regional identity promoted by Moscow via discourse, so as to be 
seen by the rest of Russia and the outside world.  This idea lends itself to the fact certain 
discourses, such as those on ethnic-conflict, security, and economic development, as projected 
for the benefit of certain social agendas, might not overpower one’s experience in everyday life.  
 
Cognitive Maps and Spatial Cognition  
 
Due the fact that my research methodology utilizes cognitive mapping to explore group 
preceptions of territorial identity, I feel that it is important to consider the theory behind this 
subject.  Perhaps one of the most important works on the concept of cognitive mapping and 
spatial cognition is The Image of a City by Lynch (1960), which deals with people’s individual 
understandings of spatial awareness and utility in urban contexts.  Lynch (1960) argues that 
mental maps (cognitive maps) constitute one’s primary means of navigation and spatial decision 
making.  In The Image of a City, Lynch (1960) presents five important components for a 
cognitive map: paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks, all of which, when understood 
collaboratively, provide an individual with the spatial awareness to conduct his or her behavior 
within a given environment.  When viewing the cognitive maps produced in this study, it is 
important to consider the impact that these components have on participants’ spatial awareness.    
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Because I am interested in participants’ precieved knowledge, as well as how said 
knowledge is presented spatially, it is necessary to understand how preceptions are formed, and 
how they translate into spatial descision making.  As Gould (1966) suggests, mental maps refer 
to images based on perceptions, which may be formulated with by individuals or by groups.  In 
regard to the theoretical basis and importance of these images, Downs and Stea (1973) argue that 
cognitive maps are critical for understanding spatial behavior and decisions making because they 
constitute both the extent, and also the limits of one’s spatial awareness.  Therefore, the world is 
understood in terms of one’s ability to cope with his or her individual set of knowledge, which 
itself may be put under various constraints.  Decisions, attitudes, and behaviors are made within 
a limited spatial context, which may or may not reflect a reality recognized in the same way by 
others.  In this study, I am interested in comparing local nuances among several socio-cultural 
groups in the North Caucasus, which may suggest whether or not these groups view their spatial 
contexts differently.   
The links among cognitive maps, spatial awareness, and decision making are expounded 
upon by Gould and White (1974), who argue that members of a group will express a shared 
spatial viewpoint, based on the degree to which the individuals in the group agree on their 
various interpretations of reality.  Therefore, collaborative assessments of group-based mental 
maps present a glimpse into the shared spatial conciseness of the group’s members, which can be 
impacted by a variety of factors, such as aesthetic components, climactic elements, and time 
spent within a given environment (Gould and White, 1974).  In the context of this study, I 
examine spatial concisensess of the practice of national traditions, langauge, religion and the 
extents of the North Caucasus region.   
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Realizing that lived expierence matters in forming one’s cognitive map, it is important to 
consider the length of time participants have spent in the region.  According to Gould and White 
(1974), the more time individuals and groups have spent in a given environment, the more acute 
their level of awareness becomes, thus leading to the idea of “cultural comfort zones.”  
Identifying where a groups views its particular cultural comfort zone, provides insight into where 
its members may feel more at ease in terms of conducting behavior and engaging within their 
social environments. 
While lived expierence is important for spatial cognition, external stimuli also have an 
impact on one’s particular mental map.  Pocock (1976) argues that a cognitive map is a mental 
image of an environment held by an individual, or group of people, which constitutes a store of 
spatial information that a person or group can recall in order to illustrate a particular place. 
According to Pocock (1976), these illustrations are based on information that is gathered through 
personal experience with one’s environment, or via external contextual stimuli.  Stimuli could 
include contextual information that presents space in an organized fashion, such as maps and 
globes, or stimuli could consist of cultural stimuli that peg qualities to places, ranging from 
cultural stereotypes to notable features in the landscape.  Therefore, a mental map is essentially a 
product of one’s ability to visualize space through perception, and then retain and ultimately 
recall this information (Pocock, 1976).   
How one acquires the information needed to construct a cognitive map is extremely 
important, as his or her spatial perceptions are likely to be affected differently by stimuli from 
lived experience as opposed to external stimuli, such as second hand information.  Raitz and 
Ulack (1981) take such issues into consideration, arguing that environments are often assigned 
various characteristic by both insiders and outsiders. Themes of spatial identity can therefore be 
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tested by comparing how and whether or not a group’s members recognize and value spatial 
elements in a consistent fashion (Raitz and Ulack, 1981). 
Tversky (1993) presents a view of cognitive maps where they are useful for studying 
course spatial relations and conceptions of environmental knowledge, but argues that cognitive 
maps offer quite restrictive representations due to fact that human minds are inherently prone to 
error in memory and judgment when recalling the characteristics of their various environments.  
I believe this reading on the concept of mental maps and their limitations is valid, and therefore 
supports the use of contextual templates for group cognitive mapping exercises.  Templates, 
which could be borders or boundaries, provide a constant frame of reference for a research 
participant in a study group.  Placing spatial limits on participants, while perhaps constraining 
their geographic imaginations, ensures that a basic spatial realm is established for the point of 
comparison.   
Finally, Kitchin (1994) argues that cognitive maps are often an appropriate research tool 
for addressing “what” and “why” questions, especially in the areas of spatial behavior, spatial 
choice and decision making, wayfinding, orientation and attitudes and perspectives.  According 
to Kitchin (1994), cognitive maps are a means to gain insight into how people create and cope 
with imaginary worlds.  Thus, the ability to utilize cognitive maps as a means to gain insight into 
a person’s opinion may indicate how he or she is likely to perceive space, hold spatial attitudes, 








Chapter III: Regional Backround and Stavropol's Role in Russia's Historical Geography 
 
 
 Conquest and control of North Caucasus has played a role in the geopolitical aspirations 
of Russia almost from its beginning, as the early Tsars recognized it as the meeting point of 
Tatar, Byzantine, Persian and Ottoman influence, while also treating it as a border between 
Orthodoxy Christianity and Islam (Ware, 1998). However, the Russian Empire needed several 
centuries to claim the steppes and mountains to its south. Prior to Russian expansion into the 
region, the Caucasus’s lower foothills and steppes were populated primarily semi-nomadic 
groups with excellent cavalry skills, like the Kalmyks and Nogays; the mountains were inhabited 
by a variety of diverse cultural groups with an abundance of unique languages and local political 
associations, many of whom had militaristic capacity and wanted no part of Russian subjugation 
(Khodarkovsky, 2002). This combination of harsh landscape and political resistance meant that 
conquering the Caucasus would require a serious organized military effort by the Russian 
Imperial Army, which was facilitated to conduct the Russo-Turkish War in the late 1700s.  
 With large numbers of Russian troops already in the South, and the perceived geopolitical 
need to fortify newly established borders after the Russo-Turkish war, Russia established a series 
of forts known as the Azov-Mozdok defense line. This network of fortresses stretched from 
modern day Rostov-on-Don to the Terek River. The city of Stavropol first appeared as one of 
these fortifications, and became an integral part of this military system, and both Stavropol’s 
location and purpose would become significant for its geopolitical future. From its very 
beginning, the city was built on the edge of the Russian Empire, constituting part of the last 
defense from outside others, notably non-Slavs and for the most part not Christians. Stavropol 
and the rest of the Azov-Mozdok line would take on the dual role of defense of Russian lands, 
and act as a launching point for offensive tactics, whether cultural, religious economic or military 
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related (Khodarkovsky, 2011). Thus, in many ways, Stavropol is a city designed to facilitate 
Russian identity, existing very much at the limits of what could be considered Russia in the 18th 
century.  
 The city of Stavropol soon expanded out from the fortress to accommodate the needs of 
the military personnel stationed there. It grew quickly and soon gained the distinction as the 
“Gateway to the Caucasus,” a mantra that is still celebrated there today (Gaazov and Lets, 2006).  
Stavropol is cited by many scholars as an outpost for the dissemination of Russian economy and 
culture, which included the founding of the Stavropol Metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox 
Church (Krasnov, 1957; Khodarkovsky, 2011; Panin, 2003). The first Slavs to populate the area 
were Cossacks, originally from the Volga and Don Regions, who were relocated to the Caucasus 
serve as garrisons, but also to populate the area with a Slavic and Orthodox Christian population 
(Khodarkovsky, 2011). The Cossacks also served to protect the construction of Stavropol from 
around the fortress. Today, many people in Stavropol are still aware of their connections to these 
first Russian settlers, and local authorities are not opposed to reminding Stavropol’s population 
of this link, as evidenced by the Cossack museum maintained by the city today. 
 Stavropol’s importance as a border town meant that it served as a node in many networks 
during Russia’s late imperial period. In addition to providing a military staging ground, many 
have argued that it constituted the most important center of trade and commerce for circulating 
goods and revenues between Russia and the many peoples of the Caucasus (Krasnov, 1957) 
(Gaazov and Lets, 2006). The city would go on to become part of the Great Cherkessk Road, 
which connected the region to Moscow and ultimately St. Petersburg via the Volga.   
Stavropol continued to play an important role in the development of the Caucasus 
throughout the 19th Century, and was the first to receive many Russian cultural and economic 
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institutions in the region, including the region's first printing factory in 1816, the first institution 
of higher education in 1837, the first theater in 1845, a women’s college in 1849, and the 
region’s first library in 1852 (Gaazov and Lets, 2006). While much work was done to develop 
Stavropol's importance as a center of culture and development at it this time, it continued to 
serve as a very clear place of Russian imperial authority, and while some focus may have been 
on placed on cultural assimilation, and such assimilation had to take the form of inclusion into 
greater Russian identity (Foxall, 2013).  Ethnic Russians were favored in Stavropol throughout 
its early history, in terms of both material wealth and social mobility.  For example, they tended 
to acquire better places to live and the best farmland and were very much understood to be 
occupiers, both in Stavropol and throughout the North Caucasus region (Richmond, 2008).  
 Imperial era policies of identity and ethno-national awareness were focused on 
Russification, or becoming Russian, the basic idea being that anyone may become Russian, at 
least culturally, through ascribing Russian cultural markers, such as Russian language, practice 
of Orthodox Christianity, participation in the state's education system, and by interaction with 
Russian print media and literature.  Non-Russian groups were defined and officially recognized 
based on categories of otherness, such as language, territory and religion, a process that came to 
be known as ethnification, common in many European colonial contexts (Funch, 1998). At the 
same time such policies worked to promote an ethnic understanding and consciousness among 
non-Russian groups, emphasizing that they were not Russian, and should work to become 
Russian, in the colonial context (Olivier, 1990). Since Stavropol's imperial role was to facilitate 
Russian expansion, such policies worked directly to affect its early demographics, administration 
and development. Therefore, its reputation as “Gateway to the Caucasus” can refer not only to is 
physical location, but as a transition zone between Russian and non-Russian peoples.  
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The Soviet Period and Its Ethno-Territorial Legacy 
 
 Ideas of ethno-national territory and identity in the North Caucasus were used by the 
Bolsheviks and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from the very beginning as one of the 
Bolsheviks' first strategies to gain non-Russians' allegiance was to seize land from Slavs, who 
were presumably loyal to the Tsar, and redistribute them to win support from indigenous peoples 
(Richmond, 2008).  This trend developed into practices of ethnification (korenizatiia) and other 
Soviet nationalities policies (see Kaiser, 1994). Various attempts at nation building and ethno-
territorial governmental policies would be used by the Soviets from Stalin to Gorbachev, all 
aimed at answering the elusive “National Question,” or how to create a Soviet national identity 
to replace hundreds of ethno-national identities that had been established, fostered, and promoted 
throughout the Soviet period (Wixman, 1980). In terms of the overall legacy of Soviet 
territoriality, the work of several scholars points especially to importance of the Soviet federal 
structure and administrative policies in emphasizing and even creating exclusive identities 
situated in politically promoted national territories (Roeder, 1991; Suny, 1993; Kaiser, 1994; 
Brubaker, 1996).   
 Soviet territorial divisions in the North Caucasus, based on ethno-national lines of 
differentiation, went along with the ideology of “state-sponsored evolutionism,” meaning that the 
state could show all of its different populations how to follow a Marxist-Leninist path to 
development, going from pre-national to national and all the way to communism, despite the fact 
that different groups began their assent at very different levels of development (Hirsch, 2005).  
Lenin himself was aware of the benefits and utility of ethno-national politics and organization 
and wrote on the subject, describing nations had four major characteristics, territorial 
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concentration, economic ties, a common language and a common cultural and psychological 
character (Lenin, 1962).   
Lenin's ideas were furthered by Stalin's view of the national question, which combined 
ethnicity, territory and political administration, ultimately encouraging ethnic identity through 
cultural development policies, ethno-territorial organization, and through ethnic identification via 
an internal passport system which officially documented the nationality of each Soviet citizen 
(Ware, 1998).  However, borders in the Stalin regime often did not accurately correspond with 
actual ethnic, linguistic, or cultural divisions (Kolossov, 1999).  Thus, emphasis on territorial 
ideas would become one of the major markers of identity, critical for understanding one's place 
in the Soviet Union and a path for navigating post-Soviet ethno-national aftermath. 
 All territories in the Soviet Union could in some way be understood in ethnic terms, 
being allocated to some type of titular nationality, a group that officially belonged there and 
often exhibited certain rights not afforded to members of other ethno-national groups.  There was 
also a firm hierarchy among different kinds of Soviet territories.  Therefore, hierarchical 
territorial identities have their roots partly in the fact that many kinds of autonomous territories 
existed in Soviet space, including smaller ethno-national territorial units or simply loosely 
designated ethno-national areas (Kolossov, 1999).  The Soviets used a complex hierarchy of 
territorial units founded on ethnicity, all with varying degrees of autonomy, the least autonomous 
being national Okrugs, the most autonomous being Union Republics. Each of these territories 
was supposed to reflect an historical state of national development, but also facilitate the 
territories' roles in the geographic, economic and cultural make-up of the greater Soviet state 
(O'Loughlin et al. 2007).  One's identification with a particular ethnic or political territory is 
inherently hierarchical because people have many scales of territory to which they can ascribe 
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meaning, such as to a state, region, area or locality, and in recent times supranational identities 
are also coming into play (Kolossov et al. 2003). 
 While non-Russian groups who were deemed worthy of territorial recognition were well 
organized into official hierarchical units, concepts of Russian ethnic territory were a bit more 
ambiguous.  The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, whose official capital was 
Moscow, was supposed to represent the Russian homeland, but this territory was itself broken 
and divided among many different groups possessing varying degrees of autonomy at various 
scales.  This situation resulted in Russians as the default hegemonic nation in the Soviet Union, 
leading to the idea that Russians could essentially be considered titular everywhere, ultimately 
resulting in Russian vis-à-vis Soviet control. As Szporluk (1994, p. 6) argues: 
After the revolution and civil war, a 'Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic' 
did exist within the larger structure of the Soviet Union, but it was not taken 
seriously, by Russians or non-Russians, as the Russian nation-state or the national 
homeland of the Russian people.  In the prevailing view of the Russians, the whole 
of the USSR was the real Russia. The architects of the USSR did not treat the 
republics as real or potential nation-states.  Moscow delineated their borders 
deliberately so as to make the republics incapable of independent existence. By 
putting together different peoples within one political entity, the party created the 
conditions under which its 'leading role' would be necessary for the operation of the 
complex system of 'autonomous' districts and regions and 'republics' within 
'republics.' This ethnic mixing within ethnically designated territorial units could 
work only if the Communist Party remained in control.  
 
Examples of such ethnic combination include the bi-ethnic titular republics, created via 
razhmezhevaniya, mixing in ethnic demarcation, exemplified in areas like Karachay-Cherkessia 
and Kabardino-Balkaria that border Stavropol Kray to the south.  
 As a Kray, Stavropol constituted a large, majority Russian territory that was planned to 
be economically self-sufficient, laid out by Soviet central planners via Gosplan (Hirsch, 2005). 
While much of Stavropol's utility to the Soviets came in the form of its agricultural productivity, 
it retained a bit of its Great Russian colonial legacy as it was placed in administrative control of 
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the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast from 1957 until the end of the Soviet period.  Also 
within Stavropol's jurisdiction were several other ethno-hierarchical constructions, such as the 
village of Tatarka, named for its predominately Tatar population, and Turkmenskij Raion, named 
for its Turkmen population.  Stavropol's proximity to other territories, a situation set up by Soviet 
territorial policy, would come to have a major impact on its role in post-Soviet geopolitical 
discourse.  
 
Contemporary Issues: Demographics and Socio-Cultural groups  
Stavropol Kray is a territory understood to be predominantly ethnically Russian, 
according to its status as a Kray within the territorial hierarchy of the Russian Federation. As a 
Kray, Stavropol is under Moscow's direct authority, and therefore does not officially recognize 
languages other than Russian, or any governmental constitutions besides the Federal 
Constitution.3  Although the population of Stavropol Kray has an overwhelmingly ethnic Russian 
majority, many minority groups are well represented in terms of overall numbers, and many 
more reside in ethnic pockets and villages clustered throughout the area.  According to the 2010 
all-Russian census, Stavropol Kray's population was 2,786,281 with ethnic Russian's comprising 
80.9 percent, with some other notable groups with foremost representation being  Armenians (5.8 
percent), Dargins (1.8 percent), and Nogay (0.8 percent), data from all of which was collected for 
this project. These groups all have established histories in Stavropol and the North Caucasus, but 
enjoy different kinds of statues and ethno-territorial recognition in the region. While ethnic 
Russians and their history and effects on the region will be discussed in detail throughout this 
chapter, some additional information regarding Armenians, Dargins and Nogays is useful in 
                                                          
3 Constitution of the Russian Federation  
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understanding some of Stavropol's minority group identity constructions and notions of territorial 
identity.      
The Armenian diaspora is one of the oldest established in Southern Russia, beginning to 
form in earnest during the 1790s with the formation of Armenian villages and districts 
throughout the region, where they tended to become rather wealthy through filling various 
competitive economic niches (Markedonov, 2009).  Armenians have an established reputation of 
trade in Russia, and were encouraged to settle in the North Caucasus region by Tsar Alexander I. 
Stavropol's contemporary Armenian populations have increased for the most part due to in 
migration from Azerbaijan following violence in Sumqayit and Baku, and conflict in Nogorno-
Karabakh, and from Armenia after an earthquake in 1988 (Rowland, 2007).  Cities like Stavropol 
were a good destination for Armenian migrants due to the well-developed communities and 
Armenian cultural presence already established there (Belozerov et al. 1998). Today, there are 
161,324 Armenians in Stavropol Kray, according to the 2010 census.  
 Armenians are a unique minority ethno-national group in the North Caucasus because 
they do constitute a true Diaspora, as Armenia exists as an independent nation-state, outside the 
official jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.  Armenians are also unique compared to other 
non-Russian ethno-national groups in the North Caucasus because the majority of them practice 
some form of Eastern Christianity, whether Russian Orthodox or as members of the Armenian 
Apostolic Church.  Common religious traditions constitute a potential common marker of 
identity among Armenians and Stavropol's majority Slavic population.  Although they share 
Christian beliefs and some traditions with Russians, Armenians in the North Caucasus have not 
been immune to discrimination and even violence targeted against non-Russians.  Cossack 
organizations, and other Russian Nationalist groups, have called for the removal of Armenians 
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from the area and have exercised violence against Armenian populations in neighboring 
Krasnodar Kray on several occasions (Osipov and Cherepova, 1996; Kritskii and Savva, 1998). 
Despite this negative influence, Armenian culture constitutes one of the most vibrant and visible 
non-Russian ethno-national cultures present in Stavropol and its surrounding areas today. 
Armenians have also historically tended to be both aware and proud of their ethno-national 
culture, more so than many other ethno-national groups in the Stavropol region, while at the 
same time they are among the most willing to socialize and build friendships with members of 
other groups (Kolossov and O'Loughlin, 2009).  
 Dargins are an ethno-national group that has received much attention in Stavropol as of 
late, due to the group's tendency to choose portions of Eastern Stavropol Kray as a migration 
destination, and strained ethnic relations between Dargins and several other groups.  Dargins, 
who have been traditionally identified as mountain people, living primarily in Dagestan for 
several hundred years, are rather integrated in the market economy, more so than some other 
ethno-national groups in Dagestan, and tend to possess capital and mobility (Eldarov et al. 2007). 
O'Loughlin et al. (2007) note that Dargins have demonstrated a strong propensity to migrate to 
the Stavropol region.  The Dargin population in Stavropol Kray doubled between 1979 and 1997, 
and it has continued to grow due to the fact that Stavropol Kray's close proximity to Dagestan, 
along with its relatively stable socio-economic conditions, make it overwhelmingly the most 
preferred destination for Dagestani migrants (Eldarov et al. 2007).  According to the 2010 All 
Russian census, there were 49,302 Dargins officially living in Stavropol Kray, compared to 
490,384 listed in Dagestan.  
 Work by Holland and O'Loughlin (2010) found that Dagestanis in general tend to have a 
stronger identification with their ethno-national groups than that exhibited by other groups in the 
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wider North Caucasus region.  In addition, previous studies on ethno-national socio-territorial 
dynamics and ethnic relations have indicated that Dargins are among the least likely of any of the 
ethno-national groups in the North Caucasus to associate with members of other groups, and that 
sentiment among Dargins to have their own autonomous territory is strong (Kolossov and 
O'Loughlin 2009).  The fact that Dargins are culturally and economically aware and expressive 
of their ethno-national identity has been a point of contention among ethnic Russian populations 
in eastern Stavropol Kray, as their increasing influx into this area has sought to strengthen ties, 
influence, and interests of Dargin groups in Daegstan into Stavropol (Ioffe et al. 2014).  
 The Nogays are a Turkic group that has historically inhabited the Russian Steppe, 
consisting of contemporary Stavropol Kray and its surrounding territories. Nogays can date their 
national roots back to around 1400 and are believed to be descended from the Golden Horde, 
thus reflecting a great history of horsemanship and semi-pastoralist or nomadic cultural that is 
celebrated in contemporary Nogay identity (these elements are displayed prominently at the 
Nogay National museum in Karachay-Cherkessia).  Islam is the majority religion among 
Nogays, as tends to be the case regarding Turkic peoples. Nogays number 22,006 in Stavropol 
Kray, with another 15,654 in Karachay-Cherkessia and 40,407 in Dagestan, according to the 
2010 census.  
 Because Nogays' 'ethnic' territory consists of parts of Dagestan, Stavropol Kray, 
Karachay-Cherkessia and Astrakhan Oblast, and there have been calls from Nogay nationalist 
leaders to unify this territory under a central Nogay-based authority (Anchabadze, 1993). Such 
desires can be observed with the formation of a political movement called "Unity" (Birlik) that 
advocated for territorial autonomy for Nogays from Stavropol Kray and Karachay-Cherkessia. 
Calls for division of Nogays from Dagestan have also come about, as they form the majority 
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population in Dagestan's most northeastern areas, which border areas with established Nogay 
populations in eastern Stavropol Kray (Holland and O'Loughlin, 2010).  Many territorial 
discontents among Nogays stem from the fact that their lack of titular status in any of Russia's 
Krays or republics has meant that they have suffered environmental discrimination, as 
exemplified by the location of a water treatment plant located among majority Nogay population 
in Karachay-Cherkessia (Richmond, 2008).  Conflicts between Nogays and Dargins in eastern 
Stavropol Kray and in western Dagestan have also been noted recently (Foxall, 2012).  
 In regard to Russia as a whole, scholars who study demographic trends and patterns have 
tended to focus on population decline (Heleniak, 2006 and Kohler and Kohler, 2002). However, 
population dynamics in Stavropol and the rest of the North Caucasus region have trended to 
exhibit overall growth. The City of Stavropol's official population is 355,066, according to the 
2010 Russian census and the city is growing.  The 2002 census reported the city's population at 
354,867 and the 1989 census at 318,298.  While the number of people living in Stavropol is 
increasing, overall gains in total population have not reflected even growth dynamics among its 
various ethno-national groups.  Current trends indicate that ethnic Russians, who typically 
exhibit a low rate of natural increase, are actually migrating out of the area, while non-Russian 
populations, which tend to have higher rates of natural increase, are migrating into Stavropol 
Kray from the republics located directly to its south.   
 The ethnic Russian population in the North Caucasus Republics began to decline in the 
1960s, as ethnic Russians migrated to Stavropol and Rostov-on-Don, a trend that picked up 
quickly after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Belozorov, 2000).  Unlike Stavropol Kray, the 
various republics of the North Caucasus (Karachay-Cherkessia, Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria, 
Dagestan, etc.) operate with autonomous status from Moscow.  These territories are majority 
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non-Russian, have separate constitutes in addition to the Russia’s Federal Constitution, and have 
official languages besides Russian.  However, these territories also tend to be economically 
disadvantaged.  Therefore, Stavropol is an attractive destination for migrants from the republics 
because of its good climatic and environmental conditions. Some have argued that Stavropol has 
begun to play a “gathering role” for the diverse population of the North Caucasus and constitutes 
a “closed migration region” given that migrants are coming to Stavropol Kray primarily from the 
republics and not from other regions of Russia (Mkrtchian, 1997).  While this trend has made 
Stavropol Kray more ethnically diverse, the opposite is happening in the North Caucasus 
republics.  As Belezerov (2005) has demonstrated, as Russians leave the North Caucasus, ethnic 
populations in the republics tend to become increasingly homogenous, even when multiple non-
Russian nationalities occupy the same territories.  
 While many people have chosen to come to Stavropol, not all such decisions are made 
voluntarily, as Stavropol has been a destination for migrants forced from their homes due to 
violence.  In 2000, Stavropol's governor claimed that there were upwards of 500,000 forced 
migrants in the region (Riazantsev, 2003).  The villages to the north of Stavropol also received 
some refugees from North Ossetia, after the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008. 
Documentation of these and other migrants has been poor at times, resulting in the tendency for 
Stavropol locals to quote their city's population at half a million as its abundance of people, and 
migrants especially, obviously reflects a number much higher than the census's stated 355,066. 
Large numbers of undocumented people and refugees, many of whom are unable to work, is 
potentially worrisome for Stavropol's economic potential.  While the North Caucasus has 
traditionally been considered an area with a labor surplus, a study by Rizantsev (2003) argues 
that projected population dynamics could threaten the region's economic security because the 
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amount of children has decreased, and death rates among able bodied individuals has increased. 
Additionally, an increase in migrants generally means an increase in unemployment for 
Stavropol Kray, to the tune of 0.2 percent for a 1 percent increase in the number of migrants 
received (Riazantsev, 2003).  While such predictions are surely a source of pessimism for some, 
inequality among Russia's regions has served as a pull factor for younger people, especially 
ethnic Russians, toward presumably brighter futures in Moscow (Ioffe and Zayonchkovskaya, 
2010). 
 With the overall number of Russians in the North Caucasus declining, O'Loughlin et al. 
(2007) describe current trends as the 'de-Russificiation' of the North Caucasus, citing its 
beginning in the late Soviet period. According to the 2010 census, Russians constituted 80.9 
percent of Stavropol Kray's population, but numbers from the late Soviet period reflect Russian 
outflow, as from 1979 to 1989, the Russian population of Stavropol Kray decreased from 87.8 to 
84 percent. The city's population, 91.5 percent of which was comprised of ethnic Russians in 
1979, is now 88.7 percent Russian, as indicated by the 2010 census.  The only significant in 
migration of Slavs into Stavropol has come via Russians migrating out of the Republics, but 
when faced with a choice to migrate, many Russians see leaving the region in general as a 
preferable decision, thus choosing to relocate to the larger cities in Central Russia, Moscow in 
particular (Belozerov, 2000; Ianchenkov, 2000).   
 
Russia's Post-Soviet Ethno-Federalism 
Russia essentially retained the ethno-federal system from the Soviets, thus its provincial 
subjects are territories are under the authority of the federal center, and are delineated based on 
the allocation of territory to particular ethno-national groups.  As was the case with the Soviets, 
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certain types of territory are afforded varying degrees of autonomy from the federal center, 
according to their territorial statuses.  Nearly one-third of Russia's federal territories are 
ethnically defined, having some type of advanced autonomous status or recognition.  
 There are six types of federal territories (provincial scale) in contemporary Russia: 
oblasts, krays, federal cities, republics (autonomous republics), autonomous okrugs and 
autonomous oblasts. Oblasts, krays, and federal cities tend to be majority ethnic Russian and are 
granted the least amount of autonomy.  Stavropol Kray remains a majority Russian and fall under 
Moscow’s direct authority.  However, the republics that border Stavropol Kray are majority non-
Russian populated territories, locally administered with some special freedoms not granted to 
oblasts, krays, and federal cities.  According Russia’s constitution, the local populations of these 
territories are allowed official languages other than Russian, the establishment of their own legal 
codes, separate constitutions, and named ethno-national (titular) recognition and status.4  
However, it is important to note that, although republics have special ethno-national status, they 
are not homogenous.  
  The changing policy on issues of nationality in Russia, along with the associated 
territorial implications connected to national territory, population dynamics, and administration, 
have been an important topics for geographers focusing on Russia since its independence (see 
Kaiser, 1994), and policy and discourse on nationalities has proven important for state-craft, 
identity-building, and authority, all of which have direct effects on the geographies of the 
Russian Federation and on the North Caucasus especially.  In each historical version of Russian 
nationalities policy, an important geopolitical theme becomes evident: contextualized identity 
building and territorial divisions in accordance with the state’s goals for stability and 
                                                          
4 Article 63 of the constitution of the Russian Federation 
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governance.  In each case, Stavropol and the North Caucasus have been directly affected when 
state identity paradigms have shifted. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, followed by the 
transition of Yeltsin to Putin-era internal geopolitics along with the Putin administration’s recent 
focus on unity, conservation, and consolidation, particularly in respect to “vertical power” and 
“federal district reform,” represent the most recent of these paradigm shifts.   
 Changes in identity-building strategy can be tracked on the North Caucasus’s landscape 
in a number of ways, notably in shifts from military to finance after two major conflicts in 
Chechnya, region-wide issues with security and terrorism, the emergence of ethno-political 
separatist groups, federal subsidies for republics, top-down economic development strategies for 
the region, and instability across Russia’s southern border with Georgia, Abkhazia, and South 
Ossetia. Promoting notions of an inclusive civic Russian identity have been suggested and 
encouraged from a number of scholars and politicians as a way to create unity without 
aggravating rifts and discontinuities among competing identities and solving the Soviets old 
nemesis, “The National Question,” in contemporary Russia.  Tishkov (1996; 1997) argues that 
the only way toward establishing ethno-national stability in Russia and the other former Soviet 
states is to create a dualistic situation where civic and ethnic identity are separated; such a 
situation is created through gradual “de-ethnization” of the state, coupled with “de-politicized” 
conceptions of ethnicity.  
 While similar ideas have been promoted in post-Soviet Russia, completely uncoupling 
ethnicity and territory, or creating a situation where every citizen of Russia is treated as an equal 
in every Russian territory seems rather unfeasible. Many consider that Soviet-style 
institutionalized ethnicity continues to dominate identity perceptions post-Soviet public 
consciousness and political practices, which leads to ethnic discrimination, racism and 
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xenophobia (Popov and Kuznetsov, 2008). Part of the reason such notions are so hard to kill 
could reside in the fact that mobilizing national sentiments to achieve territorial goals in post-
Soviet space has proven to be rather easy and affective for elites. According to Vladimir 
Kolossov (1999, p. 80):    
The political control over a geographical space is the main opportunity to realize 
nationalist aspirations as a political program. The nationalist perception of a 
territorial identity with the soil of one's ancestors as the place which belongs only to 
the members of the nation, and which is the only place where its historical destiny 
can be fulfilled, is being transformed into a feeling of national exclusiveness.  
 
Such selective identities, when manifested in territorial identities, can lead to competition or 
even conflict between territories.  Kolossov (1999) suggests that the places in Russia where 
conflicting identities exist become problematic when these subjective ideas are combined with 
objective material factors, most notably blatant economic inequalities between and among 
adjacent territories.  Stavropol and its ethnic dynamics and status as a Kray represent inequalities 
in relation to its neighboring republics.  
In addition, divides along religious ranks have a similar destabilizing potential.  Research 
on ethnicity in the North Caucasus has noted connections with religion (Yemelianova, 2005; 
Gammer, 2007).  Due to ethno-national claims on defined territories, religious claims along the 
same lines are also a possibility if breaks in Orthodox Christian and Islamic space are imagined 
along clear territorial borders.  For example, ideas of a North Caucasus Emirate, such as those 
promoted by Islamist leader Doku Amarov, suggest the territorial unity of the North Caucasus 
republics under the banner of Islam and separate from Christian Russia (Kuchins et al. 2011). 
 Issues of interethnic relations in Stavropol and the North Caucasus tend to be dealt with 
by local and federal authorities as a state security issues, rather than problems that can be solved 
via democratic politics (Wæver, 1995).  Such tactics and policy works to send the message that 
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state-power is the clear way to achieve stability.  Thus, management of multi-ethnic relations in 
Russia is achieved through the 'securitization of interethnic relations' (Popov and Kuznetsov, 
2008). As a result, public perceptions of contested identities and resistance of Russian 
dominance, along with connections to the North Caucasus as a typical context for these security 
threats, has worked discursively to promote distrust and even the 'demonization' of non-Russians 
among ethnic Russian communities (Foxall, 2010).  Schenk (2012) argues that the Russian 
government and print media used ethnic conflict in Stavropol, which took place in 2007, to form 
and disseminate nationalist ideas; although the official policies of the Russian Federation 
promote an inclusive multicultural strategy, media, which is basically loyal to Moscow (see 
FAPMCRF, 20055), tended to sensationalize events related to the Stavropol riots in a way that 
presented nationalist-friendly facts.  This discursive hypocrisy ends up working against official 
policy of ethno-national unification under a civic-Russian civic, working to reinforce 
connections between ethnic Russians' belonging to the Russian state.   
 Bad press, with subjects like Stavropol at the center, are definitely commonplace among 
Russian media outlets, and negative events throughout the North Caucasus rarely go unnoticed. 
This kind of publicity has a potentially negative impact on tolerance in Russia overall.  Studies 
conducted by the SOVA Center have suggested the presence of grand scale xenophobic 
tendencies among ethnic Russians, whereby as many as 50 percent believe that ethnic Russians 
should have privileges over non-Russians and that non-Russians should have limited freedom in 
krays and oblasts, or even be removed from said territories (Harding, 2009; Gudkov, 2008). 
However, as indicated by a study by Bakke et al. (2009), opinions about ethno-federalism did not 
significant differences among ethnically defined regions, suggesting that populations in Russian 
                                                          
5 FAPMCRF (Federal Agency for the Press and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation). 
Russian Periodical Press Market: Situation, Trends and Prospects. May 2005. 
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areas support autonomy for non-Russian groups with specially defined territories at these groups 
themselves.   
 In light of the Soviet legacy and the fact that most of the Russian population seems not to 
challenge the utility of ethno-federalism, many Russian elites and politicians have demonstrated 
their belief in the idea that ethno-national identity is a choice, whose markers are based on 
socially constructed sets of characteristics that are fluid and malleable, changing over time and 
becoming more or less salient as social circumstances change (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; 
Thompson, 1989; Tishkov 1997).  As Kolossov et al. (2003) suggest, identity in the North 
Caucasus is: 
not only a constantly changing set of social attitudes and myths but also the 
outgrowth of contest among various elites, state institutions and local administrations 
trying to 'sell' their cultural markers as best that can and to obtain control of those 
markers that have become popular. 
 
Such ideas seem applicable not only for local elites, but for the state itself, as evidenced through 
Russia post-Yeltsin era federal reforms and nationalities policies. Based on the legacy of Soviet 
hierarchy, Stavropol's ethnic Russian community could see themselves as part of the North 
Caucasus, maybe even before being part of Russia, or vice versa. Recently policy suggests that 
Moscow would like to see a peacefully homogenized understanding of the North Caucasus, 
Stavropol included, which understands its integrated role within the whole of the Russian 
Federation. However, the realization of this desire is contingent on the local population ascribing 
the correct markers of identity in the correct territorial fashion.  
 
 
Federal District Reform, Regional Consolidation, and the State's Ethnic Russian Agenda   
 
 Vladimir Putin has proven to be a Russian leader with an active agenda for statecraft that 
has taken a particular focus on the North Caucasus (Taylor, 2007).  With the election of Putin 
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and his United Russia party to an unprecedented third term as president, it seems that Russia 
wants stability and is willing to see its leaders strive toward such a goal through the modification 
of old ideas, specifically a reworking of Russia’s internal territorial structure and ethno-national 
politics.  Evidence of United Russia’s agenda can be seen via the party’s emphasis on “vertical 
power,” “federal district reform,” and the drafting of a new official state policy on 
“Nationalities6” (Pomeranz, 2009; Hahn, 2003).  These policies, all of which involve formalizing 
markers of identity in regard to territory, nationality, or possibly both, set the foundation on 
which power continues to be distributed in Russia to this day, promoting the idea of inclusivity 
and exclusivity of certain territories for certain national groups.     
 Contemporary Russia has indeed been left to deal with the lingering effects of Soviet-era 
identify building, where a desired focus on citizenship within the Russian federal state is the 
ultimate goal.  However, Russia has had to make a scalar concession to this strategy through the 
promotion of a homogeneous North Caucasus regional identity, which according to the new 
nationalities policy should fit into the narrative of a civic-Russian nation.7  Instead of being left 
with “Russia” at a federal scale as the main inclusive identity marker for the various for the 
various ethno-national groups of the North Caucasus to draw on collectively, formalizing a North 
Caucasus regional identity could provide these groups a more localized and tangible marker with 
which to collectively association.  Therefore, constructing a meaningful regional scale of 
identity, which operates with a vertical framework of power, would constitute a less removed 
territorial authority with which North Caucasus residents could identify, while at the same time 
allowing centralized policies to be more efficiently implemented.  Regional centralization and 
                                                          
6 Ukaz Prezidenta RF 1666. O Strategii gosudarstvennoi' natsional'noi' politiki Rossii'skoi' Federatsii na period do 2025 god. 
Moscow, Russia 




the implementation of vertical power, in said fashion, have arguably been two cornerstones of 
governance and territoriality in post-Yeltsin Russia.  Although these policies have been criticized 
for their unequal treatment of the state’s federal core and periphery (Ross, 2003), they have 
undoubtedly played a role in defining and constructing contemporary notions of Russia’s 
regions.  Relations among the Russian core (Moscow) and the state’s peripheries are central to 
governance within Russia’s federal structure, and some have theorized that in order to maintain 
control and stability, Moscow must control the extent to which regionalisms are allowed to 
become salient (Nunn and Stulberg, 2000).  Therefore, Russia seeks to promote controlled 
regionalization, not regionalism, where the people of a given region understand identify within 
Russia while functioning as a regional entity integrated into the federal whole.  
 Moscow has shown great willingness to devote attention to and become deeply involved 
fiscally and militarily in the North Caucasus (O'Loughlin et al. 2007). This allocation of financial 
resources (subsidies) from the federal center to the region demonstrates concern for the region.  
The state’s readiness to become involved militarily reveals its desire, and perceived necessity, to 
preserve its territorial integrity and control its southern border in order to avoid, as suggested in 
the new nationalities policies: “disintegration.”8 
 All of Moscow’s interest has, to this end, led to an unstable political geography 
throughout the greater Caucasus region, where the population has seen conflict, territorial and 
political reorganization, and the creation new international territories.  Yet, despite all of these 
changes, a regional notion is always supported, prompting the geopolitical question of why the 
North Caucasus needs to exist as an integrated Russian territorial entity.  Interestingly, the case 
of the North Caucasus seems to run contrary to the common contemporary Russian territorial 
                                                          




strategies of centralization and consolidation in that the region is being uniquely defined and 
singled out rather than brought into a greater umbrella territory.    
 Evidence for such a strategy can be seen in the reordering of territorial units and positions 
of governance since the early 2000s.  In accordance with Putin’s visions of vertical power, 
provincial governors are appointed, rather than elected, and federal districts (federalnye okrugy) 
have emerged as officially defined regional entities.  Through federal districts, United Russia has 
implemented regionally-based strategies for economic development, defense and security 
operations, and various other forms of federal subsidization, all facilitated through direct 
territorial reorganization.  Thus, emphasis for relations between a particular province and the 
federal center must now be directed through its given federal district’s “fully empowered 
representative” (polpred).  Functionally, provincial governors must operate within their various 
regional contexts, and economically, provinces have become involved in federally supported 
economic plans.  Putin's reorganization strategy has resulted in increased emphasis on regional 
identification, where regions function as integrated entities in relation to the federal center, with 
the ultimate intention being that regions collectively understand their role as part of an integrated 
Russian federal whole (Chebankova, 2008).  Due to their integration and participation in the 
greater Russian economy, federal districts are reified and attain institutional shape (Paasi, 2003), 
as constituted via their relations with Moscow.    
 In January, 2010, Moscow took a step to promote its definition of the North Caucasus 
with the creation of the North Caucasus Federal District, essentially splitting its “Southern 
Federal District” in half.  Many have speculated as to why Russia made this division, and also 
about which territories remained as parts of the Southern Federal District and which ones became 
part of the North Caucasus Federal District.  Empirical observations suggest that physical 
62 
 
boundaries and landmarks related to the Caucasus Mountains played little part it this event.  
Rather, it would seem that areas that have been plagued with various, and well-publicized, 
security-related problems were grouped together as North Caucasus, while territories that had 
been stable remained within the Southern Federal District.  This division perhaps points to a 
greater geopolitical strategy where the North Caucasus gets special attention from within, and 
buffers Russia-proper from certain threats outside, such as the spread of radicalized Islam.  This 
separation of federal districts is particularly interesting because constitutes an instance of formal 
regional disintegration, which runs contrary to both Soviet and Yeltsin-ear consolidation. 
 Debates over the formation of the North Caucasus Federal District involved Stavropol 
specifically, as it was the only kray, or majority ethnic Russian territory included in the new 
district. In addition, the North Caucasus Federal District capital was placed in Pyatigorsk, not 
Stavropol. Speculation as to the motivation behind Stavropol's situation has ranged from 
abandonment, to development opportunities, to even a 'civilizing role' for Stavropol to play in 
connection to the republics, similar to its original founding purpose in the imperial era. A major 
goal of this project is to test whether Stavropol's Caucasus identity is consistent among its local 
population and to gain insights into how regional identity markers are understood according to 
territory.    
 Finally, there remains the issue of ethno-national territory and autonomy within Russia’s 
federal structure.  Russia’s new nationalities policy lays out Moscow’s legal approach to the 
ever-present “National Question.” The new plan, signed into to law by president Putin on 
December 19, 2012, is in effect until 20259 and replaces the previous state policy, which was 
                                                          





held since 1996.  Several motivations behind the changes are cited in the document itself, 
implicitly pointing to the North Caucasus, criticizing the region’s role within the Greater 
(Federal) Russia.  According to the four advisors who drafted the order:  
negative factors conditioned by Soviet nationality policy and the weakening of 
statehood in the 1990s … subsequently leading to “an outburst of ethnic 
mobilization, ethno-territorial separatism, and religious-political extremism.” They 
go on to state that Russia faces a “the threat of disintegration,” which they suggest 
has come about due to “a high level of social inequality in society and regional 
differentiation, ethno-politicization of various spheres of life…” along with  
“corruption, failings of the law-enforcement system, and the distrust of citizens in 
the organs of power.10  
 
New policies like this one seem to be understood as more of the same.  The state's attempts at 
identity-building in Stavropol and the North Caucasus attempts to satisfy social interests of 
ethno-national groups and optimize their competition, neutralize their contested resources and 
prevent factors of conflict, which is done by modernizing management strategies and stabilizing 
policy on the base of traditional Russian historical-cultural values (Astvatsaturova and 
Chekmenev, 2013). With the emphasis seemingly placed on ethnic Russian characteristics for a 
universalizing identity with the Russian Federation, how people in a contested region like 
Stavropol view their own associations with territory at different scales, the extent and prevalence 
of their identity markers, and the cohesiveness of group opinions, may indicate whether the 
state's definitions of region and identity are accepted by its population.      
 The aforementioned policies and actions have no doubt some effect on how the 
population in the North Caucasus is forced to conceptualize regional, state-level, and local 
markers of identity.  While it would seem that policies such as vertical power, ethno-federalism, 
and federal district reform are designed to work toward a more cohesive understand of identity, 
                                                          




that presumably would promote social and economic stability in the North Caucasus, thus easing 
tensions for the Russian Federal center, it is perhaps necessary to conduct empirical research to 
gain insights into how the people in the North Caucasus understand various markers of identity, 
and their meanings in scalar context.  In the next chapter, I will explain my methodology and the 





Chapter IV: Methodology and Data 
 
In order to examine how people perceive the importance of identity markers in regional 
context, I used a methodological approach that combines quantitative, qualitative, and 
cartographic techniques, which allowed me to test whether or not participants’ association with 
the “North Caucasus” as a region serves as an important marker of identity compared to other 
place-based and socio-cultural identity markers.  This methodological approach also provided me 
with insights from participants in regard to their perceptions of constructive regionalization via 
state policies and outcomes designed to influence governance, development, and geopolitical 
strategy, specifically involving the North Caucasus.  I chose to incorporate a mixed methodology 
due to the complex nature of identity in general and because of the unique challenges associated 
with regions such as the North Caucasus, where a melding of national identities with socialist 
and post-socialist political platforms has occurred (O’Lear and Whiting, 2008).  I felt as though a 
mixed methodology, which is based on analysis of both quantitative and qualitative empirical 
data sources, was appropriate for dealing with complex issues like identity, as the methodology 
has the ability to identify trends within the population, and also attempt to offer explanations as 
to why various trends may, or may not have been present in the dataset.  Through this 
methodological platform, I was able to collect and analyze empirical data, gathered via surveys, 
interviews, and a participatory mapping exercise, from 488 individuals from the study area.  All 
of the participants were between the ages of 18 and 35, and were living in the study area either as 
students or as full time residents.  I designed the methodology of this project to examine four 




Research Question 1: How do people in the North Caucasus recognize and define this 
region?   
 
1a: Do participants have a cohesive understanding of their region territorially, or do 
different socio-cultural groups disagree on the boundaries and sub-territories that should be 
included in its definition?   
 
1b: Do participants recognize the North Caucasus as a unique region, fundamentally 
different than the rest of Russia?   
 
1c: Do participants recognize specific places (cities) as identity markers, based on                     
association with the North Caucasus? 
 
 
Research Question 2: How strongly do participants associate with specifically defined 
territorial (Ethno-Federal) constructions as identity markers: Russian Federation, 
Federal District, Kray/Oblast/Republic? 
 
2a: Are there significant differences regarding how strongly various socio-cultural groups 
associate with these territory-based identity markers?  
 
2b: Do participants respect official state territorial guarantees and borders based on titular-
status (autonomous ethno-national rights) when associating group salience with territory?   
 
 
Research Question 3: How are issues of civic-nationalism and associations with civic 
and ethnic Russian culture viewed in the North Caucasus?   
 
3a: How strongly do people in the North Caucasus associate with socio-cultural identity markers 
(ethno-national group, citizenship in the Russian Federation, religious affiliation, gender, and 
urbanization) and are there significant differences among group opinions?  
 
3b: Is the North Caucasus region perceived to be changing in terms of its civic Russianness? Is 
the North Caucasus becoming more or less culturally Russian?   
 
3c: Do ethnic Russians in the North Caucasus have a regional identity variation of a state-bearing 
nation (Brubaker, 1995)?  Do they understand dynamics of the North Caucasus in terms of a 
state-bearing Russian identity?   
 
 
Research Question 4:  How do people in the North Caucasus view state policies aimed 
at constructive regionalization? 
 
4a: How do participants regard ethno-federal governance and the state’s efforts to re-scale the 




4b: Do participants see Stavropol Kray as different from other territories in the North 
Caucasus, and if so, how?   
 
4c: How do participants view the North Caucasus as compared to other regions of Russia, 
or in terms of its relationship with the federal center?  
 
 
The survey data, participatory mapping data, and interview data I collected provided 
insight into how the participants conceptualized group identity factors in the context of the North 
Caucasus.  To conduct the first part of the methodology, I analyzed qualitative data gathered 
from surveys to demonstrate whether statistically significant differences existed among the 
opinions of various groups, within the local population (independent group identity variables 
such as language, ethno-national status, religion, etc.) in terms of these groups’ propensity to 
associate with a number of identity-forming factors (dependent variables).  These factors 
included regional, civic, place-based, ethno-cultural and gendered markers of identity, such as 
associations to certain territories, or feelings of affiliation and importance toward factors like 
citizenship, or religion.  These data were important for addressing Research Questions 2 and 3, 
as I was able to utilize them determine which markers of identity were most important to which 
groups, and how closely the various groups agreed on the importance of said markers.  In 
addition, I collected data regarding specific places (cities) that the participants considered to 
most embody notions of the North Caucasus in order to measure consensus of certain places as 
being understood as representing the region in terms of collective identity, which was helpful for 
Research Question 1.  
Next, through a Geographic Information Systems (GIS)-based participatory mapping 
exercise, I was able to gather visual representations of participants’ perceptions in regard to the 
spatial manifestations (on maps) of the wider North Caucasus region.  These collaborative 
insights shed light on how various independent variable groups viewed the North Caucasus in a 
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territorial sense, and where in the region the groups perceived their territorial salience to be 
located, detecting potential cultural and social cleavages and contested power relations.  The 
analysis of these data was critical for addressing Research Question 1.   
The third component of this data collection consisted of oral interviews, which I 
conducted personally with 39 research participants, all of whom had taken part in the surveys 
and participatory mapping exercise.  These interviews allowed the participants to freely explain 
how their personal conceptions of identity are articulated.  I also asked each participant to give 
his or her opinion in regard to a series of questions on political policies of regionalization in the 
North Caucasus, according to the participants’ lived experience.  I analyzed all of the interview 
responses through a coding scheme, “Human Preset Coding for Response-Based Messages,” to 
get a further sense of the trends and narratives that exist in the study area from the participants 
themselves.  I also relied on interview data to provide qualitative support and explanation for the 
quantitative trends uncovered through the survey and mapping portions of this project.  Analysis 
of qualitative interview data was particularly important for addressing Research Questions 3 and 
4, and for providing explanatory and anecdotal evidence for Questions 1 and 2.  
 
The Datasets and Data Collection  
During May, June and July of 2013 (HSCL#20847), I collected surveys and cognitive 
map data from 488 individuals in Russia (See Appendix A), specifically from Stavropol and 
other cities in Stavropol Kray, as well as from several cities in Karachay-Cherkessia.  The first 
part of my data collection strategy relied on a survey, which was aimed at gathering biographical 
data from each participant.  This information would be useful for analysis and identification 
throughout this project.  Participants were free to provide any information they chose, or skip 
certain aspects of the survey they were not comfortable with, or if they were unwilling to provide 
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certain information.  Along with the surveys, participants received four maps of the study area, 
with each map containing instructions on how to indicate their personal view of the territorial 
prevalence of a particular factor of identity.  In addition, 39 of the participants agreed to conduct 
oral interviews with me after completing the survey sand maps.  Participants’ materials (surveys, 
maps and interview recordings), were numbered, scanned and logged electronically for later data 
input.  Interview recordings were translated and transcribed.  After transcription, the recordings 
were deleted, per Human Subjects Committee of Lawrence policies of participant anonymity.   
 
Sampling Methods 
To collect the data for this project, I relied on a widely used technique called 
“snowballing” or “referral sampling.”  This technique has been cited as a particularly effective 
way to gather survey data in Russia and other countries in Europe and the Former Soviet Union 
(Rivera, Kozyreva, and Sarovskii, 2002); Carnaghan, 2010; Harvey, 2010).  Snowballing relies 
on a researcher’s personal contacts, through which new contacts are established and lobbied to 
participate in the project.  Therefore, research participants refer new participants, establishing 
credibility and familiarity between the interviewer and subjects.  Establishing this kind of basic 
trust is especially important in Russia, where people tend to be suspicious of foreigners and 
surveys asking demographically-based questions (Rivera, Kozyreva, and Sarovskii, 2002).  I also 
utilized a technique called “convenience sampling,” another effective method for selecting 
survey participants (Bradshaw and Stratford, 2000) and (Özdemir et al. 2011), which involves 
soliciting participants from public parks and gathering places within a given study area.   
To gather data, I relied on a base of contacts that consisted of friends, former work 
colleagues and acquaintances I had gained through my previous experience in the North 
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Caucasus.  I had several contacts at the Stavropol Ministry of Education who agreed to help me 
find participants for this research.  These contacts led to professors and administrators at Russian 
State Social University and Stavropol College of Construction, both of which allowed me access 
to their campuses to talk to students.  I chose to work specifically with these institutions because 
their student populations were very diverse, consisting of individuals from all of the North 
Caucasus’s various ethno-national groups, and from varied religious backgrounds.  Such 
individuals constituted my target participant population, having come to Stavropol from 
throughout Stavropol Kray and the surrounding territories, including the North Caucasus’ many 
autonomous republics.  I met with contacts at both of these institutions on several occasions and 
was able to collect 378 surveys and 19 interviews in the process.  However, I could not use some 
of these surveys, as they were completed by individuals outside of the target age group, notably 
staff and faculty members who were interested in the project.     
I was able to collect the rest of my surveys and interviews through contacts I established 
via friends and acquaintances that I had in Stavropol, as well as in villages and cities around 
Stavropol, and in republic of Karachay-Cherkessia.  I gathered an additional 130 surveys and 
conducted an additional 20 interviews through my established contacts and through new contacts 
that were referred to me.  I collected data from a total of 508 participants, 488 of whom met the 
demographic requirements for the study group.  Thus, the responses from these 488 participants 
are included in this project.  Specific sites for data collection included Stavropol, Mikhalovsk, 
Svetlograd, Kugalta, Izabilni, Ipatovo, Alexandrovskaya, Kislovodsk and Pyatigorsk in 
Stavropol Kray.  Data collection sites in Karachay-Cherkessia included Cherkessk, the Nogay 





The survey began by asking each participant to list his or her ethno-national group 
(natsionalnost).  Knowing how the survey participants defined their ethno-national identities was 
a critical step for approaching each of the research questions in this project.  This prompt on the 
survey was open ended, as participants were asked to write their entries on a blank line.  In total, 
22 different ethno-national groups were listed, with Russians (N=399) being the most well 
represented (see Table 4.1).  After listing their ethno-national groups, participants were asked to 
self-evaluate as to whether or not they practiced cultural traditions associated with their ethno-
national group by selecting “yes,” or “no.”  The purpose of asking this question was to gauge 
whether each participant felt personally engaged in his or her ethno-national group in terms of 
practice rather than by association.  Participants were also asked to disclose whether their parents 
were both of the same nationality so as to tell whether the participants’ sense of ethno-national 
identity would possibly be conflicted between, or among ethno-national groups based on 
personal heritage.   
Table 4.1 – Ethno-National Groups and Percentages   
Ethno-National Groups 
(Self-Identified) 
Dataset Percentage 2010 Census Percentage 
(Stavropol Kray) 
Armenian (N=31)  
Avar (N=2)  
Azeri (N=1)  
Belarussian (N=1)  
Chechen (N=2)  
Cherkess (N=2)  
Dargin (N=8)  
Greek (N=2)  
Ingush (N=6)  
Jewish (Yevrey) (N=1)  
Karachay (N=8)  
Korean (N=1)  
Kalmyk (N=1) 
Lak (N=1)  

































Moldovan (N=1)  
Nogay (N=6)  
Russian (N=399) 
Tabasarian (N=1)  
Tatar (N=6)  
Udmurt (N=1)  

















*Not indicated in 2010 All Russian Census 
The next pieces of biographical data involved participants’ places of birth and residence.  
Each participant was asked to provide his or her place of birth, via fill-in-the-blank format.  
Participants were then asked to self-evaluate as to whether they had grown up in the place where 
they were born by circling “yes” or “no.”  If a participant circled “no,” he or she was prompted 
to write in a place where he or she had grown up.  Finally, the participants were instructed to 
provide their current living place on another blank line, along with how many years they had 
been living there.  By asking participants to provide this information, I was able to determine 
whether or not they had spent their entire lives in the study area, or whether they had migrated to 
the North Caucasus.  I was also able to get some indication as to whether they had undergone 
intraregional migrations within the study area, or had emigrated from other former Soviet states.  
Because each of my four research questions hinged upon gathering opinions from participants 
with personal familiarity and lived experience within the study area, this information was 
important in determining whether participants fit the target demographic applicable to the 
research.  If participants had not arrived in the study area within the past two years from the time 
of data collection, their response data were not included in the data set.   
Out of all 488 participants, 29 were born in former Soviet Republics other than Russia, 
including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Georgia and Belarus. Only 3 of these 
individuals had arrived in the study area within the past two years.  19 participants had 
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undergone an interregional migration and were now living in the study area, having been born in 
another region of Russia, and seven of them had arrived within the past two years.  Some of 
these participants’ birthplaces included Moscow, Chelyabinsk, Magadan, Arkhangelsk, Tula, 
Bryansk, Irkutsk, Tomsk and Voronezh.  210 participants had undergone an intraregional 
migration, moving within the study area at some point in their lives.  The remaining 230 
participants currently lived in the same city or village where they were born.  While participants 
tended to come from Stavropol and the surrounding cities and villages, my sampling methods 
yielded many responses from people throughout Stavropol Kray and the wider study area (see 
Figure 4.1).   
 
Figure 4.1 – Map of Participants’ Birthplaces within the Study Area (N=455) 
 
The survey then asked participants to identify their age and gender.  Both of these 
sections were open ended.  The purpose of asking participants’ ages was to make certain that 
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they fell within the target ages for this project, 18-35.  Gender was purposely asked as a fill in 
the blank to account for the fact that participants may represent a wide spectrum of gender 
identities.  However, “female” (N=307) and “male” (N=181) were the only two answers 
provided.  It should be noted that this data set features a disproportionate amount of female to 
male participantipants, as compared to the demopraphics reported for Stavropol Kray in the 2010 
All Russian Census.  According to the 2010 Census, Stavropol Kray’s total population was 
1,607,415, with 848,758 (52.8 percent) listed as female and 758,657 (47.2 percent) as male. 
Gender was a category that was important to examine, particularly for Research Questions 2 and 
3.   
The additional biographical information I gathered relates to participants’ linguistic and 
religious affiliations.  Participants were asked to list their native language, again with a fill in the 
blank, and circle “yes” or “no,” indicating whether their native language was also their main 
language of communication.  Although all of the participants could speak Russian, the lingua 
franca of the region, I was interested to see whether non-Russian languages were being utilized 
for communication in everyday life.  417 participants indicated that their native language was 
Russian, while 71 identified a language other than Russian as their native tongue.  The most 
common group to claim a non-Russian ethno-national identity and Russian as a native language 
were Armenians, as 11 out of 31 did so.  This information was also important for exploring 
Research Questions 2 and 3.   
Participants were also asked to state their religion, again through self-identification. They 
were also asked to evaluate whether they actively participated in religious activities by circling 
“yes,” or “no.”  Similarly to how participants were asked to provide information about their 
ethno-national groups, I wanted to see whether participants considered themselves to be actively 
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engaged within religious communities, as opposed to having an association with these 
communities.  Responses given for religious identity are listed in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 – Religious Categories as Self-Identified by Participants  




Atheist (N=9),  
Baptist (N=2),  
Roman Catholicism (N=1) 
Judaism (N=1) 
No Response (N=33) 
 
 The next part of the survey began to gather participants’ perceptions of several elements 
of identity, both place-based, and non-place based.  The participants were instructed to indicate 
their feelings of importance toward 10 potential factors of identity, via a 5-point Likert style 
scale, where a rank of “1” meant “completely unimportant,” a rank of “3” indicated neutrality, 
and a rank of “5” meant “very important.”  Knowing how participants felt about these identity 
factors allowed me to get a sense of how strongly the factors were viewed by the various ethno-
national, religious, and other identity groups, which is critical information for Research Question 
2, and is also needed to explore Research Question 3.   
 The first 4 factors of identity that participants were asked to consider were non place-
based: “ethno-national group,” “native language,” “religion,” and “citizenship in the Russian 
Federation.”  The participants were instructed to use the aforementioned Likert scale to evaluate 
each factor’s level of importance.  I decided to measure “native language” and “religion,” due to 
the importance of these elements to the formation of national identity in general, as indicated by 
established works on identity in social science (see Weber, 1922, Smith, 1986, Gellner, 1987, 
and Smith, 1991).  Ethno-national group is also key for this study, per Brubaker (1995), who 
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suggests that nationalizing states, such as Russia, operate according to dynamics between state-
bearing nations and the minority populations also residing within the state.  The idea of 
citizenship is also important, according to Brubaker (1995), because elite individuals emphasize 
citizenship within the state, in this case civic Russianness, though the trappings of a “state-
bearing nation,” ethnic Russians.  Measuring identification with the concept of citizenship at the 
federal scale is also important for examining scalar notions of citizenship (Swyngedouw, 1996).  
Russian citizens may or may not gravitate to an inclusive identity based on the rights and 
collective notions of the state, especially where state re-scaling efforts have been made.  The 
purpose of asking participants to rank these elements of identity is to get a sense of whether or 
not different socially identifiable groups, whose identities are understood in terms of both 
cultural prevalence and Russian state-published statistics, viewed these particular factors in a 
stronger and weaker manor than other groups, thus providing a base line for looking at the 
salience of various identities in the study area. These data provided specific information that was 
useful for analyzing Research Questions 1d, 2a, 2b, and 3a. 
The remaining 6 dependent variables in the survey were all place-based, specially asking 
participants to rate their level of affinity with a place, with major emphasis being on a scalar 
component.  Participants were again asked to use a 5-point Likert Scale to identify their personal 
sense of territorial belonging, where “1” reflected no belonging, “3” was neutral, and “5” 
indicated a strong sense of belonging.  The factors listed were “Russian Federation,” 
“Participant’s Federal District,” “the Russian South,” “the North Caucasus,” “Participant’s Kray, 
Oblast, or Republic,” and “Participant’s City, Village, or Aul” (a village in the North Caucasus 
republics).  The goal of gathering this information was to get a general sense of how the 
population in the study area reached the notion of belonging at each possible territorial scale, and 
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to determine whether or not various groups within the general population identified more 
strongly with some scale, as opposed to other groups.  Knowing how the various identity groups 
ranked their affinity for places at various scales was useful in exploring Research Question 1.  
Analysis of these data also helped indicate trends among groups in relation to affinity for 
Stavropol in particular, which was particularly important for Research Question 3b.   
The survey’s next section was designed with the purpose of gaining a sense of how 
various cities in the study area were viewed in terms of representing the North Caucasus in terms 
of the traditions practiced there.  Participants were asked to provide three cities which they 
believed best exemplified the North Caucasus region as they understood it.  Again, the 
instructions prompted participants to write down their entries on a line provided.  41 cities were 
listed (see Table 4.3).  In addition to looking at which cities were chosen overall, I was also 
interested in seeing whether the cities chosen by certain ethno-national groups tended to follow 
ethnic lines, and whether there was any pattern related to Russian or non-Russian cities being 
more heavily associated with the concept of the North Caucasus Region.   
 
Table 4.3 – Cities Selected by Participants as Best Examples of the North Caucasus and Number 



















































The final part of the survey dealt with participants’ perceptions in regard to the 
relationship between the North Caucasus, and Russia’s federal center (Moscow). The data 
gathered from this part were important for examining research question 4, looking at the regional 
role in Russia’s contemporary federal structure.  Participants were first asked to rank the 
importance of Russia’s federal center for the development of the North Caucasus region on a 
scale from 1 to 5, similar to the previous elements of the survey.  The next question asked the 
participants to rate the importance of the North Caucasus to the federal center, using the same 1 
to 5 scale of importance.  
 
 
Survey Data Analysis  
The first step in analysis for the survey data I collected was to categorize the participants 
into independent variable groups, based up on the biographical data they provided.  As I 
previously mentioned, participants were able to identify freely with a group of their choosing in 
terms of ethno-national identity and religious identity (Tables 4.4 and 4.5).  When analyzing and 
comparing these groups’ overall responses, I was content to look at the overall volumes of their 
answers, which provided general trends and differences.  However, because I wanted to be sure 
that differences in group identity were statistically significant, not having occurred due to 
random chance, I chose analysis of variance (ANOVA) to further analyze the data.   
 The particular test I selected to analyze the Likert-style data is called the Kruskal-Wallis 
one-way analysis of variance, which is a non-parametric technique for determining whether or 
not samples originate from the same distribution which are applicable to samples of the same or 
different sample sizes (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952).  While I had previously considered conducting 
a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to determine whether differences in answers 
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between categories were significant, I was advised to run a series of Kruskal-Wallis test for each 
independent variable in the study based on the nature of my dataset.  Kruskal-Wallis testing has 
been cited as a non-parametric alternative to one-way ANOVA (analysis of variance) testing, 
which is appropriate for comparing ranks of several independent samples (Theodorsson-
Norheim, 1986).   I felt as though this method for significance testing was appropriate, based on 
the nature of my data samples.  Several of the categories in the dataset were larger than others, 
which would present issues with normality, and thus not allowing for a traditional ANOVA.  
However, since these differences were indicative of the dynamics of the actual population, the 
non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis was an appropriate test for significance that would not require 
data transformations to meet assumptions of normality necessary in some other ANOVA or 
MANOVA methods (Breslow, 1970 and Vargha and Delaney, 1998). 
 
I organized the data into 10 independent variable groups for the Kruskal-Wallis test with 
each having two binary categories (Table 4.4).  The 10 factors of identity that participants were 
asked to rate, consisting of 4 non-place-based and 6 place-based factors constituted the 
dependent variables for the Kruskal-Wallis test.  In addition, two more variables were included 
in the dependent list.  These variables were from the last part of the survey, which asked 
participants to rank the importance of Russia’s federal center to the North Caucasus and visa-
versa (see Table 4.5).     














Religion (Practice) Practicing (N=83) 
Not Practicing 
(N=406) 
Gender Male (N=181) 
Female (N=307) 











Urbanization Urban (N= 204) 
Rural (N=284) 
Language Russian (N=417) 
Non-Russian 
(N=71) 
Titular Status Titular (N=408) 
Not Titular 
(N=80) 





Table 4.5 – List of Dependent Variables and Categories for Kruskal-Wallis Testing 
Dependent Variables 




Russian Federal Territory 
Federal Districts 
North Caucasus 
General Regional Description 
Provincial Territories 
City/Village/Aul 
North Caucasus Importance to Federal 
Center 





I performed the Kruskal-Wallis tests using SPSS, which consisted of 12 one-way tests, 
each one testing for significance between the two categories of each independent variable, with 
the significance level set at 0.01 in each test.  In each case, the null hypothesis for the test is that 
the differences in answer distributions between categories is due to random chance, and is thus 
not significant.  However, should the test indicate a p-value (significance value) of 0.01 or less, 
the differences are not considered random, and thus the null hypothesis is rejected.  In general, I 
expected to find significant difference in preference for the socio-cultural identity markers 
mostly between Russians and non-Russians, and between Christians and Muslims.  I and 
expected to find significant differences in place-based markers of identity between these subsets 
of the population.   
 
Participatory Mapping Data 
 After participants had completed the surveys, they were given a series of template maps 
of the study area.  Each map issued instructions for participants to circle or outline the territory 
that they believed corresponded to a particular region or area.  The purpose of the maps, and this 
part of the methodology, was to gain insight into how participants viewed the spatial extents of 
various identity markers.  Map 1 asked participants to indicate where their native language was 
salient.  Map 2 prompted the participants to indicate the areal extent of the North Caucasus 
region.  Participants were asked to indicate the territory where their religion was salient for Map 
3.  Finally, Map 4 asked participants to indicate the territory where they national traditions were 
practiced.   
Each template map included the borders of Russian sub-fedearl territories, along with 
international borders recognized by the Russian Federation.  Major cities were also visible on 
each map.  Borders and cities were included on the maps in order to account for participants’ 
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varying levels of geographic literacy.  Although these reference indications may have potentially 
guided participants to select territoriey according to border lines, approximately 70 percent of 
participants did not follow border lines on at least one of the four maps.  The following map 
(Figure 4.2) is sample of a participant response for Map 2, which asked to indicate the areal 
extents of the North Caucasus region. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 – Participant Map Showing Perceived Territorial Extents of the North Caucasus 




 I created these template maps using the program ArcMap 10.3 by ESRI.  The template 
maps all include the borders of all krays, oblasts, republics, federal districts, international 
borders, and major cities located in the study area.  Sovereign states are also differentiated via 
shading on all 4 maps templates. The projected coordinate system that I used to display of the 
template maps in this project is the “ED 1950 Turkey 15,” which displayed via a Transverse 
Mercator projection.  I chose this coordinate system and projection because it allowed me to 
generate what I believed was the best projection of the study area for this particular project.  In 
total, I collected 1,944 map responses from the participants.    
 
Analysis of Participatory Mapping Data 
After collecting maps from participants, I scanned them to get digital copies to be 
analyzed with the program ArcMap 10.3.  I then organized the maps from each participant into a 
catalog of files, which I built using the program ArcCatalog.  The first step in converting the 
participants’ hand-drawn data into digital data that was projected via “ED 1950 Turkey 15” was 
to geo-rectify the scanned images so they coordinated with this system.  When I designed the 
templates, I included data points on each map (the dots at the corners), which served as reference 
points for geo-rectification process in ArcMap 10.3.  I then took these same control points and 
loaded them into and ArcMap 10.3 document as a simple point map.  After importing each 
participant map into ArcMap 10.3 document, I was able to use ArcMap 10.3’s geo-rectification 
function, to align the control points and bring the participant map images into the correct 




 Upon completing geo-rectification for each map data sample, the next step was to digitize 
the territories selected by each participant in the form of a polygon shape file.  I then went about 
creating polygons matching the marks that participants had made on their paper maps.  The 
individual polygons were logged into ArcCatalog in folders for each participant.  Once polygons 
had been created for each map response, I began to load them into new ArcMap documents 
(mashups).  In total, I created four master ArcMap documents, one for each map variable.  All of 
the polygons that corresponded to the various dependent variables were loaded into the master 
documents, according to their participant numbers. 
 
 Because the ultimate goal of this part of the project was to create visual identity maps of 
the 4 variables in question, corresponded to the various independent variable participant groups 
in the study, each polygon had to be manipulated from its default settings in ArcMap 10.3.  
Polygons were projected as transparent, so whenever polygons overlapped, the corresponding 
area on the map would appear darker.  The areas selected most frequently on each map would 
appear the darkest in shade, while the areas that had been less frequently selected by participants 
would appear lighter in shade.  In order to achieve visual comparative analysis each polygon had 
to be displayed without hardened borders, and also be of the same level of transparency as the 
other polygons in its variable group.  Additionally, polygons of some groups had to be weighted 
in terms of transparency when being compared to the responses of more populous groups, to 
account for the best possible visual normalization.  Due to the many possible comparative 
scenarios, various polygons were adjusted in terms of transparency depending on the 




 In order to generate a graduated scale collaborative identity map for an independent 
variable group, I sorted the groups by independent variable category using Microsoft Excel, so as 
to generate a list of participant numbers that matched the polygons.  I then activated the polygons 
from all of the members in the group in question in the master document to produce an overlay 
of all the responses from the group in question, as they responded to the particular dependent 
variable being addressed on the map.  Figure 4.3, shows the collaborative response from Muslim 
participants when asked to indicate the territory they considered to be part of the North 
Caucasus.  
 
Figure 4.3 – Independent Variable: Islam (N=46), Dependent Variable: North Caucasus, 




This map is an example of the graduated scale maps that I generated using ArcMap 10.3 to 
overlay participant data in a GIS mashup.   
 For each of the four template maps, I categorized sets of independent variable groups, 
from whose responses graduated scale maps were generated.  Some of the groups were derived 
from biographical data from surveys, such as Armenian (N=31), Dargin (N=8), etc.  Other 
independent variable groups were classified based on their Likert scale responses to the 
dependent variables from the survey, particularly whether they felt very strongly, or were 
apathetic to a particular factor of identity.  For example, Russians who ranked the importance of 
their native language as a “5” (N=256) became an independent variable group for this cognitive 
mapping analysis, as did Russians who ranked their native language as a “1” (N=33).   
When interrupting the graduated scale maps, I analyzed several factors.  First, I looked at how 
cohesively or non-cohesively group members represented the dependent variables.  Many 
cohesive responses, representing a greater concentration of like-minded opinions, suggest a 
stronger group consensus of opinion, and thus a stronger sense of group territorial identity.  I also 
searched for both overall general trends on each map, but also for ‘hot-spots,’ or specifically 
popular territory as identified by the participants.   
For the second part of the cognitive mapping analysis, I examined whether or not the 
maps were reflective of expected results, or whether participants tended to follow traditional or 
discursive definitions regarding their perceived distribution of the dependent variables. The maps 
showed how strongly participants associated their responses with existing state borders, 
respective of participants’ affinity or association with state territorial delineations and official 
state discourses on titular status for ethno-national groups in given state territories.  Therefore, I 
was able to assess whether group responses were consistent with various discourses.  I first 
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tabulated the particular territories each participant selected, and then tested for significance using 
a Chi-squared test, which can be used to determine whether an observed frequency diverges 
significantly from an expected frequency (Rogerson, 2014). 
 
Map 1: Native Language Salience   
Map 1 asked the participants to indicate the territory where their native languages were 
salient.  Independent variable categories for this map were classified according to languages 
used, first and foremost.  I selected the seven largest groups, each representing an individual 
language, to generate graduated scale maps for analysis.  I selected Russians who ranked 
language as a “5” and Russians who ranked language importance as a “1” to their personal 
senses of identity, for a Chi-Squared test to show whether or not a strong sense of importance for 
Russian language meant that participants were likely to select different territories than those who 
felt language was not important.  In total, nine independent variable groups were analyzed for 
Map 1 (see Table 4.6).  These intendent variable groups were selected for analysis specifically to 
address Research Questions 2a, 2b, and 3a.   
 
Table 4.6 – Variable Groups for Map 1   
Independent Variable Groups  
Dependent 
Variable  
Armenian (N=21) Language  
Dargin (N=8)   
Ingush (N=6)   
Karachay (N=8)   
Lezgin (N=4)   
Nogay (N=6)   
Russian Overall (N=399)*   
Russian - Language High 
Importance (N=256)*   
Russian - Language Low 





Map 2: Territorial Extents of the North Caucasus Region  
Map 2 asked participants to indicate the boundaries of what they considered to be the 
North Caucasus Region.  I identified 10 independent variable groups whose responses and 
comparative maps and selections would be useful for examining Research Questions 1a and 4a 
(Table 4.7).  For comparative purposes, I performed a Chi-Squared test on the responses from 
Russian versus Non-Russian, Christian versus Islam, participants who held the Russian 
Federation in high importance versus low importance, those who held the North Caucasus in 
high importance versus low importance, and those who identified with the Federal District in 
terms of high importance versus low importance.   
 
Table 4.7 – Variable Groups for Map 2 
Independent Variable Groups 
Dependent 
Variable  
Russian (N=399)* North Caucasus  
Non-Russian (N=89)   
Christian (N=399)*   
Islam (N=46)   
Russian Federation - High Importance 
(N=202)* 
  
Russian Federation - Low Importance 
(N=26) 
  
North Caucasus - High Importance 
(N=225) 
  
North Caucasus - Low Importance 
(N=46) 
  
Federal District - High Importance 
(N=203)   
Federal District  - Low Importance  






Map 3: Salience of Religion  
Map 3 asked the participants to indicate the territory where their religions were salient.  I 
classified 11 independent variables to analyze, based on the particular religions with which 
participants had self-affiliated in the survey, and on whether they self-identified as practicing 
their religions, or not (Table 4.8).  I also conducted two Chi-Squared tests based on these map 
data from Christians who said their religion was important versus those who said it was not, and 
from practicing Muslims versus non-practicing Muslims.  These groups and analyses were 
performed with the goal of examining Research Question 3a.   
 
Table 4.8 – Variable Groups for Map 3 
Independent Variable Groups 
Dependent 
Variable  
Christian (N=399)* Religion  
Christian – Religion Important 
(N=151)   
Christian – Religion Not Important 
(N=59)   
Islam (N=46)   
Islam - Practicing (N=19)   




Map 4: Perceived Practice of National Traditions   
Map 4 asked the participants to indicate the territory where their national traditions were 
practiced.  Independent variable categories for this map were classified according to ethno-
national group, similar to how the independent variable groups were selected for Map 1.  I again 
selected the seven ethno-national groups that had provided the most responses.  In total, seven 




Table 4.9 – Variable Groups for Map 4 
Independent Variable Groups Dependent Variable 
Armenian (N=31) 
Practice of National 
Traditions 
Dargin (N=8)   
Ingush (N=6)   
Karachay (N=8)   
Lezgin (N=4)   
Nogay (N=6)   





 Participants who agreed to conduct oral interviews after completing the survey and 
mapping exercise were given the opportunity to explain the information they had provided.  I 
utilized their comments and explanations for the purposes of qualitative clarification.  In addition 
to explaining why they had answered the survey questions as they had, and why they indicated 
the particular territories they had chosen for the cognitive maps, participants were also asked to 
answer a list of seven questions geared toward exploring the study’s four research questions. 
Through these interviews, I was able to gather first-hand qualitative data regarding participants’ 
reactions to the representation of their region in practical and popular geopolitical discourse (Ó 
Tuathail, 2006), their takes on Russia’s geopolitical goals for the North Caucasus, and their 
assessments of North Caucasus territorial integrity, economic strategies, and security issues.  The 
questions read as follows: 
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In your opinion, does ethno-national identity constitute a major societal factor in the 
Russian Federation? 
 
Does you nationality in any way have an impact on your social status, or social life? 
 
Do you think that separating ethno-national groups into specific territories provides 
any kind of advantage to the Russian Federation, or not? 
 
Do you think that the North Caucasus is a unique region?   
 
Does it differ from other regions of the Russian Federation, and if so, how? 
 
How accurately, in your opinion, are political and economic matters in the North 
Caucasus covered by mass media outlets? 
 
Do you consider the North Caucasus and its various territories as playing a role in 
Russia’s geopolitical strategy? 
 
Is Stavropol Kray different from the other Regions in the North Caucasus Federal 
District?   
 
Interview Questions 1 and 2 were included to address Research Question 3a, on civic and 
ethno-national views of culture in the North Caucasus.  Interview Question 3 was included to 
better explore Research Question 2b, dealing with the concept of ethno-federalism.  Interview 
Questions 4 and 7 were included to examine research question 3b, addressing the perceived 
civic-Russianness of the North Caucasus.  Interview Question 7 was also included to provide 
insight into research question 4b, on the status of Stavropol within the North Caucasus.  
Interview Questions 5 and 6 helped to address Research Questions 3c and 4a, about Russians as 
a “state-bearing nation” (Brubaker, 1995) and about Russia’s ethno-federal and regional polices 
of constructive regionalization.  Responses to Interview Question 3 were also useful for Research 




 Analysis of Interview Data  
 Since participant interviews covered content that was potential relevant for each of my 
research questions, their opinions and anecdotes provided qualitative explanation for many of the 
quantities trends identified in this study.  I selected anecdotes from interviews and included in 
the discussion chapter of this project when applicable, suggested evidence either for or against 
the qualitative results of this study.    
 In addition to working as qualitative supporting material for the project’s survey and map 
data, I also relied on the interviews to examine participants’ perceptions of identity in the North 
Caucasus though a technique called “Human Preset Coding for Response-Based Messages.”  
This technique had been cited as an effective way for measuring multiple content dimensions 
that can be both theoretical and data-based content dimensions (Abdelal, 2009) and (Johnston et 
al., 2009).  I developed and utilized the a coding scheme to manage the interview data (see Table 
4.10), which allowed me to sort participants’ responses according to their various independent 
variable categories, identity trends, as well as their willingness to discuss various aspects of 
regional identity and regional policy in the study area.   
Table 4.10 – Coding Scheme for Interviews  
 
I.  General Information 
1.) Interview #: Record of interview #, date, and location as stated in the beginning of the recording, 
which refers to interview participant as follows 
2.) ID #: Record of the participant ID # found at the top of every survey 
3.) Number of sentences: count and record the number of sentences in the interview, according to 
standard punctuation, and denote sentence fragments 
II. Macro Identity  Constructs 
Regarding variables 4-6, count and record the number of sentences containing reference to the 
following (sentences may be counted in more than one category if applicable): 
4.) Self-identification: information pertaining specifically to the participant, noted in the first person 
(“I am not a nationalist,” I think that there are problems in the North Caucasus,” “I am optimistic 
about the future of our region”).   
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5.) Role-identification: information pertaining to social roles as perceived by or performed by the 
participant (“The North Caucasus is the heart of Russia” “The North Caucasus is important for 
tourism development and the national economy” “Family structures are very important to us”). 
6.) Collective identification: descriptive information regarding the participant’s belonging to or 
exclusion from a social group, in-group versus out-group references (“We Russians are the cultural 
backbone of the region,” “Islamic traditions are dangerous for Russian society,” “I am typical of 
most Russians in that…”).     
III. Constructs based on Theory (Tuan, 1974) (Sack, 1983) (Häkli, 2001) (Paasi, 2009) (Felgenhauer,  
2010) (Vainikka, 2012) 
For variables 7-12, record the number of sentences containing the references to the following criteria 
and note whether the participant negated reference to said criteria “-“ (I do not agree with federal 
district reform”) 
7.) Territoriality and problem solving: reference to objectives, action, or reaction to particular policy, 
and reference to positive outcomes versus negative outcomes regarding actions taken to said topics 
8.) Structure of social expectations: references to social obligations responsibilities, rules, codes of 
behavior, institutions, or social norms, duty to others or some type of collective entity   
9.) Affect and feelings: reference to emotional expressions to places (sorrow, happiness, pride, hate, 
etc.)   
10.) Civic identity (Rossijski): reference to participation, belonging, or attachment to the Russian 
state via economic social and political identification 
11.) Ethno-national identity (nationalnost): reference to language, ancestry, religion and peoplehood 
12.)Region as brand: references to characteristics viewed as ascribed to the study area or parts of the 
study area in regional context   
IV.  Constructs from Survey Data on Media and Regional Relations 
For variables 13-15, use the same procedure   
13.)  Perceived Media Coverage: perceptions of media coverage and themes featuring the study 
area/its population    
14.) Inter-Regional viewpoint: reference to or comparisons with other regions of the Russian 
Federation, relations among regions, or relations between regions and Moscow 
15.) Stavropol’s Place in the North Caucasus: Characteristics of Stavropol Kray which make the 
territory unique or congruent with other territories in the North Caucasus Federal District   
 
 
Organizing the data according to the coding scheme’s constructs allowed me to quantify 
how many participants had voiced an option regarding each element of identity relevant to the 
study, and to examine whether participants contextualized their personal conceptions of identity 
according to place-based factors during their interviews.  The coding scheme also allowed me to 
tell how likely they were to hold certain opinions, whether positive, negative, or indifferent on 
issues concerning regionalization, identity and territoriality in the North Caucasus.  Finally, 
coding the interview transcripts provided me with a base of comparison to further explore trends 
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among the various identity groups in this study, and apply them to the various theoretical 
concepts upon which the scheme was based. 
 
Positionality, Personal Bias, and Limitations  
 I believe that as a researcher, it is critical to inform the audience of this research of my 
own personal background, interests, and potential biases that may have influenced my approach 
to this project, or effected the treatment of the human subjects on which this study founded.  I 
base this belief on scholarly work, such as Bennett (2002), Cloke et al. (2004), and Phillips and 
Johns (2012), which suggests that a researcher’s ethnic background, age, class and gender may 
affect his or her attitudes and viewpoints in relation to certain issues or groups of people.   
I acknowledge that I am an American citizen.  I am a male of predominantly Germanic 
heritage.  In the context of the Russian Federation, I am a foreigner.  My personal identity is also 
partly based on being (American) middle class, straight and white.  Although I am not Russian, 
nor do I have any ancestry related to the various ethnic groups in the study area, I am married to 
a woman who was born and raised in Russia, and who is not ethnically Russian, as the majority 
of her lineage is Armenian.  I have made no secret of these factors to any of the research 
participants who enquired about them during the course of this project.  I am aware of the fact 
that this knowledge may have had an impact on how participants conducted themselves with me 
in interviews and in their survey responses.  Because people in Russia generally tend to treat 
foreigners with suspicion, I sometimes needed to convince them that my project is being 
conducted purely for academic purposes, and that any personal data they provided would not be 
shared with anyone, or used for reason other than this project and/or subsequent academic 
research.   
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 I should comment briefly on my personal experiences in the study area and within its 
community.  I have formally studied the Russian language and earned a Bachelor’s degree in 
Russian from Michigan State University.  I also spent approximately two years living in 
Stavropol and working both in the city and the surrounding area, both conducting academic 
research and as employee of a private firm called Agenstvo AKT, which provides English-
language services related to education, marketing, and business consulting.  I acknowledge the 
fact that I have relatives in the community, through my wife, and I consider myself part of the 
greater Stavropol community, through these connections and the friendships that I continue to 
support there.  Although I have made every attempt to remain objective and unbiased while 
designing and conducting this research project, I admit that my own personal sympathies and 
interests may have played a subconscious role in my work, as I believe is the case with any 
social science research.    
97 
 
Chapter V: Results and Analysis from Survey Data 
 
 
 In total, 488 participants chose to provide survey data for this project, whereby they were 
asked to consider ten potential markers of identity (dependent variables), and rank their 
associations with these variables in terms of each variables importance to the participants’ 
personal understandings of self-identification.  The scale by which the participants rated the 
dependent variables was a five-point Likert style model, where a ranking of “5” meant “very 
important,” a ranking of “4” meant “important,” “3” meant “somewhat important,” “2 meant 
“not important,” and “1” meant “absolutely not important.”   I designed the dependent variables 
to fall into two basic categories, place-based and non-place-based, as I am interested in 
determining whether there are differences in how the residents of the North Caucasus understand 
and appreciate several social and territorial factors, in terms of these factors’ importance to 
participants’ personal and collective conceptions of identity.  Therefore, four of the dependent 
variables are social in nature, while others are based on participants’ preferences regarding six 
territories/regions, to which they could personally ascribe a sense of belonging.  My reasons for 
comparing participants’ overall mean scores are to determine which dependent variables were 
most important to the population as a whole, to see whether or not particular variables were 
favored over others and to what degree, and to see whether or not participants identified with 
formalized regional territories to the same degree as vernacular regional constructs.  Figure, 5.1 




Figure 5.1 – Overall Ranking of Dependent Variables for Participants’ Self-Identification 
 
 
 The dependent variables “Nationality (Natsionalnost),” “Religion,” “Native Language,” 
and “Russian Citizenship” were not territorially-specific but based on social and group 
associations.  Because all of the participants in the study could relate to these four variables, I 
expected them to score above “3” (somewhat important) in terms of overall importance for the 
entire survey, which turned out to be the case.  My expectation in terms of these dependent 
variables’ order of importance was as follows: “Native Language,” “Nationality,” “Russian 
Citizenship,” and “Religion.”  I expected Native Language to be the most important due to the 
fact that everyone is forced to interact with language on a daily basis.  Additionally, work on 
issues of language and identity by scholars such as Benedict Anderson (2006), highlight the 
importance of language above other potential factors.  Anderson (2006) argues that since the use 
of vernacular languages in print media became widespread, native language has replaced religion 
identity as the simplest way for people to associate with members of their own ethnic groups and 































Overall Rankings of Dependent Variables for Self-Identification  
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overall most important of all the dependent variables in the study.  I expected “Nationality” and 
“Russian Citizenship” to follow in importance.  Both of these concepts were applicable to each 
participant, and since all of them had “Russian Citizenship,” I predicted that “Nationality” would 
be more important, as it highlighted a more unique level of identity.  I had expected religion to 
be the least important social dependent variable, based on the fact that both Orthodox 
Christianity and Sunni Islam, the two major religions practiced in the study area, were not 
universally affecting all of the participants at a personal level.  As the work of scholars such as 
Karpov (2010), Knox (2004), and Marat and Richardson (1998) suggests, while practice and 
appreciation for Orthodoxy and Islam are on the rise in Russia, especially among younger 
people, there still tends to be serious resistance to these ideas held by members of previous 
generations, who spent their formative years living in an officially anti-religious society, the 
USSR.     
 For the other six variables, which examined participants’ preferences of association with 
place-based constructs, I expected the participants to follow the trends I found when addressing 
similar questions in a previous research project (Thelen, 2010), whereby participants from 
Stavropol Kray and Karachay-Cherkessia preferred to associate with the North Caucasus in a 
vernacular sense rather than formalized territories such as the Southern Federal District.  Also, 
while results from my previous study suggested that participants in the North Caucasus preferred 
this regional construct, and sub-regional territories (krays and republics) to the federal scale idea 
of the “Russian Federation,” the “Russian Federation,” was more important than a formalized 
regional construct the “Southern Federal District,” of which Stavropol Kray and Karachay-
Cherkessia were part at the time.  Since this study also asked participants to consider their 
cities/villages/auls in terms of their personal conceptions of identity, I expected this more 
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localized scale to be popular, due to familiarity and lived experience, but due to its lower priority 
in scalar size and importance within the Russian Federal System, I thought that this dependent 
variable was likely to be ranked the lowest.  Therefore, I expected the overall rankings of the 
various place-based dependent variables in the following orders: “North Caucasus,” as the most 
popular, followed by “The South of Russia,” “Kray-Republic,” “Russian Federation,” “Federal 
District,” and finally “City/Village/Aul.”    
  Out of the four social variables, “Native Language” registered the highest score, with an 
overall mean of 4.19.  The next most popular was “Russian Citizenship” (mean = 3.99), followed 
by “Religion” (mean = 3.62), and then “Nationality” (mean = 3.49).  While I had expected 
“Native Language” to be the most popular, I expected “Nationality” to be the next most popular.  
However, participants on the whole chose to identity more strongly with “Russian Citizenship” 
and “Religion,” suggesting an overall higher degree of emphasis on civic/political and 
religious/spiritual identities than with an exclusive sense of ethno-national identity.  A lower 
emphasis on nationality than on the other dependent variables was also demonstrated by many of 
the participants whom I interviewed, in addition to quantitative survey data.  A typical response 
on the topic of “Nationality” as an identity factor can be seen in the response of participant 
V003, a 24--year old Russian woman from Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Kray: 
Nationality as an important factor in contemporary Russian society … but I would 
say that it is not fully important.  Although, young people might say it does matter 
because there are a lot of points of contention among the young people here.  
Nationality remains somewhat important because the government pays attention to it. 
Some people also let nationality affect where they buy real estate.  Maybe someone 
would not buy an apartment in a certain part of town because he did not want to live 
next to national groups with bad reputations, for example where they are selling 
vegetables in markets.  But, nationality does not have any bearing on my personal 
life or social status.  I have lived here all my life, among the same people … 




These comments from participant V003 clearly show a sense of engagement with 
“Nationality” as well as a consciousness of social difference based on “Nationality.”  
However, her hesitancy not to claim the importance of “Nationality” was a very common 
trend in the interviews, especially among ethnic Russian participants. This trend draws 
upon Brubaker’s (1995) notions of how members of a state-bearing nation are likely to 
behaving in the context of their own nationalizing states, whereby ideas of civic identity 
and national identity overlap.  Because ethnic Russian culture serves in many ways as the 
basis for norms and civic behavior in Russian society, and constitutes the dominant culture 
throughout the state, an ethnic Russian person may choose not to separate notions of 
identity into state/civic versus national, what Murphy (2008) describes as a non-nationalist 
identity.  On the other hand, non-Russians, who cannot associate their ethno-national 
identity with the entire state in a salient sense, would likely have to draw on these two 
markers of identity separately.  Due to this necessary separation of national and state/civic 
markers by non-Russians, ethnic Russians may see having a strong sense of national 
identity therefore as a specifically non-Russian trait.  Holding such a view point could 
explain why ethnic Russians tended to shy away from strong associations specifically with 
their own ethno-national group, leading them to value a sense of non-nationalist identity.       
 Perhaps the biggest surprise to me, out of all the data in the survey, was the fact that 
“Russian Federation” registered not just the highest overall mean score of the territorial identity 
markers, but the highest overall mean score of any of the survey’s dependent variables with 4.33.  
Association with Russia at the federal scale even scored more highly than with “Russian 
Citizenship” (mean = 3.99), suggesting that participants favored a territorial conception of Russia 
versus a more civic marker.  This result suggests that an understanding of Russia and the 
102 
 
hierarchy of place-based identity markers with in as a meta-geography, such as suggested by 
Lewis and Wigen (1997), Paasi (2002), and Murphy (2008), is an appropriate way to 
conceptualize how people understand the various scalar identity markers in the Russian 
Federation.  The individual territorial constructions, “Russian Federation,” “North Caucasus 
Federal District,” “Kray/Oblast/Republic,” and so on, therefore constitute as spatial framework 
of knowledge (Lewis and Wigen, 1997) from which to draw associations.  One way that 
associations can be made with territories as identity markers within a meta-geography is via key 
institutions (Paasi, 2002).  Because the Russian Federation exhibits a centralized power structure, 
described by Agnew (2005) in terms of a “classic sovereignty regime,” characterized by a high 
and effective degree of centralized political authority, one would expect its key institutions to 
distribute from the federal level across more localized scales of meaning.   
I had expected the overall mean scores to reflect a higher appreciation for “Russian 
Federation” than some of the other territorial identity markers.  However, the scalar preferences 
of the participants did not follow my expectation, as the most localized identity marker, 
“City/Village/Aul,” was the second-most popular of the place-based dependent variables with an 
overall mean score of 4.13.  This trend in the data to prioritize the federal and local scales in 
importance for one’s identity can be understood with the comments of Participant V021, a 26-
year old ethnic Russian man from Stavropol, who said: 
The two most important scales for understanding where someone is from is a small 
homeland and a large homeland, in the middle meaning gets lost.  We live in a local 
context, and we see the overall context of Russia through media and institutions.  
 
It seems that the data trends from this study point to a similar overall opinion as the one held by 
Participant V021, because the four regional scale place-based dependent variables scored lower 
overall than dependent variables at the federal and local scales.  This notion of preference for 
103 
 
federal or local scales speaks to Knight’s (1982) work on scalar identity, where meso-level scales 
of meaning, in this case constructs such as federal districts, are potentially confusing as they join 
different kinds of territories, krays, oblasts, and republics, together under a unified form of 
inclusive governance.  Institutions that disseminate more powerful meanings therefore are seen 
to originate from with the federal and localized scales.   
 The overall most popular place-based identity variable was “Kray/Oblast/Republic,” 
which had a mean score of 4.10.  “Kray/Oblast/Republic” was followed by “Federal District,” 
which registered an overall mean score of 3.91.  For regional identity, it is important to note that 
these two dependent variables are both formal regions, as are “Russian Federation” and 
“City/Village/Aul.”  Therefore, the two vernacular regional dependent variables, “The South of 
Russia” (mean = 3.88) and “The North Caucasus” (mean = 3.88), ranked as the lowest of the 
place-based markers in the study.  However, it is important to note that participants did rank all 
of the place-based dependent variables more highly than both “Religion,” and “Nationality.” 
This result was surprising because, as the interview data in this study suggest, elements relating 
to religion and nationality are very present in the landscape of the North Caucasus, and are 
considered to be important in terms of social practices and expectations throughout the study 
area.   
The overall mean scores provide a general sense of how participants felt about the study’s 
dependent variables, and constitute a baseline by which to compare more specific identity trends 
present among various groups of participants.  After establishing these basic survey data trends, 
my next step in the survey data analysis was to identify any significant differences among 
several identity groups (independent variables), in order to gain a more complex understanding 




Significant Differences in Identity Preferences between Independent Variable Categories  
 
 In order to determine whether or not the distributions of rankings for the study’s 
dependent variables differed significantly between the binary categories of the study’s 10 
independent variables, I conducted a Kruskal-Wallis test.  The Kruskal-Wallis test is a non-
parametric test used to determine whether or not differences in distributions between two 
populations are statically significant, as opposed to having occurred randomly.   Each of 10 
independent variable groups in the study has two binary categories (Figure 5.6).  The output the 
Kruskal-Wallis test, in the case of each independent variable, showed whether or not the 
distributions of responses from the two binary categories were significant in regard to each 
dependent variable.  Because each independent variable category represents a unique identity 
group, for example “Muslims,” or “ethnic Russians,” understood in comparison to another group, 
“Christians,” or “non-Russians,”  determining whether or not these groups opinions differed 
significantly across the categories was important for exploring differences in understandings, 
accounting for social dependent variables, as well as placed-based dependent variables.  In total, 
the Kruskal-Wallis tests that I conducted indicated 26 instances where the differences in the 
answer distributions were significant between independent variable group categories.  In the 
following sections I will present these significant instances, and provide anecdotal evidence from 
interview data that supports these findings.   
 
Significant Differences in Identity Preferences between Ethnic Russians and Non-Russian 
Participants 
 
The two independent variable categories for “Nationality” being compared in the 
Kruskal-Wallis test were Russian (indicating that participants had self-identified as ethnic 
Russians) and Non-Russian (indicating that participations had self-identified as non-Ethnic 
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Russians).  When comparing the Kruskal-Wallis output for “Nationality,” I found significance 
values (p-values) lower than the significance level (0.01) in regard to three of the dependent 
variables, thus indicating that the differences in their distributions were significant.  The results 
showed that in terms of the importance of religion for self-identification, Non-Russians (mean = 
4.18) considered their religion to be significantly more important than Russians (mean = 3.52).  
Non-Russians (mean = 4.32) also ranked their perceived importance of the North Caucasus 
Region to be significantly higher than Russians (mean = 3.79), and Non-Russians’ (mean = 4.42) 
perceived importance of their Krays, Oblasts, or Republics was also significantly higher than 
Russians’ (mean = 4.04) perceived importance of the same variable.  
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The fact that non-Russian groups native to the North Caucasus region are often 
referenced collectively as “North Caucasus Nationalities” (Severnye Kavkazkie Natsionalnasti) 
creates a regional sense of cultural separation, which works to unite a large number of otherwise 
unique socio-cultural groups under a common banner.  Because Russians are generally not 
recognized as being native to the North Caucasus region, perhaps with the exception of the 
Cossacks (Boeck, 1998), a sense of ethnic Russian identity can be understood as outside, or in 
addition to the North Caucasus nationalities.  Additionally, if non-Russian North Caucasus 
nationalities are seen as established and legitimate cultures in the region, then Russians could be 
seen as outsiders, or native to places elsewhere.  Such a blatant association with the North 
Caucasus region itself, in addition to the greater Russian/non-Russian binary subtext, would 
likely work to explain why non-Russians would value an overarching territorial association with 
the North Caucasus region at a significantly higher level than ethnic Russians.   
Even Armenians, a widely accepted South Caucasus nationality, are often associated with 
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differences in the Kruskal-Wallis output existed between non-Russians and Russians, and not 
between Christians and Muslims, points to the notion that Armenians, who overwhelmingly 
identified themselves as Christians in the survey, responded more in line with the other non-
Russian nationalities, who mostly identified as Muslims.  This result therefore suggests that there 
is definitely an attractive sense associated with the North Caucasus that is shared among many 
non-Russian ethno-national groups regardless of their origin.  One thing that the various non-
Russian nationalities tend to have in common, in the context of the North Caucasus, is the 
established communities in the region. According to participant V006, a man of mixed Russian 
and Armenian descent:   
We will always observe sub-cultures in Russia.  Armenians go about their own 
business, so do Chechens. It does not matter where they are, as long as they can 
found and maintain communities.   
 
If establishing communities is indeed a major factor in forming place-based identities 
among members of said community in the context of Russia, then the history of ethnic 
settlement in the area, combined with contemporary trends in migration and population 
dynamics, would certainly suggest that most, if not all of the non-Russian groups in the 
study area could justifiably associated with the North Caucasus in a vernacular sense.  
Since ethnic Russian communities exist throughout the Russian Federation, a focused 
association with the North Caucasus as a specific context for community for ethnic 
Russians would be just one of many regional associations that ethnic Russian participants 









 Non-Russians’ significant preference for Krays/Oblasts/Republics is perhaps logical, due 
to the nature of ethno-federalism in contemporary Russia.  Non-Russian groups, especially those 
with titular status, can establish formalized social norms through the use of non-Russian official 
language and separate republic constitutions and legal structures that are tailored to the various 
non-Russian ethno-national groups’ ways of life and social preferences.  In such a system, Krays 
and Oblasts, which constitute the majority of ethnic Russian territories, are governed directly 
according to the constitution of the Russian Federation and, in a legal sense, are not substantively 
different.  However, laws, customs, and social expectations can be more unique in republics, and 
can differ vastly from republic to republic.  It is also important to note that most of the non-
Russian participants in the study, having completed the surveys in Stavropol, have obviously 
experienced life to some degree in a kray and a republic, whereas Russian participants may not 
have lived in or even spent significant time in republics.  This preference of association with a 
more sub-federal scale territorial identity marker aligns with Sack’s (1983) notions of degrees of 


























power, in relation to the federal center.  Karachay-Cherkessia, and other republics, can be 
considered less territorialized than Stavropol Kray, because of their unique sets of autonomous 
rights and laws, which are not applicable in majority ethnic Russian krays and oblasts.  In 
Russia’s ethno-federal system, the autonomous features of the republics are specifically 
translated in ethno-national terms, as certain sets of defined rights for specific groups of people, 
in specific territories.    
 
Significant Differences in Identity Preferences between Native Russian Speakers and 
Native Speakers of Other Languages 
 
 When analyzing response data in terms of participants’ native languages, the independent 
variable “Language,” I expected the results to trend the same as they had in regard to the 
independent variable “Nationality,” as the participants tended to fall into the same categories, 
with Russian speakers’ responses in line with ethnic Russians, and the responses of speakers of 
non-Russian languages tending to follow the same trend as the responses submitted by non-
Russians. Therefore, I expected to see significant differences for the categories Religion, North 
Caucasus, and Kray/Oblast/Republic, and these trends were indeed present in the data output, 
with  Native speakers of non-Russian languages (mean = 4.26) showing a significantly higher 
preference for religion than Native Russian speakers (mean = 3.51), Native speakers of non-
Russian languages (mean = 4.40) showing a significantly higher preference for their 
Kray/Oblast/Republic than did native Russian speakers (mean = 4.05), and Non-Russian native 
speakers (mean = 4.50) also indicating a higher preference for the North Caucasus than native 




Figure 5.5 – Importance of Religion for Self-Identification between Russian Speakers and 
Speakers of Other Languages   
 
 
Figure 5.6 – Importance of North Caucasus for Self-Identification between Russian Speakers and 
Speakers of Other Languages 
 
 
Figure 5.7 – Importance of Kray/Oblast/Republic for Self-Identification between Russian 

















































































Interestingly though, another dependent variable, Nationality, showed a significantly 
higher preference by native speakers of non-Russian languages (mean = 3.94) than by native 
Russian speakers (mean = 3.41), as 18 participants who had self-identified with a national 
identity other than Russian, also identified Russian as their native language.  The addition of 
“Nationality” to the list of significantly different preferences for language identification, and not 
for ethno-national identification, is potentially interesting because this trend suggests that 
speaking one’s native language leads to a more significant appreciation for his or her nationality, 
at least in the context of the study area, than one’s social and cultural connections to his or her 
ethno-national group.   
Anecdotal evidence from the interview data also tended to suggest that speakers of non-
Russian languages were generally concerned about the future of their native languages, in terms 
of their use and preservation.  According to participant V028, a 34-year old Nogay woman from 
Karachevsk, Karachay-Cherkessia, 
Nationality is a really important factor for me.  I have two young sons and I will 
insist that they marry Nogay women.  It is important for me that their wives will be 
Nogay so that they have the chance to be raised with our traditions.  If they do not 
marry Nogay women, then their children will not learn our language and that is 
that… my decedents will not be Nogays!  Language is the most important factor.  
The Nogay language holds our nation together. 
 
In the comments of participant V028, she highlights the idea that language itself is critical for the 
other elements of nationhood to be practiced, and that those who do not speak Nogay, are in fact 
culturally inauthentic, and not true members of the Nogay nation.   
The importance of language authenticity was also present among the interviews, in which 
several participants questioned whether or not various versions or dialects of their native 
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language should be considered socially or culturally equivalent to the standards versions.  
According to participant V031, an Armenian woman living in Stavropol: 
I would consider Stavropol, Krasnodar, and Rostov to have clean Armenian (chistiy 
Armyanski) for now, but I can tell you that the language is already changing there as 
well.  I have noticed that third-generation and some second-generation Armenians in 
Russia understand Armenian, but they do not speak it very well … for example, even 
a place like Baku, from what I know, has a language is more like Karabakh-
Armenian, which I do not consider to be clean Armenian. 
 
The notion that the use of Russian language by non-Russians can replace non-Russian languages 
within greater ethno-national non-Russian communities in the North Caucasus was also present 
in the interviews of several Armenian participants.  This group included participant V030, a 25-
year old Armenian woman who was born in Yerevan, Armenia, but immigrated to Stavropol at 
the age of 5, and Participant V031, quoted above, a 23--year old Armenian women, also from 
Yerevan who immigrated to Stavropol at age 3.  According to participant V030: 
It seems to me though that Armenian language is really only present where 
Armenians live together and form a community.  Otherwise Armenians here in 
Russia all know Russian, and will freely speak Russian with anyone.  However, I 
have met a lot of Armenians my age from other cities, outside of Stavropol, who 
have preferred to speak Russian with me, rather than Armenian. 
 
These comments by Participant V030 speak to the fact that Russian, as the lingua franca of the 
North Caucasus, is necessarily spoken by members of the Armenian community.  In addition to 
being taught in schools and used throughout Russia as the language for state functions and 
intuitions, Russian language in the North Caucasus is also critical for intercommunication among 
the various ethno-national communities in the region.  Therefore, the opportunity to speak 
Russian, in addition to the sociocultural and economic expectations and advantages associated 
with Russian language, make knowing and communicating in Russian a necessity.  Other 
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languages, although possibly prevalent within various non-Russian communities, are accessible 
only in situations of mono-ethnic communication.   
 
Figure 5.8 – Importance of Nationality for Self-Identification between Russian Speakers and 
Speakers of Other Languages 
 
 
Significant Differences in Identity Preferences between Participants Claiming to Practice 
National Traditions versus Those Claiming not to Practice National Traditions.  
 
 Of all of the independent variable group categories in this project, none showed more 
significant differences across the dependent variables as “Practice of National Traditions.”  The 
results show that participants who claimed to actively practice what they considered to be the 
traditions of their ethno-national group also said that many elements of identity were 
significantly more important to/for their personal understanding of identity than did participants 
who claimed not to actively practice national traditions.  These differences occurred across both 
territorial and social variables, with the exception of the dependent variable “Citizenship,” which 
refers to the importance of citizenship in the Russian Federation.  Citizenship was given a 
significantly higher preference by participants not actively practicing national traditions (mean = 





























Figure 5.9 – Importance of Russian Citizenship for Self-Identification between Participants Who 
Practice National Traditions and Those Who Do Not 
 
Relying on a sense of civic inclusion in the overall context of the Russian Federation was 
significantly favored by those respondents who reportedly did not practice their national 
traditions.  This trend is interesting because it shows a preference for a greater, more inclusive 
sense of belonging, beyond one’s ethno-national community, language group, or religious belief 
system.  It also suggests that a lack of personal connection to nationalistic elements might lead to 
a greater appreciation for the idea of a Rossisskie sense of personal identity, in agreement with 
the concept of non-nationalist identity (Murphy, 2008).  In a multi-ethnic environment, such as 
the North Caucasus, citizenship in the Russian Federation can be used as a potential identity 
marker for a person of any nationality.  Participant V037, a 30--year old Armenian woman from 
Stavropol who indicated that she did not practice her national traditions, offered the following 
comments, illustrating the importance of citizenship in regard to social inclusion with the greater 
context of the Russian state: 
For me, citizenship in the Russian Federation is most important out of the options 
listed on the survey.  I think I feel this way because I live in the Russian Federation, 
but I am not ethnically Russian.  Citizenship means more to me than nationality 
because we have a lot of nationalities, but we all have Russian citizenship in 






























For non-Russian participants, such as Participant V037, an inclusive sense of identity found in 
connection to the Russian Federation seems to be a formative component of her personal sense 
of identity.   
 While citizenship was favored by participants not practicing their national traditions, the 
dependent variables “Nationality,” “Religion,” and “Native Language,” were all ranked 
significantly higher by participants practicing national traditions.  Of three social variables, 
“Native Language” scored the highest, with practicing participants registering a mean score of 
4.33, versus non-practicing participants’ mean score of 3.65.  This result is logical because 
speaking a particular language is a social process and a potential identity marker with which 
every participant in the study was likely to have engaged (perhaps with the potential exception 
being any non-Russian speaking participants living in isolation from their ethno-national 
communities).   
Language was also the dependent variable mentioned most often by participants in this 
study’s interview data, with many participants commenting specifically on its importance.  
Participant V039, a 24--year old Russian man from Stavropol, who also indicated that he actively 
practiced Russian national traditions, offered the following comments on language: 
I consider my native language, Russian, to be the most important factor in my 
identity.  I am proud of my language and I believe that we should respect it and 
speak it correctly.  It makes me sad to see so many people in Russia today either 
speaking it or writing it with a lot of mistakes.  I also believe that language is the 
most important part of any culture.  In Russia today, many younger people my age 
do not continue any of the traditions of previous generations, and they rarely go to 
church.  So, I think the language is something that everyone has, and it is actually the 
only element that all ethnic Russian people share.   
 
Responses such as that offered by participant V039 support the idea that language, which can be 
considered as a national tradition, is a fundamental component in Russian society.  Due to the 
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fact that Russian is the regional lingua franca, official language of the Russian Federation, and 
most commonly spoken native language in the North Caucasus means that engagement with the 
Russian language is a social and economic necessity.  However, his comments also indicate an 
awareness of change, and lack of attention and effort in supporting classical or educated levels of 
language usage, pointing to various standards of the language which could potentially be used to 
discern between Russian simply as a language of communication or as a specific marker of 
heritage and national identity that is specific to ethnic Russians as a group.     
 
Figure 5.10 – Importance of Native Language for Self-Identification between Participants Who 
Practice National Traditions and Those Who Do Not 
 
 While social engagement and interaction with the Russian language is practically 
unavoidable in Stavropol, those participants who claimed not to practice national traditions were 
much more indifferent to the idea of language in their interview comments.  Some participants, 
among those not practicing their national traditions, were even dismissive of the importance of 
language.  However, they still tended to associate language as an important factor in terms of 
national identity as a concept.  Participant V004, a 25-year old Russian man from Stavropol, who 





























for me associating with an ethnic group and an ethnic language is not unimportant.  I 
feel like I cannot fully take myself out of the Russian ethnic group, but I also cannot 
say that I try to support or practice our cultural traditions.  I could not say I am a 
model Russian, I suppose. 
 
The comments of Participant V004 clearly show an awareness regarding the link between ethno-
national groups and their native languages, and suggest that there are understood standards to 
which a member of the Russian ethno-national group should adhere in order to be considered a 
model Russian.   
 After “Native Language,” “Religion” was the next-highest ranking dependent variable 
with significantly higher preference by participants practicing their national traditions.  Those 
who indicated that they practiced national traditions gave “Religion” an overall mean score of 
3.74, while non-practicing participants’ mean sore for “Religion” was 3.10.   
 
Figure 5.11 – Importance of Religion for Self-Identification between Participants Who Practice 
National Traditions and Those Who Do Not 
 
Participant interviews tended to focus on religion as a major North Caucasus identity 
marker, particularly among populations who are seen as taking forms of strict or extreme 
impetrations of either Islam or Christianity.  A theme that was present in several interviews 
among participants who claimed to practice their national traditions was the idea that religion, 




























broader sense of inclusion than would language or nationality, but a more distinct and exclusive 
marker than Russian Citizenship.  According to Participant V021, a 26--year old Russian man 
from Stavropol: 
I consider religion to be the most important social factor in the North Caucasus.  The 
effects of religion are the most pronounced of the various social factors on this list.  I 
am not talking about people who have a moderate sense of religion, I am referring to 
people are radical or fanatical about how they practice.  These people are very 
noticeable in the North Caucasus.  Even at a basic level, take someone for example 
from our Slavic Stavropol Kray.  It would be easy for that person to establish 
communication with an Ossetian, or possible an Armenian or Georgian because they 
share a commonality in terms of Christian understandings.  There are seldom 
problems among national groups of the same religion.  Conflict gets played off at 
having to do with nationality, but we do not really see Christians in conflict with 
other Christians, or Muslims in conflict with Muslims, at least not in this region.  I 
also believe that in recent times, Muslims identify more strongly with an identity 
based in Islam, rather than an identity based on their various national groups. 
 
The comments of Participant V021, someone who identified as practicing national traditions, 
present religion as a broad identity marker.  The idea of “Christian understandings” among 
believers of various churches, a theme present in his comments, places emphasis on the idea that 
Christianity as an overall identity concept might be considered in a collective sense, rather than 
in term of exclusive national understandings of the various Christian Churches common in the 
North Caucasus, such as the Russian Orthodox Church, Armenian Apostolic Church, or 
Georgian Orthodox Church.  Therefore, social differentiation between Christianity and Islam is 
more important than differentiation between various branches or denominations within the two 
religions.   
 Although divisions between Christianity and Islam were shown in the results from this 
study to be an important identity split in the North Caucasus, whether or not one practiced his or 
her national traditions served as a basis for significant difference in the importance of religion, 
according to the Kruskal Wallis test results.  Since religion can in itself be considered a national 
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tradition, it is perhaps logical that those participants who practice national traditions in general 
would indicate the importance of religion for their personal conceptions of identity, as the data 
analysis shows.  Therefore, comments made by participants who indicated that that they did not 
practice national traditions should have suggested a lack of importance, or at least indifference to 
the importance of “Religion” for identity.  Such a pattern was indeed evident among the 
interviews of participants who did not actively practice national traditions, as demonstrated by 
these comments from Participant V006, an 18--year old Stavropol man of mixed Russian, 
Armenian and Ukrainian national heritage: 
I would tell you that religion and nationality for me are really not important at all, 
therefore I ranked them as “1.” Someone’s nationality does not play a role in how I 
see him or her as a person.  Whether people are good or bad, or whether they are 
interesting or not really depends on might be affected by the kinds of experiences 
they have, and some of these experiences could be had, or encountered within the 
context of national traditions, but I do not think such experiences determine how 
their character will be overall … Religion is not really important to me personally 
because I myself and not religious and I do not really associate with any others who 
are religious.  
 
Participant V006 places emphasis on the social channels that religious participation and 
association can create for a person in the North Caucasus, but ultimately focuses on one’s 
individual character as the most critical element of his or her identity.  However, his comments 
also suggest the importance of these aforementioned social channels, as well as the broader 
generalizations that exist in regard to perceived religious identification.  The idea that people will 
be able to draw on understandings concerning their religious persuasions, which was presented 
by participant V021’s comments, is supported by participant V006 in terms of his admitted lack 




Figure 5.12 – Importance of Nationality for Self-Identification between Participants Who 
Practice National Traditions and Those Who Do Not 
 
 
 As was expected, “Nationality” as an overall concept was also favored by participants 
who practiced national traditions, with a mean score of 3.62 versus a mean score of 2.97 from 
non-practicing participants.  “Nationality” was ranked lower than “Native Language” and 
“Religion,” and received the lowest overall mean score of 2.97 by participants not practicing 
national traditions of any significantly lower mean score in this study, the only mean score of 
significant differences between independent variables groups to receive and an overall mean 
score lower than 3.   
 Although all of the interview participants addressed the concept of “Nationality,” it was 
most often mentioned in connection to the overall cultural diversity of the North Caucasus 
region.  However, participants not practicing their national traditions tended to rely more heavily 
on language and religion as identity markers, emphasizing the fact that personal choices and 
preferences guide one’s choices of language usage and religious practice, while one’s nationality, 
at least in the North Caucasus, is not considered to be chosen, but rather inherited by birth.  





























Karachay-Cherkessia, support the aforementioned lack of preference for “Nationality” among 
participants who did not practice their national traditions: 
Nationality for me is not really important.  Religion is important because I believe it 
is both more of a point of contention between people, and it is also a choice.  People 
do not really chose their nationalities but they choose which religions to follow. 
 
 While nationality was less important than most other identity markers for participants not 
practicing national traditions on a personal level, many of participants in this independent 
variable group did comment on the importance of social connections in contemporary Russian 
society.  Those participants practicing national traditions tended also to comment on the idea of 
connections, and several participants suggested that, since one’s nationality can act as a 
screening factor for career opportunities or social advancement, the idea of nationality was still 
meaningful for making social assessments with people who were unfamiliar.  According to 
participant V033, a 26--year old Russian Man from Stavropol, that indicated that he practiced 
Russian national traditions: 
Although I practice some Russian traditions, I do not believe that nationality really 
has any practical meaning in modern Russian society, other than as a way to 
establish connections for work, or maybe in the government or the army.  The most 
important factor in Russian society is having connections, specifically with money 
and more often than not in Moscow.  Here we simply exist, as part of the Russian 
Federation … somewhere in the social structure.   
 
Participant V033 suggests the importance of group connections for personal advancement.  
Throughout this study, the idea of connections became very prominent among participants’ 
responses.  With the example of socio-cultural identity markers like “Native Language,” 
“Religion,” and “Nationality,” group delineation becomes quite clear.  The preferences of 
participants who practiced national traditions were also significantly higher across four of the 
placed-based dependent variables in this study, including “Russian Federation,” “The South of 
Russia,” “Kray/Oblast/Republic,” and “City/Village/Aul.”  The only placed-based dependent 
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variables were the “North Caucasus,” and the “North Caucasus Federal District,” about which 
the responses from the groups practicing and not practicing their national traditions did not differ 
significantly.  However, the results suggest that practice of national traditions is related to 
territorial awareness in relation to personal conceptions of identity.   
 The federal scale identity-marker “Russian Federation,” the overall most highly rated 
dependent variable in the study, was significantly preferred by participants who practiced their 
national traditions (mean = 4.41), compared to non-practicing participants (mean = 3.97).  The 
dependent variable with the next highest mean scores was “City/Village/Aul,” the most localized 
scale, with the mean of practicing participants at 4.23 and the mean score of non-practicing 
participants at 3.74.  This trend shows that participants thought more highly of place-based 
identity markers at the widest and narrowest ends of the territorial scope of this study, with 
regional conceptions given less importance overall.  The comments of participant V021, a 26-
year old Russian man from Stavropol, who claimed to practice Russian national traditions, 
explain this trend:   
The two most important scales for understanding who someone is, or where someone 
is from, is a small homeland and a large homeland, in the middle meaning gets lost.  
We live in a local context, and we see the overall context of Russia through media 
and institutions. 
 
Preferring the local and federal scales over regional place-based identity markers seemed often to 
be the case with many participants.  As participant V021 suggests, presentation is important for 
understanding place-based identity markers.  Because information tends to be presented at the 
federal level, contextualized in term of the Russian Federation, the federal scale is easy to 
identify.  It is also the most inclusive place-based dependent variable, and an option with which 




Figure 5.13 – Importance of Russian Federation for Self-Identification between Participants Who 
Practice National Traditions and Those Who Do Not 
 
 
Figure 5.14 – Importance of City/Village/Aul for Self-Identification between Participants Who 
Practice National Traditions and Those Who Do Not 
 
Matching the trend of preference for place-based identity markers by participants who 
indicated that they practiced their national traditions, the dependent variable 
“Kray/Oblast/Republic” was preferred significantly higher by the practicing participants (mean = 
4.19) than by non-practicing participants (mean = 3.71).  Several interview participants 
highlighted the fact that the republics especially were important for preservation of non-Russian 
national traditions.  Participant V005, a 29-year old Dargin man from Stavropol, who indicated 




















































Dargin national traditions are primarily practiced in Dagestan, where we are socially 
free to behave according to our traditional ways of life and raise our children 
accordingly.  However, there is a Dargin presence now in Stavropol Kray, and I 
would argue that it growing.  We (Dargins) are more or less in every republic 
though.  I would say that there is probably a small Dargin diaspora community 
somewhere in each of the North Caucasus Republics, and also in most of the Russian 
territories… at least in Southern Russia.  However, a lot depends on the living 
standards anywhere you look at Dagastani populations, and how they relate back to 
the Republic of Dagestan … I can say for sure that there are many Dargins who 
really do care about their nationality, and who live according to our traditions.  One 
example would be respect for elders.  Very traditional styles of upbringing really 
emphasize this factor. However these factors tend to be emphasized among those 
who have connections back to Dagestan.  
 
Participant V005’s references to Dagestan as an important place for Dargin cultural traditions 
shows why, in the context of the North Caucasus, and within an ethno-federal structure in 
general, having a defined sense of national territory and homeland gives one a reference point to 
place his or her traditions as accepted social norms, or as sets of practices that are outside of 
accepted social norms in a particular territory.  The ideas that Dargin Diaspora communities are 
practicing Dargin traditions more authentically if they maintain connections back to Dagestan, 
helps explain why those participants who are in tune with these traditions in their everyday lives 
would also be aware of the differences among cultures, and therefore have an appreciation for 
specific territories where their ethno-national social norms are considered to be “in place” 




Figure 5.15 – Importance of Kray/Oblast/Republic for Self-Identification between Participants 
Who Practice National Traditions and Those Who Do Not 
 
The notion that Stavropol Kray acts as a context in which Russian national traditions and 
associated social norms was also present in interview data provided by participants who claimed 
to practice these traditions.  According to Participant V033, a 26--year old Russian man from 
Stavropol, that claimed to practice Russian traditions: 
Stavropol is actually has a unique set of national traditions practiced by the ethnic 
Russian community.  I would say that ethnic Russians here are like those in areas 
like Rostov and Volgograd, however there are a lot of other influences here, some of 
which are Slavic and some that are not Russian.  In Stavropol, ethnic Russians have a 
unique understanding of what it means to be Russian because, not only have we been 
influenced by so many other cultures, we can also compare what it means to be 
ethnic Russian with other cultures.  Culturally, I think ethnic Russians from 
Stavropol and Stavropol Kray are unique.   
 
In the ethno-federal system, Stavropol Kray, as a majority ethnic Russian territory, could be 
understood in an exclusive sense by ethnic Russians, as a territory in which their groups’ cultural 
norms are supposed to be considered as “in place,” similar to the argument made by Participant 
V005 with Dargins and Dagestan.  However, as Participant V033 eludes, Stavropol can be 




























Russian areas and subsequent levels of transculturation that has occurred within Stavropol Kray, 
between ethnic Russian and non-Russian populations.     
 
Figure 5.16 – Importance of South of Russia for Self-Identification between Participants Who 
Practice National Traditions and Those Who Do Not 
 
 
Although a less popular choice among place-based dependent variables by participants 
overall, “The South of Russia” was also significantly more highly preferred by participants who 
practice their national traditions (mean = 3.96), than by those that do not (mean = 3.52).  Because 
the idea of “The South of Russia” does not necessarily have to constitute a formal region, as long 
as one does not take the Southern Federal District as synonymous with the “South of Russia,” 
participants in the study could potentially still prefer to think of themselves in connection with a 
more ambiguous conception of the South, as opposed to a formalized federal district based 
understanding.  Because identity markers associated with the South of Russia tend to be cultural, 
and constructed in opinions to markers traditionally associated with Russia’s federal center, or 
other regions of Russia, it is logical that participants who understood their traditions as 
“southern,” and who also practiced those traditions, would preference “The South of Russia” as 



























In addition to preference for Southern Russian Culture in particular, interview 
participants who commented on their preference for the South of Russia, often mentioned that 
the North Caucasus was part of the South of Russia.  The idea of the North Caucasus as a sub-
region within the Russian South was also discussed by Participant V035, a 33-year old Russian 
woman from Stavropol who indicated that she practiced Russian national traditions:  
I identify with the idea of the South of Russia more than the other territories on the 
list.  I want to think of myself as a Southern person.  I am actually of the opinion that 
the North Caucasus Federal District is illogical.  I think that the North Caucasus is 
part of the South of Russia because people there live similarly to other people in 
Southern Russia.  Also, I consider the South of Russia to be among the most 
important regions in Russia.  Therefore, this is all the South of Russia as far as I am 
concerned, and I would compare the South to the North, or Central Russia, but I do 
not believe that the South of Russia and the North Caucasus should be separated.  
There are sharper cultural differences and differences in mentality between 
Stavropol’s populations versus Moscow, than the people of Stavropol versus the 
people of Krasnodar. 
 
The comments of Participant V035 show a clear distain for the idea that the North Caucasus 
should be separated from the Russian South, as she believes cultural boundaries are more 
pronounced between the South and other regions, as opposed to her perceived cultural 
boundaries within the context of what she believes to be the South of Russian.    
 
Significant Differences in Identity Preferences between Participants of Multi-National 
Backgrounds, versus Participants Whose Parents are of One Nationality 
 
For the independent variable group “Mixed-Ethnicity,” an independent variable based on 
whether or not participants identified their parents as being from the same ethno-national group, 
“Parents of the Same Nationality,” versus participants who identified their parents being of 
different ethno-national groups, or “Parents of Different Nationality,” showed significant 
differences in identity preference for two dependent variables: “Nationality” and “The South of 
Russia.”  The results show that participants with parents of the same nationality significantly 
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preferred nationality as an identity concept (mean = 3.57) to participants with parents of different 
nationality (mean 3.09).  Participants with parents of the same nationality also preferred The 
South of Russian (mean = 3.95) to participants with parents of different nationality (mean = 
3.51).   
The fact that participants of a single ethno-national heritage would prefer “nationality” 
over participants with multi-national heritage is not surprising.  Having parents of different 
nationalities presents the potential for a conflicted sense of ethno-national identity for someone 
in the North Caucasus.  Although it is possible for him or her to identify with one or more 
nationalities, I expected other elements of identity to be more important for the “Parents of 
Different Nationality” group.  Participant V006, an 18-year old man from Stavropol, of mixed-
ethnic backgrounds, explained in his interview that he did not favor nationality as a concept. 
According to Participant V006: 
I am Russian, Ukrainian and Armenian by descent, but I was born and raised in 
Stavropol, so I live according to Russian traditions mostly.  My parents were born 
around Stavropol, in some villages, I am not sure where exactly, but I was born here 
in the city … I would tell you that religion and nationality for are really not 
important at all, therefore I ranked them as ‘1.’ I prefer to identify myself based on 
where I am from, the language that I speak, which is Russian and some Armenian, 
and my overall character as a person. 
 
Although nationality was a concept that participants of mixed-national heritage were aware of, it 
was never their highest determining factor of identity in any of the interviews.  A theme that was 
often present regarding this lack of preference for nationality among multi-national participants 
seemed to suggest disconnect between language usage/knowledge and group identity.  
Participant V034, a 30-year old man from Stavropol, who identified himself as Greek, despite 
having a mixed-ethnic background, offered the following comments: 
I understand that I am Greek in ways other than just language.  For me it is a 
personal choice in how I identify myself, in how I behave, and I also rely on 
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historical and family connections to Greece and Greek populations in the North 
Caucasus.  I rely on historical connections to Greek populations in this region as 
source of my personal sense of identity, despite the fact that being Greek does not 
make me part of an established North Caucasus national group … I believe that 
everyone in the North Caucasus is Russian speaking to some degree, so the North 
Caucasus context should be important to us here.   
 
This response from Participant V034 demonstrates the overall importance of national heritage 
throughout the North Caucasus regional in general.  In cases of minority communities, with no 
official ethno-federal titular rights, such as the North Caucasus’ Greek population, a link 
between ancestral residents and the contemporary community leads to a feeling of belonging to 
and within the region.  This idea also supports the notion made by participant V006 earlier in this 
chapter about the importance of established communities and how a region might be an attractive 
place-based identity marker for non-Russian groups.  The existence of historical Greek 
communities in the North Caucasus, in cities such as Yessentuki and Caucasian Mineral Waters, 
can draw on lineages, are firmly supported by archeological evidence Minns (2011). 
Interestingly, both participants V006 and V004 identified as having parents of different ethno-






Figure 5.17 – Importance of Nationality for Self-Identification between Participants of Single 
and Multiple National Identities   
 
 Participants whose parents were of the same nationality also significantly preferred the 
dependent variable “the South of Russia,” (mean = 3.95) to their multi-national counterparts 
(mean = 3.51).  Interview data suggests that this preference could partially be due to the fact that 
since multi-national participants may lack the ability to fully rely on a defined concept of 
“Nationality” for their personal sense of identity, that they might prefer more formalized and 
defined territorial constructs.  Participant V037, a 30-year old woman from Stavropol of mixed 
Armenian and Russian heritage offered the following comments:  
The South of Russia is arbitrary ... I prefer to associate myself to territories that have 
a more defined meaning.  I understand the Russian Federation, and Armenia as being 
the homelands of my ancestors.  I understand Stavropol Kray and also the city of 
Stavropol because I live here and can see the limits. I know where those things are.  I 
do not think a conception like the South of Russia (Yuzhnaya Rossiskaya) is very 
structured or well defined, so I cannot really say that someone like me could call 



























Participant V037 suggests the importance of homeland and historical association with regions 
and territories as important factors for identity.  Although the previous comments for Participant 
V034 showed that he was more comfortable with a region, the North Caucasus and Greece, he 
still ultimately drew on connections to a homeland.  Likewise, Participant V037 claimed 
associates to Armenia and Russia, both of which she was comfortable defining.  Participant 
V037’s comment on the South of Russia as “arbitrary,” also shows a respect for defined borders 
and a preference to associate with a formal region, as opposed to a vernacular one.  Her comment 
could also be used to show an ultimate respect for the authority of the Russian Federation, which 
ultimately has to power to draw sub-federal borders and decide how regional territories are 
administered.  Therefore, reification though borders, and state institutions can be important, in 
some cases more so than a popular sense regional understanding which does neatly contextualize 
places and create a container with clearly defined limits.  In the broader scope of this project, 
attitudes and understandings such as those held by Participant V037 show why it might be useful 
to formalize regions, should the state wish to create a firm set of limits and lines of inclusion and 
exclusion, and perhaps alludes to potential motivations for establishing the North Caucasus 
Federal District.   
 
Figure 5.18 – Importance of South of Russia for Self-Identification between Participants of 
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Significant Differences in Identity Preferences between Male and Female Participants 
 
 Preference patterns that I observed across most of the dependent variable throughout this 
study remained similar between male and female participants, except in one instance: “North 
Caucasus Importance to Federal Center.”  Although both gender groups ranked this dependent 
variable highly, agreeing that the North Caucasus region is important to the Federal Center, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test reflected a significant preference by women (mean = 4.45) versus the 
preference for this dependent variable by men (mean = 4.14). 
 Throughout the interviews, both male and female participants tended to note the 
importance of the relationship, however there were several interesting differences within the 
content trends between in the groups’ interviews.  Male participants tended to focus on the North 
Caucasus as a border region, security issues, and cultural differences, while female participants 
tended to mostly mention issues of economic development.  According to Participant V024, a 
30-year old Russian man from Stavropol:  
In any case, the North Caucasus is going to be important to the federal center 
because it constitutes an international border with foreign countries and 
governments.  And, in general, the religion practiced there is Islam. 
 
In this brief response, Participant V024 identifies the North Caucasus geographic location along 
the Russian Federation’s southern border, along with suggesting that being an Islamic region, 
culturally different than greater Russia, would be cause for the federal center to pay attention to 
the North Caucasus.  Participant V029, a 30-year old Nogay man from Stavropol, offered the 
following take on the importance of the North Caucasus to Russia’s federal center: 
this region (the North Caucasus) garners a lot of attention because there is so much 
potential for social movements to get organized, based around a strong sense of 
national identity.  The Federal Center might have to intervene in conflicts between 
two North Caucasus nationalities, or Moscow might have to deal with anti-federal 
separatist movements.  This sort of uncertainty has become compartmentalized into 
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the various areas in the North Caucasus.  However, because of disconnects within 
local populations, the entire region has the potential to become unstable.  Therefore 
the North Caucasus gets a lot of attention from the Federal Center as an entity, in and 
of itself. 
 
Participant V029 also highlights cultural disconnect, in the form of potential social movements 
that the federal center might find undesirable, and security, in the form of political instability, as 
reasons for why the federal center should find the North Caucasus an important region. 
Female participants were also aware of issues with conflict, however, their focus tended 
to be placed also on the economic attention that the North Caucasus commands from Russia’s 
federal center in the form economic policy and resources allocation.  Participant V028, a Nogay 
woman from Karachevsk, Karachay-Cherkessia offered the following take on the importance of 
the North Caucasus, highlighting the importance of federal attention for development, and the 
importance of development to avoid social unrest:  
If people have jobs, make a good living, and have something with which to occupy 
their lives, they are far less likely to resort to negative behavior and conflict.  
Therefore, the economy in the North Caucasus has to be improved, and the way the 
system works, the federal center controls how much it can improve … we (the North 
Caucasus) are important to the Federal Center because we have the potential to make 
them look very bad.  If there are problems here, other regions of Russia may lose 
confidence in the overall power structure, and more problems would thus be created 
for the Federal Center. 
 
Participant V028 points out the role of the federal center and government as having the 
responsibility to ensure development and economic stability throughout the entire country.  
Because the North Caucasus receives a lot of attention overall, failures in policy may cause other 
regions of the country to lose faith in Moscow’s leadership.  Therefore the North Caucasus might 
be seen as a potential political and economic liability within the greater Russian system of 




Figure 5.19 – Perceived Importance of the North Caucasus to Russia’s Federal Center between 
Male and Female Participants 
 
 
Significant Differences in Identity Preferences of Participants Practicing Religion, versus 
those Not Practicing Religion 
 
The independent variable “Religion (Practice),” which is divided into a practicing group, 
made up of those participants who indicated that they followed a religion and also attended 
services or performed activities related to it regularly, and a non-practicing group, who either 
identified themselves as atheists, or indicated that they did not regularly attend places of worship 
or participate in religious activities.  When analyzing this independent variable, I expected to 
find a significant difference (rejecting the null hypothesis of no difference), via the Kurskal-
Wallace test between the two groups in regard to the dependent variable “Religion.”  The results 
confirmed my expectation as participants practicing religion significantly preferred religion as an 
identity marker (mean = 4.01) to non-practicing participants (mean = 3.46).  A connection 
between preference of religion in one’s personal conception of identity, and the practice of his or 
her religion would logically be related.  However, it is interesting that, although non-practicing 
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was still higher than 3, at 3.46.   This result suggests that religion is still an important factor for 
identity in the North Caucasus, despite whether or not one chooses to practice.   
 
Figure 5.20 – Importance of Religion for Self-Identification between Participants Practicing 




Significant Differences in Identity Preferences between Christians and Muslims 
  
 The most striking differences in results between group comparisons, among all of the 
various independent variables, were perhaps the significant differences between Christians and 
Muslims, the groups of the independent variable “Religion (Type).”  In total, the responses 
regarding preferences for identity markers of Christians and Muslims differed significantly 
across nine of the dependent variables.  In each case, Muslims ranked the variable higher than 
Christians.  The results show that Muslim participants favored both conceptual and place-based 
identity markers more highly than Christians.  In addition, the fact that Religion (Type) showed 
more significant differences between independent variable groups than the independent variable 
Nationality, whose groups were Russian and Non-Russian, suggests that religious identities 
could in fact constitute a more polarized way to understand societal division in the North 





























Figure 5.21 – Importance of Nationality for Self-Identification between Christians and Muslims  
 
 With a mean score of 4.02, Muslim participants favored the dependent variable 
“Nationality” over Christian participants, who registered a mean score of 3.45.  This significantly 
higher preference for “Nationality” by Muslims versus Christians, along with a higher overall 
mean score for Muslims, suggests that for the Islamic nationalities of the North Caucasus overall, 
association with Islam means that one is more likely to also have a strong association with his or 
her religion.  Interview data with Muslim participants tended so show that this group held the 
concept of nationality in high regard for a few reasons. First, several participants commented on 
the fact that traditionally Islamic nationalities tended to be very tight-knit in terms of their social 
circles.  According to Participant V036, a 24-year old Nogay woman from Stavropol, who self-
identified as a Muslim:  
I think nationality matters in Russian society because people of like nationality tend 
to group together.  I think we can see this happen quite often in Stavropol, where the 
population is very ethnically diverse.  Some Muslim communities tend stick together 
very closely.      
 
Participant V027, a 29-year old Karachay woman from Teberda, Karachay-Cherkessia, who 

























I believe that one’s nationality does impact one’s social status in the North Caucasus.  
In fact I would say that this concept is probably the most important element of social 
status in this Republic (Karachay-Cherkessia).  However, in overall Russian society, 
I think nationality matters less if one does not live in such an ethnically diverse 
territory.  Nationality affects social circles, and possible economic opportunities. 
 
Both of these participants’ comments suggest an awareness of National identity among 
traditionally Islamic Nationalities.  Participant V027 suggests that Nationality is an important 
concept in Karachay-Cherkessia for social status, an idea that falls in line with rights afforded to 
titular nationalities in autonomous republics by the constitution of the Russian Federation.  
Nationality matters in Karachay-Cherkessia because Karachays and Cherkess are titular groups, 
whereas Nogays and Abazins are not, despite being non-Russian nationalities with established 
populations and histories in the territory that is today Karachay-Cherkessia.  Participant V036 
suggests that in a diverse multi-ethnic environment like Stavropol, national connections continue 
to matter for Islamic Nationalities.  
 Muslims favored the importance of Religion (mean = 4.48) to Christians (mean = 3.58).  
Interviews from Muslim participants overwhelmingly showed an awareness regarding Islam’s 
importance, if not for the individual participant, but for his or her national group.  Participants 
also commented on connections between Islam and their national traditions.  According to 
Participant V025, a 30-year old Muslim Karachay man from Teberda, Karachay-Cherkessia:   
I only go to the Mosque on holidays.  I have some relatives and friends who go more.  
Some of them go to the Mosque to pray every Friday.  We have a tradition among 
Karachays, which might exist with other Muslim groups as well, that it is our 
parents’ responsibility to make us go to the Mosque and participate until the age of 
15.  After 15, we are the ones who are sinning if we choose not to go to the Mosque.  
That is a tradition that is being brought back. 
 




My parents were raised in the Soviet Union, when it was not possible to go to 
Mosque at all.  So, families have to be actively involved with Islam to make sure that 
such traditions are followed.   
 
It is interesting that Participant V025 mentions both elements of personal and group 
responsibility in terms of the practice of Islam within the group overall.  Family structure in 
relation to religious practice is also important, and Participant V025’s attention to differences 
between Soviet times and contemporary Russia highlights the importance of Islam’s resurgence 
among the various Muslim groups in the North Caucasus.   
 Similar themes can be seen in the interview of Participant V028, a 28-year old Nogay 
woman from Karachaevsk, also is also a Muslim: 
I always make sure to go to a mosque for holidays.  I would really like to be more 
involved with the practice of Islam though.  However, to be really dedicated to 
Islam, one needs a lot of time.  Thankfully I have access to a mosque in Karachay-
Cherkessia.  That makes things easier.  I suspect that Muslims in Stavropol probably 
practice less because they lack places of worship.  One advantage that younger 
people have is that it is socially acceptable for us to practice.  Our parents grew up in 
Komsomol, and Islam was not favored at all.  So, in a way, we have to learn, or 
relearn what to do on our own.  Some things (Soviet era mindsets) never went away. 
 
While in agreement with Participant V025, but from a Nogay perspective, Participant V028 also 
brings up the importance of being able to access a Mosque.  Muslims in Karachay-Cherkessia, 
and the other republics are freer to practice Islam with routine worship in Mosques, which is 
traditional among North Caucasus Islamic communities (Broxup, 1981).  Stavropol’s lack of an 
active mosque, and large variety of Orthodox Churches, perhaps serves to remind Muslims that 




Figure 5.22 – Importance of Religion for Self-Identification between Christians and Muslims 
 
 
 Muslim participants showed a significantly higher preference for the dependent variable 
“Native Language” as important identity markers than Christians, whereby Muslims mean score 
for their native languages was 4.54, while the Christians’ mean was 4.17.  Interview comments 
by Muslim participants regarding their native languages generally showed strong emotions or 
connections and importance for languages, and were often also concise.  According to 
Participant V005, a 33-year old Dargin man from Stavropol: 
I have to rank my native language, Dargin, as a 5 out of 5, which I would expect to 
be the case among all of the Islamic nationalities of the North Caucasus because I 
believe language and religion are really the two components that structure our lives 
and define us as unique groups of people. 
 
The importance of language was an overall trend, perhaps one that should have been expected, 
and the fact that language is significantly more important among Muslim participants than 
Christians is more evidence of the generally stronger overall sense of identity and its importance 
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 Regarding significant differences in preference between Muslims and Christians for 
place-based identity markers, Muslims’ rakings of importance were higher for all of the regional 
scale markers.  Differences between Muslims and Christians for the federal scale dependent 
variable “Russian Federation,” and the local scale dependent variable “City/Village/Aul,” were 
not significant, showing that Muslims more strongly associated with identity markers at the 
regional scale than did Christians.  
 Muslims ranked the dependent variable “Federal District” significantly higher than 
Christians, with a mean score of 4.17 to 3.91.  Despite a ranking of nearly 4 by Christians, 
interviews from Christian participants tended to downplay the importance of the North Caucasus 
Federal District, as well as Southern Federal district.  Christian participants tended to display 
confusion about, or disagreement with the formation of the North Caucasus Federal District.  
According to Participant V024, a 30-year old Christian man from Stavropol: 
The big difference is now, with the formation of the North Caucasus Federal District, 
Pyatigorsk has become much more important, as it is now a political center for this 
region.  To me, it does not really makes sense to have to capitals in one region.  
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Caucasus Federal District.  I think Stavropol should have just been the capital of all 
of it, since the districts were changed. 
 
The idea that the North Caucasus Federal district is a political construct, defined with some kind 
of purpose in mind was also noted by some other Christian participants, but some seemed 
unfamiliar with the Federal District as a concept, such as Participant V033, a Christian man from 
Stavropol: 
The North Caucasus Federal District is not that important for me, likely because it is 
a new designation.  Thinking about this area as the North Caucasus in general is 
more comfortable for me.   
 
Here Participant V033 seems to prefer the idea of a vernacular concept of the “North Caucasus,” 
rather than the formalized “North Caucasus Federal District.”   
   
 




As with all of the territorially-based identity markers covered in this study that registered 
significant differences in the Kurskal-Wallis analysis, the dependent variable “North Caucasus,” 
was also preferred by Muslims (mean = 4.52) to a higher degree than Christians (mean = 3.80).  
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non-Russian national groups, who are predominantly Muslim, as “North Caucasus Nationalities 
(Severnye Kavkazkye Natsionalnosti),” suggesting a connection and sense of belonging of these 
ethno-national groups to the region.   
 




 Muslim participants were very conscious of the fact that the North Caucasus region is 
majority Muslim, and that Islamic traditions continually play a role within the region.  According 
to Participant V036, a Muslim woman from Stavropol:  
My religion (Islam) exists in practically every territory in the Russian federation, but 
in small concentrations.  However, it exists in greater concentration in the North 
Caucasus than anywhere else, and the fact that Islam is the expected system of faith 
here has led the North Caucasus to be a region inside of Russia where Islam can be 
practiced to a greater degree than other religions.   
 
An acknowledgement of transition of dominant religions, from Christianity to Islam was also 
discussed. According to Participant V029, a Muslim man from Stavropol: 
In terms of regional identity, I prefer to think in the context of the North Caucasus 
versus Russia beyond the North Caucasus.  There are differences between northern 
and southern Russia of course, but the North Caucasus constitutes a blending of 
ethnic Russian and non-Russian peoples, as well as a shift from primarily Christian 
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All of the Muslim participants commented on the importance of the North Caucasus to their 
identity to some degree, usually by noting the fact that Muslims communities are large in number 
and are widespread throughout the North Caucasus.  Most of them noted discernible differences 
between the North Caucasus and areas of Russia further beyond the region, as highlighted by the 
comments of Participant V029.   
 
Figure 5.26 – Importance of South of Russian for Self-Identification between Christians and 
Muslims 
 
 Muslim participants ranked the dependent variable “South of Russia” (mean = 4.17) 
significantly higher than Christians (mean = 3.83).  The interview data tended to show that 
Christian participants preferred to associate the South of Russia more as part of Russia, while 
Muslim participants tended to see the Russian South as more like the North Caucasus than other 
parts of Russia.  The fact that Christians’ preference for the South of Russia was slightly higher 
than for the “North Caucasus,” while Muslims’ preference for the South of Russia was slightly 
lower than for the “North Caucasus,” suggests that the South of Russia is understood in milder 
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I identify with the idea of the South of Russia more than the other territories on the 
list.  I want to think of myself as a Southern person.  I am actually of the opinion that 
the North Caucasus Federal District is illogical.  I think that the North Caucasus is 
part of the South of Russia.  Also, I consider the South of Russia to be among the 
most important regions in Russia.  Therefore, this is all the South of Russia as far as I 
am concerned, and I would compare the South to the North, or Central Russia, but I 
do not believe that the South of Russia and the North Caucasus should be separated. 
 
Participant V035’s comments clearly suggest a perceived connection and scalar order to how the 
broader region should be identified, with the North Caucasus within the South of Russia.     
 While Christian participants tended to point out the North Caucasus as a part of Southern 
Russia, Muslim participants often said that the “South of Russia” as a concept was important to 
them because the North Caucasus was either part of, or similar to Southern Russia.  According to 
Participant V005, a Muslim man living Stavropol at the time of the interview: 
I ranked the South of Russia a 4 because it is important to me and because the North 
Caucasus is part of Southern Russia. My home republic is Dagestan, but actually I 
prefer to live here in Stavropol, I like my life here better.  However, my home aul is 
pretty important to me.  If all things were equal, and I could build a business there, to 
the extent that such a business is possible in Stavropol, I would probably prefer to 
live there, in my aul, but Stavropol is as close to Dagestan in a cultural sense as one 
can find anywhere else in Russia.  
 
Approaching the importance of the South of Russia from these varying perspectives again 
suggests the importance of the study area as a transition zone, not only between ethnic Russian 




Figure 5.27 – Importance of Kray/Oblast/Republic for Self-Identification between Christians and 
Muslims 
 
Finally, Muslim participants also ranked the importance of their Kray/Oblast/Republic 
(mean = 4.54) significantly more highly than Christian participants (mean = 4.08).  This 
difference was expected to the principles of ethno-federalism, based on the idea that Muslim 
nationalities have autonomy in Republics, and are freer to practice Islamic cultural traditions 
within their Republics.  Additionally, most of the Republics are designated for Muslim groups, 
with the expectation being North Ossetia-Alania.  Additionally, in most cases, Republics are 
populated not only by traditionally Muslim titular nationalities, but also by minority groups who 
also practice Islam, such as the Nogays in Karachay-Cherkessia.  Therefore, the republics 
constitute formalized territories where Islam can be considered in place.   
Because so many significant differences in survey response distributions between 
Christians and Muslims were prevalent in the Kurskal-Wallis analysis, it is clear that members of 
these respective communities have different mindsets and priorities when it comes to forming 
constructs of identity.  However, all of the significant differences between groups in this analysis 
are potentially important when it comes to further examining the North Caucasus’s potential 


























two major ways that a region is typically viewed are through “identity of a region,” referring to 
the area’s cohesive nature in terms of cultural awareness, business activities, governance, 
political and religious distinctions, or though “regional consciousness,” whereby people in the 
region identity with structures of expectations, institutions, symbols and discourses.  According 
to Paasi (2003), if understandings regarding “identity of a region” and “regional consciousness” 
do not align, then said region is likely to be at odds with the state, at least to some degree.  
Because the survey data and analysis show how strong the population associates with various 
identity markers, and where significant differences exist in how these markers are understood, I 
will draw on it as a basis for interpretation regarding the mapping and interview data analyses in 




Chapter VI: Results of Cognitive Map Analysis 
 
 
The cognitive mapping technique I developed and implemented for this project measured 
participants’ opinions regarding the spatial salience of four dependent variables: “Native 
Language,” “North Caucasus,” “Religion,” and “National Traditions.” The following maps 
reflect the collective opinions of participants in the context of dependent variable groups based 
on biographical data and rankings of various independent variables from the survey data (see 
Chapter III), or present the spatial representation of data provided by the 2010 All Russia Census 
for the purposes of comparison and to establish base line expectations.  I attempted to represent 
the following response maps as congruently as possible in comparison to one another, based on 
the limitations of ArcMap 10.3, with transparency of 99 percent for 100 participants was the 
goal.  If a dependent variable group had more than 100 participants, I randomly selected 100 
responses for analysis.  If a dependent variable group had 50 participants, each polygon was 
shown at 98% transparency, and so on.   
For the first part of the cognitive mapping analysis, I examined composite responses 
regarding “Language” and “National Traditions,” to address whether or not members of the 
studies various ethno-national groups (Table 6.1) presented cohesive territorial understandings in 
terms of where these two variables were perceived to be salient.  These composite maps also 
provided information that was useful to address the question of whether or not the various 
independent variable groups associated the salience of “Language” and “National Traditions” 
with official state territorial guarantees and borders, based on titular rights and status granted via 
Russia’s ethno-federal system.  Thus, my expectations were that the nationalities would indicate 
the territories in which their ethno-national groups had titular status, or notable presence in the 
population, as salient in terms of the use of their native languages and practice of their national 
148 
 
traditions.  For example, I expected Karachays to indicate Karachay-Cherkessia as the territory 
in which these two dependent variables were salient.  I expected ethnic Russians to select 
Stavropol Kray, Krasnodar Kray, Rostov Oblast, and so on.   
Maps from ethnic Russians, of which I had an abundance, were also useful for addressing 
territorial understandings held by participants who also had strong preferences to associate with 
language and national traditions as concepts.  I was able to compare maps of perceived Russian 
language salience from participants who ranked “Native Language” as a “5” in the survey, 
compared to those who ranked it as a “1.”   Similarly I was able to address potential trends with 
conceptual preference and territorial understanding with “National Traditions” by comparing 
responses for Map 4 from ethnic Russians who ranked “Nationality” with a “5” versus a “1.”   
While the composite maps show group perceptions intricately, I was also interested in 
comparing which territories were selected for cases in which I felt comparative analysis would 
be important.  Therefore, in addition to visual analysis from the maps, I also tabulated the 
individual territories selected by participants in the independent variable groups.  If a 
participant’s response on the map selected any part of a given territory, then I counted said 
territory as a selection.  While tabulating selections for individual territories did not take into 
account the exact territorial extents of each response, it did show whether or not a participant 
included said territory as a marker, versus omitting it.  Thus, comparing these territorial selection 
results using a Chi-Square test allowed me to determine whether or not the patterns of selection 
between dependent variable group categories was statistically significant, therefore not occurring 
due to random change.  For example, analyzing the Map 4 territorial selections made by ethnic 
Russians who ranked “Nationally” as a “5,” versus a “1,” would indicate whether or not ethnic 
Russians with strong preference for this identity marker were significantly more likely to claim 
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salience for their National Traditions in different territories compared to ethnic Russians who did 
not strong identity with “Nationality” as an identity marker.   
The next part of this cognitive map analysis dealt with questions of how participants 
recognized and territorially define the North Caucasus region, concerning participants’ responses 
to Map 2: “North Caucasus.”  I analyzed the collective territorial selections, with Chi-Square 
tests, and visual analysis of composite maps in five comparisons for Map 2, looking for 
differences in how ethnic Russians viewed the territorial extents of the region versus non-
Russians, and how Christian participants viewed the region compared to Muslims.  These first 
two comparisons were useful in examining how national and religious groups understood the 
extents of the region in terms of both similarities and differences.  The final three comparisons 
were concerned with participants associations with territorial identity markers as concepts, in 
terms of how they viewed there the areal extents and territories included in the North Caucasus 
Region.  I compared the responses from participants who ranked the Russian Federation as a “5” 
versus a “1,” the “North Caucasus” as a “5,” versus a “1,” and “Federal District” (NCFD) as a 
“5” versus a “1.”   
The final part of the cognitive map analysis deals with Map 3: “Religion.” I analyzed 
composite maps of Christians and Muslims to examine the overall perceived saliences of these 
three groups in terms of its own beliefs.  I then conducted comparisons on perceived territorial 
salience of religion between Christians who had ranked “Religion as a “5” in terms of 
importance for identity, versus those who had ranked it as a “1.” Conducting visual analysis on 
the composite maps and Chi-Square tests on the groups’ selected territories was useful in 
showing how engagement with compared to perceived territorial salience.  I then repeated this 
method with Muslims who had claimed to practice Islam, as opposed those who had self-
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identified as non-practicing, looking at differences in territorial understandings in terms of 
engagement with the religion among its adherents.  I chose to focus on the importance of Islam 
with this group, as the vast majority of Muslim participants had ranked “Religion” as a “5,” thus 
I believed practice to be a more meaningful distinction. 
 
Part I: Perceived Territorial Salience of Native Language and National Traditions  
 
In part 1 of the cognitive map analysis, I examined the collective responses of seven 
ethno-national groups, determined by participants’ self-identification via the survey.  The groups 
included those from whom at least 4 individuals participated in the project, thus providing 
comparable data. These groups represent some of the largest ethno-national communities in the 
North Caucasus, and particularly in Stavropol Kray.  My basic expectation of where the 
members of each national group would assume the salience of their native languages and practice 
of their national traditions was based on the most recent All Russia Census, from 2010.  The 
participants were therefore expected to select the territories where their ethnic populations were 
represented, with the areas having the most representatives selected the most often.  The 
composite maps from each group are normalized according to sample size via each induvial 
selection’s level of transparency, so as to make each map as visually comparable to the others as 
possible, given the limits of Arc Map 10.3.     
 
Table 6.1 – Variable Groups for Map 1 “Native Language” 
Independent Variable Groups  
Dependent 
Variable  
Armenian (N=21) Language  
Dargin (N=8)   
Ingush (N=6)   
Karachay (N=8)   
Lezgin (N=4)   
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Nogay (N=6)   
Russian Overall (N=399)*   
Russian - Language High Importance (N=256)*   
Russian - Language Low Importance (N=33)   
*N=100 Randomized for Composite Map Representation  
 
 
Table 6.2 – Variable Groups for Map 4 “National Traditions” 
Independent Variable Groups Dependent Variable 
Armenian (N=31) 
Practice of National 
Traditions 
Dargin (N=8)  
Ingush (N=6)  
Karachay (N=8)  
Lezgin (N=4)  
Nogay (N=6)  
Russian Overall (N=399)  
Russian - Nationality High 
Importance (N=129)* 
 
Russian - Nationality Low 
Importance (N=65) 
 
Russian - North Caucasus High 
Importance (N=173)*  
Russian - North Caucasus Low 
Importance (N=37)  



















Armenian Participants’ Perceived Territorial Salience of Armenian Language and Practice 
of National Traditions  
 
 
Figure 6.1 - Armenian Population based on the 2010 All Russia Census  
 
 
 I established expectations for how Armenian speakers might associate to the territories in 
which they believed their native language was spoken by taking population data available in the 
2010 All Russia Census, and normalizing it according to the total Armenian population in the 
territories of the Russian Federation, represented at the scale of sub-federal territories, as seen in 
Figure 4.1.  According to the projected census data, more Armenians are found in Krasnodar 
Kray (281,680) than any other Russian Federal Territory, followed by Stavropol Kray (161,324), 
Rostov Oblast (110,727), Volgograd Oblast (27,846), North Ossetia-Alania (16235) and Adygea 
(15,561).  Therefore, I expected Armenian speakers’ composite map of language salience to 
follow the basic pattern show in figure 4.2, along with territories indicated outside the borders of 
the Russian Federation, namely Armenia.  I also expected to see Armenians select territories in 
Azerbaijan, namely indicating Baku and Nagorno-Karabakh, as both of these areas in Azerbaijan 
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have noted concentrations of ethnic-Armenian residents (see O’Lear and Whiting, 2008; De 
Waal, 2013). 
 
Figure 6.2 - Map 1: Native Language Salience – Armenian (N=31, 97% transparency)  
 
 
 The composite map of Armenian Speakers identifying the territories in which they 
believed their native language to be salient, seen here in Figure 6.2, did show some similarities to 
the expected results based solely on census data.  We see the greatest concentration of responses 
centered in Armenia, as expected.  When looking at the territories in the Russian Federation, the 
composite map shows that Armenian speakers tended to indicate the ethnic Russian titular 
territories in higher concentration than the North Caucasus Republics.  However, some 
participants clearly indicated their belief that Armenian language was salient throughout the 
study area.  Armenian speakers identified a high concentration, or “hot spot,” around the city of 
Stavropol, which extended south to Stavropol Kray’s southern border, encompassing cities such 
as Pyatigorsk, Caucasian Mineral Waters, and Yessentuki, reflecting early Armenian settlement 
patterns of Stavropol Kray (Ioffe, Nefedova and de Beurs, 2014).   
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 Surprisingly, Armenian speakers did not identify Nagorno-Karabakh or Baku in heavy 
concentration compared to Armenia and parts of Stavropol Kray.  One participant who omitted 
these territories from her map was Participant V018, an Armenian speaker from Stavropol.  
During our interview, I asked her why she had indicated neither Nagorno-Karabakh, nor Baku on 
her map.  According to Participant V018: 
Karabakh … I did not forget it, I just did not choose it.  I do not consider Karabakh 
dialect to really be the same language (as the Armenian I speak).  I have two native 
languages, Russian and Armenian.  My mom is from Sumgait and dad is from Baku, 
but I was born in Russia.  I choose territory where Russian is spoken and where 
Armenian is spoken.  There are pockets of Armenians everywhere.  I might have 
circled Tbilisi, or maybe Grozny, but I do not consider these major areas that would 
use Armenian language. 
 
The response of Participant V018 suggests two important possibilities and trends for Armenian 
speakers in the Russian Federation.  First, the young generation of Armenians, many born in the 
Russian Federation, speak Russian at a native level, and likely use Russian language as their 
primary language of communication, as nearly all of the Armenian speakers in the survey 
indicated.  Therefore, when thinking about their own personal conception of native language, 
they may not lean entirely on Armenian as the basis for their linguistic identity.  Second, her 
response demonstrates a break in identity between Armenians in Russia with Armenian 
populations in Azerbaijan.  The fact that Participant V018 notes a break in linguistic affiliation 
with Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, supported by the lack of indication of Nagorno-Karabakh 
on the maps of other Armenian speakers, definitely suggests that Karabakh and Baku 
Armenians’ usage of the Armenian language is not understood as equivalent to the language 




Figure 6.3 - Map 4: Perceived Territory where National Traditions are Practiced – Armenian 
(N=31, 97% transparency)  
 
 
 When indicating the territories where they believed their national traditions were 
practiced, Armenian participants produced an almost identical map to that which showed their 
perceived salience of Armenian language.  This similarity suggests that Armenians strongly 
connected population, language, and traditions.  Just as was the case on the Armenian language 
map, traditionally Armenian areas in Azerbaijan were not selected, further suggesting an identity 
disconnect between Armenian populations in Russia and Azerbaijan.  Notably, Armenian 
participants constituted the only ethno-national group in the study not to show major differences 
between where they indicated the salience of their native language compared to where they 





Dargin Participants’ Perceived Territorial Salience of Dargin Language and Practice of 
National Traditions  
 
 The 2010 All Russia Census indicates major ethnic-Dargin populations in several 
territories in the Study area, including Dagestan (425,526), Stavropol Kray (35,018), Astrakhan 
Oblast (3,080), and the Republic of Kalmykia (5,327).  As seen in Figure 6.3, Dargin 
populations exist in much higher concentration in Dagestan than in any of the other territories in 
the study area, although Stavropol Kray also has a sizeable Dargin community.  Also, the trend 
for Dargins to move from Dagestan to villages in Stavropol Kray since the early 2000s, has 
worked to establish a network of chain migration leading to steadily increasing numbers for 
Stavropol Kray’s Dargin population (Kolosov, Galkina and Krindach, 2003).  Therefore, I 
expected Dargin participants’ responses to be most concentrated in Dagestan, but also to include 
at least some overlap into eastern Stavropol Kray.   
 





 The composite map from Dargin participants does confirm my expectations regarding 
concentrations in Dagestan and Stavropol Kray.  As visible in Figure 6.3, Dagestan was clearly 
selected as more salient for the prevalence of Dargin language than any other territory.  
Stavropol Kray, as expected, appears to be the second most selected territory.  However, I found 
it somewhat surprising that Dargin participants selected the central portion of Stavropol Kray, as 
opposed to the eastern portion of the territory, closer to Dagestan.  Also, surprising was the fact 
that the study area’s northern portion was selected, despite the low numbers of ethnic-Dargins, 
and therefore presumably Dargin language speakers, in these sub-federal territories.  Since the 
participants conducted the map analysis in Stavropol, it is likely that they had come from 
Dagestan to study at one of the universities in the city, and might not be in touch with Dargin 
migrants in eastern Stavropol Kray.  The perceived presence of Dargin Language outside of 
Dagestan illustrates the belief that Dargins have migrated out of the republic and into other 
territories.  As previous work on Dargin migration has suggested, available land in Eastern 
Stavropol Kray has been an attractive pull factor for members of the group, as economic 
conditions in Stavropol Kray are generally better than in Dagestan, and family groups and 
individuals can retain cultural connections with Dargin populations in Dagestan due to Stavropol 
Kray’s close proximity to the republic (see Ioffe, Nefedova and de Beurs, 2014; Foxall, 2012.)  
However, the results from Dargins’ perceived language salience seem to indicate that these 
participants see their population as having expanded further than Eastern Stavropol Kray.  Such a 
belief is potentially important for those families and individuals considering potential migration 




Figure 6.5 - Map 1: Native Language Salience – Dargin (N=8, 86% transparency)  
 
 
 In terms of Dargin participants’ perceived practice of national traditions, there were a few 
differences when compared to the map of Dargin language salience.  First, the concentration of 
responses for national traditions were slightly lighter in Dagestan, although it remained almost 
the same for Stavropol Kray.  Also, the scope by which Dargin participants viewed the practice 
of their traditions was much wider than where their language was salient, as it extended into 
Chechnya, as well as beyond the North Caucasus into Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Iran.   
Many Dargin traditions are connected to Islam, which is also the case with many of the 
Islamic ethno-national groups in the North Caucasus (Henze, 1995).  The trend that Dargin 
participants expanded their scope on national traditions particularly to areas commonly 
associated with Islam could be evidence of a perceived identity connection between specifically 




Figure 6.6 - Map 4: Perceived Territory where National Traditions are Practiced – Dargin (N=8, 
86% transparency)  
 
 
Ingush Participants’ Perceived Territorial Salience of Ingush Language and Practice of 
National Traditions  
 
 Ingush populations were listed as noteworthy population in Ingushetia (385,537), North-
Ossetia-Alania (28,336) and Chechnya (1,296), according to the 2010 All Russia Census.  
Therefore the results I expected regarding the perceived salience of Ingush language among 
Ingush speakers were a heavy concentration in Ingushetia, followed by a smaller concentration in 




Figure 6.7 - Ingush Ethnic Distribution by Sub-Federal Territory, based on 2010 All Russia 
Census 
 
 While Ingush speakers did display their greatest concentration of map selections in 
Ingushetia, particularly around the capitol, Magas, they actually chose Chechnya as the second 
most popular territory for the salience of Ingush language, as Figure 6.7 displays.  Despite 
having a great concentration of Ingush people in North Ossetia-Alania, this territory was not at 
all favored by Ingush participants in regard to their language.  Possibly, their propensity to select 
Chechnya points to the fact that contemporary Chechnya and Ingushetia were part of the same 
territory, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, during Soviet times.  
Therefore, Ingush participants could have associated their ethno-national group with the 
historical connections to the combined territory, thus assuming their language would still be 
spoken in Chechnya.  However, the 1,296 Ingush in Chechnya, per the census, constitutes only 





Figure 6.8 - Map 1: Native Language Salience – Ingush (N=6, 83% transparency)  
 
 
 As was the case regarding Dargin participants’ maps, Ingush participants also widened 
their scope concerning the practice of their national traditions in comparison to the salience of 
Ingush language.  The Ingush selection range for national traditions, as seen in Figure 6.8,  
includes most of the mountainous areas of the North Caucasus, along with South Ossetia and 
parts of Georgia proper, and east to Makhachkala in Dagestan.  Also included were the 
mountainous areas of Southern Stavropol Kray.  While Ingushetia retained the highest 
concentration of selections of any individual territory, the trend from the Ingush language map, 
to select Chechnya over North Ossetia-Alania, was also present on the Ingush map for perceived 
practice of national traditions.  I expected some Ingush participants to select Chechnya because 
the two contemporary republics of Ingushetia and Chechnya existed together as one during 
Soviet times.  Such a result goes against the logic of the Russian census, which displays higher 
Ingush populations in North Ossetia.  Therefore, the lack of selections for North-Ossetia Alania 
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did not follow my expectations, based on the census.  Although, the omission of North-Ossetia 
Alania in such a small sample size likely reflects the fact that the six Ingush participants simply 
lacked experiences with the territory.  However, one alternative explanation for this lack of 
connection between Ingush participants and North-Ossetia Alania could be the religious 
disconnect between Ingushetia and North-Ossetia Alania, Ingushetia being majority Muslim, and 
North-Ossetia Alania being majority Christian.  Another explanation might be that Ingush simply 
perceive a lack of difference between their group and the Chechens.  In any case, these map 
results clearly go against expiations suggested via empirical census data and demonstrate a 
potential disconnect between local beliefs and official statistics.     
  
 
Figure 6.9 - Map 4: Perceived Territory where National Traditions are Practiced – Ingush (N=6, 









Karachay Participants Perceived Territorial Salience of Karachay Language and Practice 
of National Traditions  
 
 The territories with noteworthy populations of Karachays, as indicated by the 2010 All 
Russia Census, were Karachay-Cherkessia (149,655), where Karachays constitute a titular group, 
and Stavropol Kray (8,700). The expected result, demonstrated by Figure 6.9, is to have 
Karachay speakers select Karachay-Cherkessia in a noticeably higher concentration than 
Stavropol Kray, without selecting much area in additional territories.  
 




 Karachays, as expected, did indicated Karachay-Cherkessia the most when indicating 
their perceived salience of Karachay language.  However, their overall collective scope of 
responses was far wider than the expected results, based solely on the census data.  Participants 
selected neighboring Kabardino-Balkaria with the next highest frequency, followed by Stavropol 
Kray, then Krasnodar Kray, and then all of the additional Russian Federal territories in the study 
area.  The propensity to select Kabardino-Balkaria for Karachay language, despite this territories 
small Karachay population, is explained by Participant V027, a Karachay native speaker:   
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For language I selected Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria because the 
Karachay and Balkar languages are fundamentally the same.  Karachay and Balkar 
are just separate dialects, we can understand each other without any problem at all.   
 
This participant’s attitude toward the similarities of the Karachay and Balkar languages is 
interesting because it is strikingly opposite to how Armenian participants tended to feel about 
Armenian speakers in Azerbaijan.  While Karachays and Balkars, although closely related both 
linguistically and historically, they were officially classified as separate nationalities in the 
Soviet period, and remain so in the context of the Russian Federation (Boeschoten, 1998) 
(Cornell, 1997).  However, Participant V027 notes a very close association between these 
officially different groups, while claiming Karabakh Armenian as a separate dialect was enough 
for Armenian speakers not to select Nagorno-Karabakh on their language salience maps.   
 
Figure 6.11 - Map 1: Native Language Salience – Karachay (N=8, 86% transparency)  
 
 
 When selecting territory where Karachay national traditions were perceived to be in 
practice, Karachay participants still concentrated their selections on Karachay-Cherkessia, 
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followed by Kabardino-Balkaria, then Krasnodar Kray, Adgeya, Dagestan and a small section of 
Stavropol Kray.  Kalmykia was not selected for Karachay national traditions, although it had 
been for language.   Also, as was the case with the map showing the practice of Dargin national 
traditions, Karachays, expanded the scope of form their language salience map to include more 
territories to the South. In this case, the map for Karachay national traditions shows selections in 
Azerbajian and Iran.   
 
Figure 6.12 - Map 4: Perceived Territory where National Traditions are Practiced – Karachay 
(N=8, 86% transparency)  
 
 
This selection pattern for the perceived practice of Karachay national traditions is explained by 
Participant V025 a 30-year old Karachay man from Karachaevsk.  According to Participant 
V025: 
I think wherever Karachays live, Karachay national traditions also exist. However, I 
think our national traditions are probably more prevalent here in Karachay-
Cherkessia.  It is harder for Karachays in other parts of Russia to practice because 
they are small in number, and they cannot get access to the items they would need to 
166 
 
cook our foods, or maybe they do not have a Mosque where they live.  So, our 
traditions are a lot brighter here where Karachays live in concentration.  
 
Again, this participant, a member of a traditionally Islamic ethno-national group, suggests a 
connection between Islamic traditions and Karachay national traditions, offering a potential 
explanation for the wider scope for perceived practice of national traditions compared to 
Karachay language salience.   
 
Lezgin Participants’ Perceived Territorial Salience of Lezgin Language and Practice of 
National Traditions  
 
The 2010 All Russia Census indicated noteworthy populations of Lezgins in Dagestan 
(387,746) and Astrakhan Oblast (3,187).  Because the overall number of Lezgin residents for 
Dagestan is so much greater than in the other territories in the study area, I expected participants’ 
perceived scope of language salience and practice of national traditions to also be heavily 
concentrated in Dagestan, with few indications outside of the republic.   
 





 Participant responses regarding the salience of Lezgin language did show the highest 
concentrations in Dagestan, as expected.  However, the scope of participants’ selections 
consistently also expanded to include territory in Chechnya and Ingushetia.  In terms of areas 
where Lezgin participants indicated that they believed Lezgin national traditions were practiced, 
the scope was widened to include the southern areas of Stavropol Kray.  It is interesting to note 
that, as was the case with Ingush and Dargin participants, Lezgins selected parts of Stavropol 
Kray, the mountainous portions in particular, for the practice of national traditions, but not for 
language salience.   
 
 






Figure 6.15 - Map 4: Perceived Territory where National Traditions are Practiced – Lezgin (N=4, 
75% transparency)  
 
 
Nogay Participants’ Perceived Territorial Salience of Nogay Language and Practice of 
National Traditions  
 
I expected Nogay participants to indicate the heaviest concentrations of territorial 
selections for their perceived language salience and practice of national traditions in Dagestan, 
and also include concentrations in Stavropol, Karachay-Cherkessia, Chechnya and Astrakhan 
Oblast.  As is the case with all of the ethno-national groups in the study, I based the expected 
results on the 2010 All Russia Census, which cites Stavropol with 20,680 Nogay residents, 
Dagestan with 38,168, Karachay-Cherkessia with 14,873, Astrakhan Oblast with 4,570 and 








 Nogay participants’ selections for territories in which their native language was salient in 
that it did follow expectations somewhat, although Stavropol Kray received the highest 
concentrations, slightly more than Dagestan.  However, the scope of Nogay language salience 
extended well beyond the borders of the Russian Federation, as Nogay participants selected 
Ukraine, as well as Turkey and Iran.  However, the South Caucasus countries were not selected 




Figure 6.17 - Map 1: Native Language Salience – Nogay (N=6, 83% transparency)  
 
 
 Interestingly, when Nogay participants mapped the areas of the study area where they 
believed their national traditions were practiced, several areas which had been selected for 
language salience did not appear.  While a heavy concentration of selections was present from 
Karachay-Cherkessia through southern Stavropol Kray and into Dagestan, similar to the trend in 
the Nogays’ language map, areas in Rostov Oblast, Volgograd Oblast, and Kalmykia did not 
appear.  Additionally, Iran was not selected for national traditions.  Again, connection between 
Islamic tradition and ethno-national traditions may have had to do with these omissions. All of 
the Russian federal territories dropped on the Nogays’ traditions map, which had been present on 
the language are populated with Christian majorities.   
Understanding the differences in identity between Shia and Sunni traditions, combined 
with separation between language and traditions again illustrates the connections between 
Islamic and national traditions in the traditionally Muslim ethno-national groups of the North 




Figure 6.18 - Map 4: Perceived Territory where National Traditions are Practiced – Nogay (N=6, 
83% transparency)  
 
 
Ethnic Russian Participants’ Perceived Territorial Salience of Russian Language and 
Practice of National Traditions  
 
 The expected selections for native language salience and areas were national traditions 
were practiced for ethnic Russians was also based on data from the 2010 All Russia Census, 
which indicated Russian populations in much heavier concentrations in the study area’s krays 
and oblasts than in the republics.  According to census data, Krasnodar Kray had 3,769,840 
ethnic Russian residents, followed by Rostov Oblast (3,224,031), Volgograd Oblast (1,951,035), 
Stavropol Kray (1,861,485), Astrakhan Oblast (511,951), Adygea (224,144), Kabardino-Balkaria 
(162,275), North Ossetia-Alania (122,860), Karachay-Cherkessia (124,511), Kalmykia (70,721), 
Chechnya (22,600), and Ingushetia (2,861).  However, since Russian is an official language in all 
of the territories in the Russian Federation, and is also widely spoken in the other former Soviet 
172 
 
Republics shown in the study area, I expected at least some concentration of selections for 
language and traditions to be everywhere on the template map.   
 




 Ethnic Russian participants’ responses did follow my expectations quite closely.  The 
map for Russian language salience does show heavier concentrations for the territories with 
majority ethnic Russian populations, along with greater concentrations in the Russian Federal 
territories, followed by the former Soviet Republics, followed by territory in Turkey and Iran.  




Figure 6.20 - Map 1: Native Language Salience – Russian (N=100, 99% transparency)  
 
 
 When looking at ethnic Russians’ collective map regarding the areas where they 
perceived Russian national traditions to be practiced, the expected trend of heavier concentration 
of selections in majority ethnic Russian territories is still present.  However, the difference in 
shading between the majority ethnic Russian territories and the other territories is much sharper.  
The ethnic Russian participants therefore clearly, as a group, recognized a difference between 




Figure 6.21 - Map 4: Perceived Territory where National Traditions are Practiced – Russian 
(N=100, 99% transparency)  
 
 
Comparing Importance of Language for Identity to Language Salience Selections by 
Ethnic Russians   
 
 When conducting a visual comparison between maps of perceived language salience 
between ethnic Russian participants who identified strongly with Russian language as a personal 
factor for their identity, thus rating it a “5” in the survey data, against ethnic Russian participants 
who claimed that language was not at all an important factor for them, thus rating their native 
language as a “1” on the survey, some differences in these groups’ respective maps appear 
immediately.  First, ethnic Russian participants who strongly identified with Russian language 
were much more selective with the territories they chose to identify on their maps.  Conversely, 
those who did not strongly identify with the Russian language approached this map with a much 








 Another major visual difference between these two maps is that participants who did not 
strongly identify with language selected Ukraine, the South Caucasus countries, Turkey, and Iran 
noticeably more frequently than ethnic Russian participants who strongly identified with their 
native language.  The selection of the North Caucasus republics was also slightly more 
concentrated in the composite map of ethnic Russians who did not strongly identify with their 








In order to determine whether or not ethnic Russian participants showed a significant 
propensity to make territorial selections on language salience, based on their personal 
perceptions of the importance of Russian language to their own sense of identity, I conducted a 
Chi-Square test for the selections made by these two groups, which allowed me to determine 
whether the selections made by the two groups significantly different, as opposed to having 
differences that occurred randomly. The analysis showed a significance value of 0.00, indicating 
that the territorial scope of selections regarding the salience of Russian language included 
significantly more territory than the collective selections made by ethnic Russians who strongly 
identified with their native language.  In other words, ethnic Russians who claimed to strongly 
identify with the Russian language were significantly more likely to consider Russian language 
less salient, both in non-Russian majority territories within the Russian Federation, as well as in 




Figure 6.24 – Perceived Territories where Russian Language is Salient (Russian, Native 
Language Ranked as "5," N=100) 
 
 
Figure 6.25 – Perceived Territories where Russian Language is Salient (Russian, Native 
Language Ranked as "1," N=33) 
  
 While both groups favored krays and oblasts over republics, and territories outside the 
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difference between their responses.  Two republics included in the study area are not part of the 
North Caucasus Federal District, Kalmykia and Adygea, which have non-Russian titular groups 
and non-Russian languages with official status.  The ethnic Russian participants who claimed 
high importance for Russian language were much more likely not to select territory in Kalmykia 
and Adygea than those who claimed Russian language was of low importance.  Participants who 
ranked “Native Language” as a “5” selected Adygea on 68 percent of their Map 1 responses, 
while ethnic Russians who ranked “Native Language” as a “1” selected Adygea on 82 percent.  
The same trend was visible with Kalmykia, where the same participants with strong language 
preference selected Kalmykia as Russian language salient on 67 percent of their map one 
responses, compared to 82 percent by ethnic Russians who ranked “Native Language” as a “1.”  
This trend demonstrates that ethnic Russians who hold Russian language in high importance 
were more conscious of its status, or the presumed proportions of Russian to non-Russian 
speakers in various areas.  While both groups clearly recognized decreasing salience of Russian 
language in the North Caucasus Republics, compared to Krays and Oblasts, more participants 
who held Russian in low importance were willing to indicate its salience in Adygea and 
Kalmykia, suggesting that these participants either were not aware of Kalmykia and Adygea’s 
republic status, or that they simply considered these two republics to more Russian language 
salient than the North Caucasus Republics.  
 
Part II: Map 2 – Perceived Territorial Extents of the North Caucasus Region   
 
 Because one of my major goals with this project was to explore the relationship between 
territorial understanding of the North Caucasus region and association with national, religious 
and placed-based identity markers among the study area’s population, I utilized responses from 
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Map 2, which asked the participants to indicate the territorial extents of the North Caucasus 
region, for a series of comparisons.  In all of the composite maps I produced, I was also 
interested in examining collective groups’ responses in terms of whether or not the results 
showed cognitive group alignment with the state-approved formalized definition on the location 
and territorial composition of the North Caucasus region, vis-à-vis the North Caucasus Federal 
District.   
The first comparative analysis I conducted for Part II was between perceived location of 
the North Caucasus region between Russians and non-Russians.  I then repeated the analysis 
between composite maps from Christians and Muslims, accounting for the two major markers of 
social identity among participants, as indicated by survey data and interviews.  Next, I compared 
responses among participant groups who strongly identified with the “Russian Federation,” 
“North Caucasus Region,” and “Federal District” with responses from participants who claimed 
low importance for these place-based identity markers.  For each group, I tabulated its territorial 
selections to compare against another variable, again using a Chi-Square test to check for 
significant differences in the distributions of responses.   
 
Table 6.3 – Variable Groups for Map 2 
Independent Variable Groups Dependent Variable  
Russian (N=399)* 
Perceived Territorial Extent of 
the North Caucasus Region  
Non-Russian (N=89)   
Christian (N=399)*   
Islam (N=46)   
Russian Federation - High Importance 
(N=202)* 
  
Russian Federation - Low Importance 
(N=26) 
  





North Caucasus - Low Importance 
(N=46) 
  
Federal District - High Importance 
(N=203)   
Federal District  - Low Importance  
(N=38)   
*N=100 Randomized for Composite Map Representation 
 
 
Comparing Territorial Extents of the North Caucasus Region from Ethnic Russians versus 
non-Russians 
 
 When looking at responses regarding participants’ understandings in regard to the 
territorial extents of the North Caucasus Region from ethnic Russians and non-Russians, the 
composite maps from the two groups appear to be remarkably similar.  Both groups seem to 
prioritize territories in the formalized North Caucasus Federal District as part of the region, while 
putting less emphasis on territories outside.  Selections of Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, 
Azerbaijan, or any territories outside the Russian border appear to have been made much more 
infrequently than selections for NCFD territories in particular.   
 






Figure 6.27 - Map 2: Territorial Extents of the North Caucasus Region – Non-Russian (N=89, 
99% transparency)  
 
 Given the closeness in appearance of the composite maps, it is perhaps not surprising that 
viewing tabulated selections for ethnic Russians and non-Russians also presents similar results.  
When I conducted a Chi-Square test on the two distributions, the test showed a significance 
value of 0.45, indicating that the two distributions were indeed not significantly different 
statistically.   Therefore, these results indicate a clear understanding and agreement on where the 
North Caucasus region is located, and of which territories it is comprised, between Russians and 




Figure 6.28 – Perceived North Caucasus Territories (Russian, N=100) 
 
 
















































































Percieved North Caucasus Territories (Non-Russian, N=89)
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Comparing Territorial Extents of the North Caucasus Region from Christians versus 
Muslims  
 
 Although the data trends did not show significantly different understandings regarding 
the location and assortment of territories that constitute the North Caucasus region when 
comparing responses from Russians and non-Russians, a comparison of responses based on 
religious affiliation showed a different result.   When looking at the composite maps from each 
group, it is clear, as was the case with the ethnic Russian versus non-Russian comparison, that 
both groups respect the formalized borders of the North Caucasus Federal District.  However, the 
composite map from Islamic participants shows a focused preference for the mountainous areas 
of the NCFD, close to the border with Georgia especially.  The composite map from Christians 
fades slightly as it approaches the border, and less emphasis on territories outside of the Russian 
Federation.  Southern Krasnodar Kray, Adygea and Kalmykia also appear slightly darker on the 
Islamic composite map than they appear on the Christian composite map.   
 





Figure 6.31 - Map 2: Territorial Extents of the North Caucasus Region – Islam (N=46, 98% 
transparency)  
 
When I conducted a Chi-Square test on the distribution of selections from Muslim and 
Christian participants, the significance value was 0.01, indicating that there is a statistically 
significant difference between Muslims and Christians in terms of how these two groups view 
the location and territorial composition of the North Caucasus region.  When comparing 
tabulated selections from Islamic and Christian participants, a notable difference comes to light 
immediately.  While the republics in the eastern part of the region are selected as part of the 
North Caucasus progressively less by Christians, their number of selections remains consistent 
among on the Islamic composite map.   
In general Muslims showed a more cohesive collective understanding of the region, as 
represented by the North Caucasus Federal District.  All of the NCFD territories were selected by 
at least 89 percent of Islamic participants, while Christians only selected several of the republics 
with percentages in the seventies.  Muslims were also more likely than Christians to make 
selections outside of the NCFD, especially for Krasnodar Kray and Adygea.  Muslims selected 
185 
 
Krasnodar Kray on 39 percent of their maps to Christians’ 23 percent.  Muslims selected Adygea 
on 43 percent of their maps to Christians’ 21 percent.   
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Comparing Perceived Territorial Extents and Territorial Composition of the North 
Caucasus Region from Participants with a High Preference for the “Russian Federation,” 
versus Low Preference for the “Russian Federation”  
 
 To explore a possible relationship between participants’ associations with the “Russian 
Federation” and their views on the North Caucasus region, I compared Map 2 response data from 
participants who had ranked “Russian Federation” as a “5” on the survey, versus participants 
who had ranked it as a “1.”  I wanted to examine the possibility that a strong identification with 
Russian might be correlated with his or her propensity to accept the state-backed formalized 
NCFD version of the North Caucasus, when compared to participants who did not strongly 
identify with the “Russian Federation,” in terms of their personal views on identity.   
 While there were a few slight differences in the Map 2 responses from participants who 
ranked “Russian Federation” as a “5” versus a “1,” the two resulting composite maps look 
remarkably similar.  NCFD territories are clearly selected over other areas on both maps.  One 
slight difference appears to be a heavier concentration of selections for the mountainous areas in 
NCFD republics by participants who ranked “Russian Federation” as a “1,” whereas those 
participants who ranked “Russian Federation” as a “5” tended to draw their selection lines to 
include more areas, following formal borders.   
 Perhaps the most striking difference appears in the areas south of the Russian border.  It 
appears that Participants who ranked “Russian Federation” as a “5” were more likely to select 
the traditional South Caucasus territories, as well as the disputed territories in Georgia than 
participants who ranked “Russian Federation” as a “1.”  These selections also tended to follow 
border lines, as was the trend with territories selected as part of the North Caucasus within the 















 As was the case with their composite maps, the tabulated selections of territories based 
on ranked affiliations with the “Russian Federation,” appeared to have very similar distributions 
when comparing participant who had ranked “Russian Federation” as a “5” versus a “1.”   
Indeed, the Chi-Square test registered a significance value 0.17, indicating that there was no 
significant difference in regard to the specific territories selected as part of the “North Caucasus 
Region” between these two groups.  Therefore, based on these data trends, there does not appear 
to be any major difference in how participants understood the territorial extents and composition 
of the North Caucasus region based on how strongly they regarded the “Russian Federation” as a 
marker of identity.  
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Comparing Perceived Territorial Extents and Territorial Composition of the North 
Caucasus Region from Participants with a High Preference for the “North Caucasus,” 
versus Low Preference for the “North Caucasus”  
 
The next comparison in conducted for Map 2 response data dealt with participants’ 
spatial understanding the “North Caucasus,” based on their associations with the region as a 
vernacular place-based identity construct.  As I had done with to compare collective group 
opinion in association with “Russian Federation,” I compared Map 2 response data from 
participants who had ranked “North Caucasus” as a “5” on the survey, versus participants who 
had ranked it as a “1.”  Again, I wanted to examine the possibility that a strong identification 
with a place-based identity marker, this time the “North Caucasus,” might be correlated with a 
participant’s propensity to indicate an understanding of the region that matched a the NCFD 





































Territorial Extents of the North Caucasus Region (Russian Federation 
Ranked as "1", N=26)
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outside of the NCFD borders, and those who did not strongly associate with the “North 
Caucasus” to rely on the NCFD definition as a default.   
Composite maps based on this place-based identity marker, comparing responses based 
on personal identity, produced very similar composite maps.  Territories in the NCFD are 
definitely more popular in each case than territories outside.  Participants who ranked the “North 
Caucasus” as a “5” were more willing to go outside of the NDCF borders than participants who 
had ranked the region as a “1,” but this difference appeared to be very minimal.  Perhaps the best 
example of this slight difference can be seen with selections of Adygea, which appears to be 
slightly darker on the composite map of participants who ranked the “North Caucasus” as a “5.”    
 










 When looking at tabulated selections of the induvial territories by participants who 
ranked the North Caucasus as a “5” versus as a “1,” the distributions appear to be very similar.  
When I conducted a Chi-Square analysis on these data, the test registered a significance value of 
0.99, indicating that the slight differences in these two distributions were indeed not significantly 
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Comparing Perceived Territorial Extents and Territorial Composition of the North 
Caucasus Region from Participants with a High Preference for the “Federal District” 
versus Low Preference for the “Federal District”  
 
 When comparing Map 2 composite responses from participants who strongly identified 
with the “Federal District” as an identity marker (ranking “Federal District” a “5” on their 
surveys) with participants who ranked it as having low importance (ranking “Federal District” as 
a “1”), the two groups tended to be in agreement regarding their territorial selections.  There are 
however, two trends that should be noted from these composite maps.  First, Stavropol Kray 
appears to be more prominently selected in map produced by responses from participants who 
ranked “Federal District” as a “5,” compared to the map of those who ranked it as a “1.”  
Additionally the map from participants who ranked “Federal District” as a “1” shows higher 
concentrations of selections for territories in in Southern Stavropol Kray, closer to the Caucasus 
Mountains, than does the map from participants who ranked “Federal District” with a “5.”  
Therefore the visual map results show that participants with strong identification to the “Federal 
District” were more comfortable including Stavropol Kray, in its entirety, into their perceived 
territorial understandings of the “North Caucasus,” than participants who ranked “Federal 
District” with low importance.   
 Another interesting trend when comparing these two Map 2 composites can be observed 
when looking at Krasnodar Kray.  The composite map from participants who ranked “Federal 
District” as a “5” clearly shows more collective emphasis within Krasnodar Kray when 
compared to the composite from participants who ranked “Federal District” as a “1.”  I found 
this trend to be surprising, as Krasnodar Kray was not included into the North Caucasus Federal 
District when the territory was formally established in 2010.  This trend suggests that 
participants who strongly identify with the NCFD might feel that it is an important marker of 
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identity conceptually, and not be aware of its actually defined boundaries and composition, or 
they might feel as though the Federal District definition of the region does not include all of the 
territories that these participants considered as part of the North Caucasus in the vernacular 
sense.  Nonetheless, it appears that participants who ranked the Federal District of low 
importance produced a composite that matched formalized federal district definition of the 
region more closely than participants who strongly identified with the concept of “Federal 
District” as an identity marker.    
 










 Tabulating the territorial selections for comparison and Chi-Square analysis yielded 
results that matched the visual observations that I was able to draw from composite maps.  The 
patterns in territorial selection of participants who ranked “Federal District” as a “5” and those 
who ranked “Federal District” as a “1” differed mainly in the proportions of selections for 
Stavropol Kray and Krasnodar Kray.  Portions of Stavropol Kray were selected in 85 percent of 
the maps from participants who ranked “Federal District” as a “5,” versus on 68 percent of the 
maps from participants who ranked “Federal District” as a “1.”  Selections for Krasnodar Kray 
appeared on 36 percent of the maps from participants who ranked “Federal District” as a “5,” 

















































Territorial Extents of the North Caucasus Region (Federal  District 






























Territorial Extents of the North Caucasus Reigon (Federal  District 
Ranked as "1", N=31)
197 
 
When I conducted a Chi-Square test for these distributions, the analysis returned a 
significance value of 0.00, suggesting that there is a statistically significant difference between 
selections of participants who strongly identified with “Federal District” as an identity marker 
versus, those who did not.  Interview data from participants who ranked “Federal District” as a 
“1” did seem to suggest some hesitation by such participants to fully incorporate Stavropol into 
the North Caucasus.  Once example from Participant V006, an 18-year old man from Stavropol, 
who ranked “North Caucasus” as a “1” offered the following statement: 
Actually, Stavropol’s role in the North Caucasus is fairly interesting because it just 
recently became part of the North Caucasus in an official sense.  Stavropol is a very 
diverse territory.  I think that it has cities that really do look like the traditional North 
Caucasus ideal, like Kislovodsk and Pyatigorsk for example.  However, there are 
also some pretty traditional Russian villages in central and northern parts of 
Stavropol Kray.  There people are not living much differently than populations in 
other ethnic Russian villages anywhere else in Russia.  There are a lot more non-
Russian people moving into Stavropol though, especially since it became part of the 
North Caucasus Federal District.  I think soon we will be about 50 percent Russian 
and 50 percent non-Russian.   
 
This assessment by participant V006 supports the visual trend for participants not strongly 
associating with “Federal District” as an identity marker to select areas of Southern 
Stavropol Kray, while omitting its northern and central areas.   
The idea that a break exists between Slavic/Russian culture and non-Russian culture 
somewhere in Stavropol Kray, also suggested by Participant V006, was echoed by several other 
participants who ranked “Federal District” as a “1,” and were not willing to define the entire 
Kray as the “North Caucasus,” per Map 2.  The theme of Russian versus non-Russian identity for 
Stavropol Kray was also broached by Participant V039, a 24-year old Russian man from 
Stavropol, who ranked “Federal District” as a “1.”  According to Participant V039: 
I do not strongly identify with the idea of a federal district, or even with the North 
Caucasus because I think these territories are political and they are devices that are 
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used to promote one agenda or another.  To me, it seems that we are supposed to 
understand Stavropol as the same as the North Caucasus, according to the latest 
division of territory (the North Caucasus Federal District).  I find this idea ridiculous 
because Stavropol is nothing like the republics.  We have a different mentality here, 
along with a different culture and different religion.  We should be in the Southern 
Federal District, not the North Caucasus Federal District.   
 
These thoughts from Participant V039 exhibit evidence of disconnect between his 
understandings of the North Caucasus in terms of “identity of a region” versus “regional 
consciousness,” as suggested by Paasi (2003).  The participant clearly disagrees with his 
territory’s formalized inclusion into the NCFD versus the Southern Federal District, based 
on two important elements that Passi (2003) associates with the “identity of a region:” 
culture and religion.  Participant V039’s sense of “regional consciousness” does not align 
with the state-formalized “identity of a region,” and thus the participant’s comments reflect 
a conflict in terms of his conception of regional identity.   
The insights of Participants V039 and V006 on Stavropol’s place in the North 
Caucasus, namely that Stavropol does not entirely fit in with the other territories in the 
NCFD, may also explain why Krasnodar Kray was also more often omitted as part of the 
North Caucasus by participants who ranked “Federal District” as a “1.”  Krasnodar Kray, 
like Stavropol, is comprised of a Slavic (ethnic Russian) majority.  It is also heavily 
agrarian and its terrain transitions from Steppe to mountainous areas in the South, just as 
Stavropol Kray’s transitions.  Therefore, there are several logical reasons one might 
consider Stavropol and Krasnodar Krays to be similar.  It is clear from his comments that 
Participant V039 disagrees with the formalization of Stavropol Kray as part of the North 
Caucasus, and the trends in the map and selection data would suggest that his opinions are 
shared to a significant degree among others who do not strongly associate with “Federal 
District” as an identity marker.   
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Despite the fact that some participants clearly went against the borders of the 
NCFD when indicating the location and composition of what they believed to be the 
territorial extents of the North Caucasus, it is important to note that on every composite 
map in Part II, the NCFD appears highlighted, and its territories are more commonly 
selected than outside territories.  This very clear trend suggests that participants were using 
this state-formalized definition to decide which territories to indicate, suggesting 
agreement between state-produced definitions and overall regional consciousness.   
Evidence of collective agreement between the NCFD and the “North Caucasus” is 
likely the result of the successful dissemination of state-produced knowledge on the local 
population, which has allowed the Russian state to exercise territoriality by presenting its 
formalized definition of the region as “reality-as-it-is” (Hakli, 2001).  The NCFD territorial 
definition is strictly state driven, as referencing the specific territories of which it is 
comprised together as the “North Caucasus” is perhaps illogical, as suggested by several 
participants.  For example, using a definition based on the mountains or congruent physical 
landscapes would certainly prompt more participants to include Krasnodar Kray, and 
conceptions of the region based on non-Russian populations would have promoted more 
emphasis on Adygea and Kalmykia.  As theory would suggest, the trend for participants to 
select the NDFC definition may be to their experience with “visualizing devices,” images 
(maps) produced by the state, which work to create optical consistency (Latour, 1986) thus 
reifying the state’s definition as a marker of territorial identity.    
 
Part III – Map 3: Salience of Religion  
 
  Along with ethno-national identity, religious identity is a very prominent social factor in 
how people in the North Caucasus form group associations and personal conceptions of identity.  
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Just as looking at perceived areas for native language and national traditions, asking participants 
to indicate areas where their religious beliefs were salient on Map 3 provided insight into the 
territorial understandings of the study area Christian and Muslim communities.  The North 
Caucasus, in addition to being a transition zone between Russian and non-Russian space, can 
also be considered as a transition zone between the greater Christian- dominant and Muslim-
dominant regions of the world.  Therefore, viewing composite maps from Christians and 
Muslims provided me with an interesting glimpse into general understandings and perceptions of 
religious salience in the study area.   
   The general expectations I had for the overall composite map patterns were based on 
majority ethno-national populations in each territory of the study area, per census data, and those 
groups’ traditional religious associations.  Therefore, I expected areas in which the majority of 
the population is of an ethno-national group associated with Christianity to identify said territory 
as salient for Christianity.  For example, I expected Stavropol Kray, Krasnodar Kray, Rostov 
Oblast, and the other predominantly ethnic Russian areas to indicate salience for Christianity, 
along with Armenia, Georgia, North-Ossetia and South-Ossetia, which are also predominantly 
Christian.  I expected the North Caucasus Republics, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran and Abkhazia to 
be selected more by Muslim participants.   
 It was important to compare responses from those participants who identified strongly 
with their religion, ranking it a “5” on survey data, with those who did not strongly identify with 
their religion, ranking it a “1.”  I expected there to be some polarization between Christians who 
were heavily invested in their religion versus those who were not in terms of where they 
understood their beliefs to be salient.  I expected the same to be true in terms of Muslims who 
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saw their religion as very important to their personal senses of identity, versus those who did not 
strongly identify with Islam.   
 
Table 6.4 – Variable Groups for Map 3 
Independent Variable Groups 
Dependent 
Variable  
Christian (N=399)* Religion  
Christian – Religion Important 
(N=59)   
Christian – Religion Not Important 
(N=59)   
Islam (N=46)   
Islam – Practicing (N=19)   
Islam – Not Practicing (N=19)   
  *N=100 Randomized for Composite Map Representation 
 
 The Map 3 composites for Christians and Muslims followed my expectations very 
closely.  In the Christian composite map, the most commonly selected areas are the Krays and 
Oblasts, followed by Ukraine, Kalmykia, Armenia, the North Caucasus Republics and Adygea, 
Georgia, and finally the other countries outside of the Russian Federation.  Interestingly, 
Christian participants overlooked Georgia more than I had expected, and they also did not 
indicate North or South Ossetia in high concentration.  There are perhaps two logical 
explanations for these omissions.  First, the majority of Christian participants many not have 
understood that the aforementioned areas are majority Christian.  For example, since North-
Ossetia is often associated with the other non-Russian republics in political discourse, some 
participants many not have been aware that Ossetians are majority Christian, despite being 
surrounded by majority Muslim populations.   
Another reason could be that different Christian branches and denominations were 
understood as different religions.  For example, since there are differences between the 
Armenian Apostolic Church, and the Russian Orthodox Church, followers of either many not 
202 
 
have selected territories heavily associated with the other Church.  This explanation would 
account for why Armenia was more heavily selected than Georgia, as there were more 
Armenians than Georgians in the participant pool.  This explanation was evident in interview 
data, as seen in the comments of Participant V022, a 26-year old Christian woman from 
Stavropol.  According to Participant V022: 
Armenians are also Christians, but there are some differences.  I would consider this 
map to be my religion, which is Russian Orthodox Christianity.  Georgia is also 
different, so I did not include Georgia either.   
 
These comments illustrate the complexities of how breaks in religious identity can have an 
impact on perceived territorial salience.  Nonetheless, it is important note that a clear break 
between the Stavropol and Krasnodar Krays, and the North Caucasus republics is visible, 
suggesting that Christian participants indeed understood Christianity in the republics to be less 
salient than in the majority ethnic Russian territories.      
 




Figure 6.47 – Map 3: Salience of Religion – Muslims (N=46, 98% transparency)  
 
 Viewing the Map 3 composite from Islamic participants, I noticed that it too met my 
expectations to a high degree.  The most commonly selected areas were in the North Caucasus 
Republics.  Of the traditionally ethnic Russian territories, Stavropol was the most commonly 
selected.  Adygea also showed greater selection concentrations than Krasnodar Kray, which 
surrounds it.  Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey are also much more heavily selected on Muslim 
participants’ Map 3 composite than on Christian Participants’ Map 3 composite.  However, just 
as some Christian participants were hesitant to claim territory that they perceived to be salient to 
other branches of Christianity, interview data revealed that some Muslims were sensitive to the 
differences in perceived territorial salience between Sunni and Shia.  For example, according to 
participant V028, a Muslim woman from Karachaevsk, Karachay-Chekessia: 
I do not consider the Islamic traditions in Azerbaijan to be consistent with a Nogay 
version of Islam, which is Sunni.  Azeris are Shiites and they have a different way of 




Comments and understanding like those of participant V028, who strongly identifies with Islam 
in terms of her own personal identity, illustrate how seriously of how religious understandings 
can be defined in the North Caucasus.   
 Regarding the case of North Ossetia, Muslim participants chose this territory less 
frequently than the other North Caucasus republics, and even less frequently than Stavropol 
Kray.  This trend again suggests the importance of religious identity for social divisions in the 
North Caucasus.  While Christian participants may have simply associated North Ossetia with a 
majority non-Russian area, and therefore also with Islam, Muslims participants were obviously 
aware of the majority Christian population in North Ossetia, as indicated by Muslim participants’ 
Map 3 composite.  This awareness can be seen in the comments of Participant V029, a 30-year 
old Muslim man from Stavropol, who offered: 
Vladikavkaz, in my opinion, is a very important city for understanding the North 
Caucasus.  It really shows the religious diversity that the region had, even before 
ethnic Russians came in.  Sometimes people tend to forget that Ossetians and some 
other small groups are Christians in and of themselves, not because they converted to 
Russian Orthodox Christianity. 
 
 It is also important to note that areas in Stavropol Kray were selected in higher 
concentrations than other majority ethnic Russian territories.  This trend on the map definitely 
suggests that Muslim participants were comfortable including Stavropol Kray with other 
perceived salient Islamic territories, including the northern part of Stavropol Kray, which several 
participants in the study have notes specifically as having traditional Russian villages and 
agricultural ways of life that are not necessarily congruent with non-Russian communities in the 
southern portion of the North Caucasus Federal District.  However, the borders of the North 
Caucasus Federal District appear to be clearly defined on Muslim participants’ Map 3 composite, 
suggesting that the NCFD constitutes salient Islamic territory.   
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Comparing Perceived Territorial Salience of Christianity from Christian Participants with 
a High Preference for “Religion,” versus Low Preference for the “Religion”  
 
 When comparing responses from Christians who strongly favored “Religion” in terms of 
their personal sense of identity, thus ranking “Religion” a “5” on their surveys, with responses 
from Christians who ranked “Religion” as a “1,” I found some striking differences in how these 
two groups understood territorial salience of Christianity.  The territories that were selected in 
highest concentrations for rationally majority Christian populations, the majority ethnic Russian 
Krays and Republics, along with Ukraine, were selected by both groups.  However, there seems 
to be some disagreement in regard to the salience of Christianity in the North Caucasus 
Republics and Kalmykia, as Christians who ranked “Religion” with a “5” were much less likely 
to claim the Republics as salient for Christianity.     
 
 









 I found that the trend for Christians who strongly associated with “Religion” to avoid the 
North Caucasus Republics on their Map 3 responses was verified after I tabulated the individual 
territorial selections and performed a Chi-Square test on the distributions of the two groups.  
Christians who had ranked “Religion” as a “5” selected Karachay-Cherkessia on 32 percent of 
their maps, Kabardino-Balkaria on 24 percent, North Ossetia-Alania on 25 percent, Ingushetia on 
22 percent, Chechnya on 20 percent, and Dagestan on 22 percent.  Christians who had ranked 
“Religion” as a “1” selected these territories at frequencies of 53 percent, 47 percent, 44 percent, 
36 percent, 36 percent, and 32 percent respectively.  Performing a Chi-Square test on these 
distributions resulted in a significant value of 0.00, indicating that the selection patterns of 
Christians who ranked “Religion” as a “5”were significantly different than the pattern from those 




Figure 6.50 – Perceived Salient Christian Territories (Christians Religion Ranked as "5,” N=59) 
 
 





















































































 There was evidence in the interview data that shed light on the significant trend of 
Christians who ranked religion as a “5” not to indicate the North Caucasus territories as salient 
Christian territories.  The most common trend I discovered in my conversations with participants 
on the presence of Christian communities in the study area tended to focus on out-migration of 
Russians/Christians from the Republics, and also from the North Caucasus region in general.  
Participant V039 offered the following comments on the topic: 
I think Orthodox Christianity is getting less and less common in the North Caucasus 
republics.  Although, I know that before the conflict with Chechnya, there were a lot 
Christians there, but they got out either during or after the conflict.   
 
Participant V039’s comment speaks to the fact that he, and presumably other Christians based on 
the data, are aware of the out-migration trend in question.  Both this kind of awareness, and 
collective acknowledgment of the lack of Christian salient areas that can be seen in the data, 
suggest that seeing “Religion” as important does constitute a potential polarization regarding 
perceived Christian territories in the North Caucasus.  These differences also support the greater 
idea that religious identity constitutes and extremely important factor of identity in the region, 
and there are significant territorial differences in how the salience of religion is understood. 
   
Comparing Perceived Territorial Salience of Islam from Muslim Participants actively 
practicing Islam versus those not Practicing  
 
 When I conducted the same analysis on the perceptions of Islamic salience between 
groups of Muslim participants, I found very similar trends to those demonstrated by the 
responses of Christian participants.  While ideally I would have looked at Muslims who ranked 
“Religion” as a”5” versus a “1,” very few Muslim participants ranked “Religion” as a “1.”  
Therefore, in order to take a potentially more meaningful statistical approach, I decided to run 
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the analysis on groups based on practice, as participants indicated whether not they activity 
practiced their religion on the survey.   
The results indicated some differences in perceived salience between practicing versus 
non-practicing Muslim participants.  First, areas in the North Caucasus Republics were selected 
for Islamic salience more frequently than Krays and Oblasts, or territories outside the Russian 
Federation by both groups.  However, concentrations specifically in the republics and 
mountainous areas of Stavropol Kray were selected in a more specific manor by practicing 
Muslims than by non-practicing Muslim participants.  Similar to the pattern I observed with 
Christian association, the tendency of Muslim participants who claimed to actively practice was 
to omit traditional majority Christian territories on their maps more frequently than Muslims 
participants who claimed not to practice.   
 
 





Figure 6.53 – Map 3: Salience of Religion – Non-Practicing Muslims (N=27, 96% transparency)  
 
 
 I conducted a Chi-Square test on the territorial selection distributions from practicing and 
non-practicing Muslim participants, and again the differences were significant, with the test 
results showing a Chi-Square significance value again of 0.00.  When looking at territorial 
selections, I observed that the selection pattern for Islamic territorial salience was indeed similar 
between practicing and non-practicing Muslim participants, concerning the selections made for 
the North Caucasus republics.  However, non-practicing Muslims were much more likely to 
associate Islamic salience with territories outside of the North Caucasus Federal District than 
practicing Muslims.  Non-practicing Muslim participants selected Rostov Oblast on 25 percent 
of their Map 3 responses, Volgograd Oblast on 22 percent and Astrakhan Oblast on 22 percent.  
Practicing Muslims selected these territories at frequencies of 16 percent, 16 percent and 21 




Figure 6.54 – Perceived Salient Islamic Territories (Practicing Muslims, N=19) 
 
 
























































































Percieved Salient Islamic Territories  (Non-Practicing Muslims, N=27)
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 Another interesting difference I noticed was that practicing Muslims were more likely to 
select Stavropol Kray and Krasnodar Kray for Islamic salience than were non-practicing 
Muslims.  Areas in Stavropol Kray were selected on 84 percent of the maps of practicing 
Muslims, versus 48 percent of non-practicing Muslims.  Krasnodar Kray was selected on 52 
percent of the maps from practicing Muslims, versus 33 percent for non-practicing Muslims.  
Therefore, these results suggest that while responses from practicing Muslims were more 
concentrated, as demonstrated by the group’s Map 3 composite, practicing Muslims had an 
overall wider scope of individual territories in which they made their selections.  These 
responses tended therefore not to be based on the formalized territorial borders on the template 
map, and most of the participants in the group selected only parts of any given territory.  Also, it 
is clear that practicing Muslims put heavy emphasis on the mountainous areas in the southern 
portion of the North Caucasus Federal District and Krasnodar Kray, showing an understanding of 
certain portions of these territories to be more strongly associated with the practice of Islam.   
 The theme of the mountains constituting a break between Russian dominated areas and 
areas where cultural norms and expectations are more traditional came up in many interviews, 
and may support this similar theme present with heavy concentrations of selections for Islamic 
salience in the mountains by Muslim participants.  Participant V021, a 26-year old Christian man 
from Stavropol, offered: 
In Karachay-Cherkessia there are a lot of Orthodox people.  Part of Kabardino-
Balkaria has Orthodox people.  However, I would not include places like Grozny and 
Mahachkala, or cities in other very mountainous areas.  Even in areas of Karachay-
Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria where the Karachay and Balkar populations are 
heavily concentrated, we do not really see many Russians, or other Orthodox 
believers.  
 
Although not a Muslim himself, the comments of Participant V026 clearly show the perceived 
association that rural and mountainous areas are perceived to be more heavily Islamic.  Similar 
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comments offered by Participant V034, a Christian who had claimed to live in various 
mountainous in the North Caucasus and in Georgia.  According to participant V034: 
Some people in the mountainous regions still live back in time, in a very 
underdeveloped state.  Stavropol acts as a kind of a buffer zone between these 
underdeveloped areas, and the rest of Russia.  Stavropol also helps to keep the 
Muslims of Russia in touch with Russia, and less in touch with other Islamic 
populations in Southwest Asia or South Asia.  Therefore, I think the fact the Muslim 
populations are concentrated heavily in the North Caucasus is deliberate.   
 
Participant V034’s comments further underscore the idea that the study area’s general population 
is aware of the perceived differences between the mountains and the lowland areas in the North 
Caucasus region.  He also hints on the fact that the North Caucasus, or at least the mountainous 
areas of the region, might be considered salient for Islam in a formalized sense.  These 
comments, when aligned with those made by Participant V006 concerning his perception that the 
composition of Stavropol Kray would soon become roughly 50 percent Russian and 50 percent 
non-Russian, present a very interesting viewpoint, putting Stavropol Kray in play as a buffer 
between Russia proper and the mountains.  Evidence of such an attitude is further proof of the 
awareness that the participants demonstrated concerning a perceived break between Russian and 
non-Russian culture, as well as Islamic- versus Christian-dominated culture, with Stavropol Kray 




Chapter VII: Results and Analysis from Interviews and Qualitative Data  
 
 
In addition to completing maps and surveys, which were covered in the previous two 
chapters, I also interviewed participants who were willing to discuss their surveys and map 
responses with me one-on-one.  In total, 36 participants agreed to conduct oral interviews, thus 
elaborating on the selections the participants had made, and sharing their opinions on the 
subjects of federal district reform, ethno-federalism, territorial differentiation and characteristics, 
regional structure and territorial relationships, geopolitical relations, and their feelings on the 
subject of national identity in the North Caucasus.  Allowing the participants to freely comment 
on their selections and contributions to the data set provided me with an opportunity to explore 
their reasoning and attitudes qualitatively, in order to gain a deeper perspective on various trends 
that appeared when analyzing the study’s quantitative data.   
Encouraging participants to discuss their data selections and decisions was useful for 
gathering anecdotal evidence that provided insights into each of the study’s research questions. 
Concerning Research Question 1 (“How do people in the North Caucasus recognize and define 
this region?”), participants were free to list specific places, namely cities, or other place-based 
markers of identity when discussing their preferences for the survey’s dependent variables.  For 
Research Question 2 (“How strongly do participants associate with specifically defined territorial 
(Ethno-Federal) constructions as identity markers: Russian Federation, Federal District, 
Kray/Oblast/Republic?), participants were able to comment on their preferences for territories, 
along with providing their own opinions on borders, federal district reform, and issues of ethno-
federalism and titular status, if the participants themselves chose to evoke these themes.  Adding 
to my evidence for Research Question 3 (“How are issues of civic-nationalism and associations 
with civic and ethnic Russian culture viewed in the North Caucasus?”), participants were free to 
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comment on their associations with the dependent variable “Russian Citizenship,” as well as 
their feelings on “Nationality,” again providing qualitative insights on survey data trends.  
Finally, for Research Question 4 (How do people in the North Caucasus view state policies 
aimed at regionalization?), participants’ comments on federal districts and relations between the 
North Caucasus and Federal Center provided valuable qualitative insights concerning regional 
power dynamics.   
Along with any comments participants wished to offer in regard to the survey and map 
data, I also asked them to answer a series of scripted questions, each one addressing particular 
nuances in my four research questions (see the list of interview questions in Chapter IV). I 
designed these questions to specifically elicit responses and opinions on whether or not 
nationality constitutes a major social factor in contemporary Russian society, and whether or not 
ethno-federalism provides advantages for Russia.  I also asked them to state their opinions on the 
status of the North Caucasus as a region, in terms of it geopolitical importance and overall role 
within Russia, as well as on the status of Stavropol as a territory and its sense of regional 
belonging, or lack thereof, in the North Caucasus.  Additionally, I also requested that the 
participants comment on how accurate they believed the information they could access through 
the mass media to be, in comparison to what they actually saw happening in the North Caucasus 
region through their own lived experiences.  Therefore, I was able to gather first-hand qualitative 
data regarding participants’ reactions to the representation of their region in practical and popular 
geopolitical discourse, their views of Russia’s geopolitical goals for the North Caucasus, and 
their assessments of North Caucasus territorial integrity, economic strategies, and security issues. 
Although I asked the participants a series of questions, each participant was free to say as little or 
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as much as he or she wanted, to speak about his or her opinions on this project or its goals, and to 
add any other information or topic for the record.  
The coding scheme I designed to organize, code, and analyze qualitative data for this 
project is based closely on a technique known as “Human Present Coding for Response-Based 
Messages,” which has been cited as an effective way for measuring multiple content dimensions 
in participant interview data (Abdelal, 2009) and (Johnston et al., 2009). The interview data and 
records of the interviews, along with the content, are displayed here in a four-part coding 
scheme.  Tables 1 and 2 below constitute general information on the interviews, including 
participants’ biographical data, the length of the interviews (after I translated and transcribed 
them), as well as the dates and locations of when and where the interviews took place.  The 
following sections of this chapter reflect on coding for macro identity constructs, which deal 
with each participant’s specific view of self-identification, role-identification and collective 
identification.  The next few sections of the coding scheme isolate content related to theoretical 
constructs, previously outlined in Chapter II, including territoriality and problem solving, 
structure of social expectations, affect and feelings, civic identity, ethno-national identity, and 
region as brand.  Finally, in the last few sections of the scheme, I coded for information related 
specifically to perceived and available media content, along with perceptions on intra/inter 







Table 7.1 – General Biographic Information for Interview Participants  
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Table 7.2 – General Interview Details   
ID # Date Place of Interview   
# of 
Sentences   
# of 
Fragments  
V003 June 3, 2013  Stavropol, City Center  47 24 
V004 June 4, 2013  Stavropol, Northeast 62 6 
V005 June 5, 2013  Stavropol, Northeast 72 9 
V006 June 11, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 49 4 
V007 June 11, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 14 2 
V008 June 11, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 21 6 
V009 June 11, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 15 2 
V010 June 11, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 19 3 
V011 June 11, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 17 2 
V012 June 11, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 8 3 
V013 June 11, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 20 7 
V014 June 11, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 26 3 
V015 June 11, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 23 2 
V016 June 11, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 16 0 
V017 June 11, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 14 4 
V018 June 11, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 17 5 
V019 June 11, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 22 2 
V020 June 11, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 17 8 
V021 June 13, 2013  Stavropol, City Center 70 7 
V022 June 17, 2013  Stavropol, City Center 45 9 
V023 June 18, 2013  Stavropol, City Center 47 5 
V024 June 19, 2013  Stavropol, City Center 51 8 
V025 June 22, 2013  Karachaevsk, Karachay-Cherkessia 52 7 
V027 June 22, 2013  Teberda, Karachay-Cherkessia 54 6 
V028 June 22, 2013  Teberda, Karachay-Cherkessia 65 15 
V029 June 22, 2013  Adyge-Khabl, Karachay-Cherkessia  66 7 
V030 June 23, 2013  Stavropol, City Center 32 11 
V031 June 23, 2013  Stavropol, City Center 39 10 
V033 June 25, 2013  Stavropol, Northeast 11 4 
V034 June 26, 2013  Stavropol, Northeast 29 6 
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V035 June 26, 2013  Stavropol, City Center  60 7 
V036 June 26, 2013  Stavropol, City Center 49 8 
V037 June 27, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 46 4 
V038 June 28, 2013  Stavropol, Northwest 11 2 
V039 June 28, 2013  Stavropol, City Center 35 5 




Macro Identity Construct: Self-Identification  
 
 When coding for self-identification, I isolated passages in the interviews that specifically 
pertained to the participant, and were noted in the first-person.  For example, a passage such as “I 
am a citizen of the Russian Federation, so I appreciate the rights afforded to me by our 
constitution” would be counted in the scheme under this overall macro identity construct.  If a 
participant said “Citizens of the Russian Federation” the passage was not counted in this section, 
even though the participant could have indicated his or her citizenship on the survey.   
I believe that coding for passages in the first person provides a sense of personal 
investment, belief, or belonging to a particular identity marker.  By recording the frequency at 
which identity markers were referenced in the first person, I was able to discern the basic degree 
to which participants tended to be invested in two place-based markers, the North Caucasus and 
the Russian Federation, as well as their ethno-national groups, more than other markers.  On 
average, participants spoke in the first-person 40.1 percent of the time during the interviews, 
suggesting that they were not hesitant to personally claim a stake in the identity markers to which 
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Coding from the interviews for participant self-identification revealed several interesting 
trends in the data.  First and foremost was the fact that two place-based identity markers were by 
far the most common constructs with which participants identified in the first-person: the North 
Caucasus, with 19 participant self-identifications, and the Russian Federation with 16 self-
identifications.  While I expected to find this trend with the Russian Federation, as it registered 
the highest overall mean score of all the dependent variables in the survey data, in terms of 
importance for identity, I was somewhat surprised to see the North Caucasus mentioned with 
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first person references in three more interviews than the Russian Federation.  The “North 
Caucasus,” in terms of the survey data, was one of the least popular markers of identity, as it 
lagged behind formal territories in terms of importance ranking among the participants overall.  
However, the “North Caucasus” and the “Russian Federation” are constructs with which each 
interview participant could identify, so each had a chance to be mentioned in the first person by 
every participant.  However, Kray/Oblast/Republic scale territories, as a group, were mentioned 
only 10 times, Stavropol Kray with six first-person identifications, Karachay-Cherkessia with 
three and Dagestan with one.   
 Another observation I made when coding for first-person identification was that while the 
North Caucasus was identified in 19 interviews (52 percent) with first-person association, the 
North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD) was mentioned in the first-person in only one 
interview.  When compared to the survey rakings, participants overall said that the NCFD was 
more important than the North Caucasus as a vernacular construct. However, when speaking 
freely on topics related to the region, participants overwhelmingly preferred to reference the 
“North Caucasus” as a vernacular region.   
 Finally, in terms of social identity markers, participants spoke about their ethno-national 
group in the first person more often than their religions or native languages.  61 percent of the 
participants mentioned their national identity in the first person, including 12 ethnic Russians, 
three Armenians, three Nogays, two Karachays, and one Dargin.  In contrast, religion was 
mentioned in the first person in 33 percent of the interviews, with eight such references to 
Christianity and four to Islam.  Languages were mentioned in the first-person in 22 percent of the 
interviews, four by ethnic Russians and four by Armenians.  Also, while nearly all of the non-









Macro Identity Construct: Role Identification 
 
 To code for role identification, I isolated passages from the interview transcripts in which 
participants referred to specific social, political, emotional, and/or economic roles, uses, or 
functions performed or associated with the study’s various identity markers. For example, a 
comment such as “Karachay-Cherkessia is an incubator for nationalism” was coded as a role for 
Karachay-Cherkessia, and a comment such as “Russia is the guarantor of rights and laws in the 
North Caucasus” was coded as a role for the Russian Federation, and a comment such as “Islam 
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provides a common method for cultural exchange” was coded under as a role for Religion.  In 
total, I determined that 27.4 percent of the total interview content was applicable for role 
identification in the coding scheme.   
I categorized these passages in groups, which corresponded to the depended variables 
that I analyzed from the survey data.  Roles associated to Russia as whole, the federal 
government, and/or the country’s federal scale institutions, were counted for “Russian 
Federation.”  References to the North Caucasus in general, or in a vernacular sense were 
categorized into “North Caucasus.” Any passages dealing with the role of nationality as a 
concept, roles as they applied to ethnic relations, or any specific national group were, were 
counted in “Nationality.”  Roles of sub-federal territories were counted under 
“Kray/Oblast/Republic.”  Roles of local scale territories were grouped under City/Village/Aul.  
References to roles of language, or any specific languages in the study area were grouped as 
“Language,” with the same logic for religious references being grouped into “Religion.” Finally, 
the references to roles played by Federal Districts, both the North Caucasus Federal District and 
Southern Federal district were grouped under “Federal District.”   




Percentage  Identity Marker/Construct Associated with Role   
V003 14,2 22.5 Religion; Russian Federation; Republics; Nationality  
V004 9,2 16.2 Stavropol Kray; Stavropol; Nationality  
V005 8,1 11.1 
North Caucasus; Dargin National Identity; Dagestan; 
Chechnya  
V006 9,0 17 
Russian Federation; North Caucasus; Stavropol Kray; 
Pyatigorsk 
V007 3,0 18.8 Nationality; Individual/Citizenship  
V008 3,4 26 Nationality  
V009 3,0 17.6 Nationality 
V010 2,1 13.6 Stavropol Kray; North Caucasus Federal District 
V011 2,0 10.5 North Caucasus  
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V012 3,0 27.3 Nationality as a platform for political organization  
V013 0,0 0   
V014 3,0 10.3 The North Caucasus; Chechnya; Dagestan  
V015 7,2 36 Individual/Citizen; North Caucasus; Stavropol  
V016 2,0 12.5 North Caucasus  
V017 3,0 16.7 Stavropol Kray 
V018 4,1 22.7 Nationality  
V019 6,2 33.3 Russian Federation; Stavropol Kray; Individual/Citizen 
V020 4,3 28 North Caucasus  
V021 11,2 11.7 Islam; Republics; Russian Language; North Caucasus  
V022 7,0 13 North Caucasus; South of Russia 
V023 11,3 7.7 
Russian Federation; ethnic Russian nationality; 
Orthodox Christianity; North Caucasus; Stavropol  
V024 22,4 44.1 
Russian Federation; Stavropol Kray; Stavropol; 
Pyatigorsk; North Caucasus Federal District; North 
Caucasus  
V025 20,3 39 
Karachay-Cherkessia; Stavropol Kray; Russian 
Federation; Individual/Citizen; Islam  
V027 14,2 26.7 
Russian Federation; Republics; Karachay-Cherkessia; 
North Caucasus; Stavropol Kray  
V028 28,4 40 
Karachay-Cherkessia; Islam; Stavropol Kray; 
Individual/Citizenship; the North Caucasus; Azerbaijan 
V029 25,3 38.4 
North Caucasus; Vladikavkaz; Russian Federation; 
Republics; Stavropol Kray 
V030 17,2 44.2 
Pyatigorsk; North Caucasus Federal District; Armenian 
nationality; Stavropol Kray 
V031 17,3 40.8 
Nationality, Language; Religion; Individual/Citizen; 
Stavropol; Krasnodar; Rostov; Armenian Language; 
Baku; Nagorno-Karabakh; North Caucasus Federal 
District 
V033 9,0 60 
Abkhazia; South Ossetia; North Caucasus Region; 
Stavropol; North Caucasus  
V034 16,5 60 Pyatigorsk; Stavropol; North Caucasus; Stavropol  
V035 18,3 31.3 
Russian Language; Individual/Citizen; Southern person; 
The South of Russia; North Caucasus; Stavropol Kray 
V036 10,0 17.5 
The North Caucasus; Russian Federation; Stavropol 
Kray  
V037 9,2 22 
North Caucasus Federal District; North Caucasus; 
Stavropol Kray  
V038 6,2 61.5 North Caucasus; Stavropol  
V039 12,0 30 North Caucasus; Stavropol Kray; Russian Language  
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V040 7,2 60 North Caucasus; Stavropol Kray 
 
 
With 21 participants assigning roles to various Kray, Oblast, and Republic scale 
territories, sub-federal territories were the most common constructs to identify in association 
with functions, roles, or territorial purpose.  Of all of the krays, oblasts, and republics coded for 
role identification, Stavropol Kray was the most popular, which was to be expected since the 
majority of the interviews were conducted in that territory.  Participants discussed Stavropol 
Kray’s role an ethnic Russian territory in the North Caucasus Federal District, as an area of 
natural beauty, as an agrarian territory, as a territory dominated by ethnic Russian language and 
culture, as a transition area between Russian and non-Russian space, as a multi-national territory, 
as part of the Steppe, as a place of unique Russian traditions, and as a displaced territory in the 
context of the North Caucasus Federal District.   
 
 
Figure 7.2 – Major Identity Markers used in Participants’ Role Identification   
 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25































Several other sub-federal territories, in addition to Stavropol Kray, were associated with 
roles by the participants.  Chechnya was discussed as an oil producer, as well as a general 
producer of natural resources.  Dagestan was also cited for its role as a natural resource provider. 
Karachay-Cherkessia was discussed in its role as a republic (independent from Stavropol Kray), 
as a part of Russia, as a territory designated for Islam, and as a tourist destination.  In addition, 
several participants’ comments on republics in general, suggesting them to be dependent on 
Russia’s federal center for development, and as incubators for nationalism.   
The North Caucasus, discussed as a vernacular region, was the next most frequently 
mentioned identity marker in terms of role associations, with 15 participants identifying roles for 
the region.  Participants discussed social roles for the North Caucasus, including its role as a 
multi-national region and as a place of unique habits, different to the way people behave in other 
regions of Russia.  In the context of Russia, participants noted the North Caucasus’s role as a 
border region, as a frontier region, and as a security risk, as well as a part of the greater Russian 
South.  In terms of economic roles for the North Caucasus, participants described the region as 
an object of development, as a natural resource provider, and as a region of great natural beauty 
and thus high tourism potential.   
The concept of “Nationality (Natsionalnost),” or particular national groups, was 
described according to role identification by 11 participants.  Participants spoke about roles 
played by the concept of nationality such as, its usefulness as a device for creating a sense of 
ethnic culture, as a deterrent for development and economic destabilization, as a form of social 
stratification, and as a platform for political organization.  National traditions were discussed in 
the role of cultural preservation. Additionally, Russian culture was associated with the role as the 
default nationality, against which other North Caucasus National groups are measured.   
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The “Russian Federation,” a category which included participants’ comments on federal 
scale entities, was associated with role identification in 10 interviews.  The roles of the Russian 
Federation included its status and responsibilities as a multi-national state, as a provider of 
financial resources and guarantor of economic development to sub-federal territories, as a 
container of civic-Russian (Rossiskaya) culture, as a part of and participant in the “civilized 
world,” as a promoter of Eastern Orthodox Christianity.  The Russian Federation was also cited 
as a granter of rights and maker of laws for Russia’s sub-federal territories.    
With six participants speaking in regard to roles of individual citizens of Russia, the 
category Individual/Citizen was the next most mentioned in terms of role identification.  
Participants mostly mentioned each citizen of Russia as responsible for his or her own behavior 
and life decisions.  Participants who commented on roles of individuals also tended to mention 
social status and success as dependent on each person’s abilities, access to education, and 
willingness to accept the basic norms of civic-Russian society.   
Although sub-federal territories, like Stavropol Kray, or Karachay-Cherkessia, were 
discussed more in terms of role identification than cities were, five participants associated 
various cities in the study area with specific roles.  Stavropol was the most commonly mentioned 
city.  Stavropol was associated with roles as a part of Russia, as a part of the North Caucasus, as 
a multi-national city, as an historical place of defense against non-Russian forces, as an 
important city for conflict prevention, as a place designated for Christianity in the North 
Caucasus, as a city designated for ethnic Russian culture in the North Caucasus Federal district, 
as an important city for Russia’s Armenian diaspora, as a place of higher learning and culture, 
and as a place for entertainment and night life.  Other cities mentioned were Pyatigorsk, in its 
role as the administrative capital of the North Caucasus Federal District, and several cities cited 
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by Armenian participants as being important for the Armenian diaspora in addition to Stavropol, 
which included Rostov-on-Don, Krasnodar and Baku.   
Five participants also commented on “Language” for role identification, either as a 
concept, or as specific languages having roles.  Non-Russian languages in general were 
discussed, in a collective sense, as an “other” in the context of the Russian Federation.  Russian 
language though was mentioned most often, and was mentioned in terms of its role as the lingua 
franca of the North Caucasus region.   
The concept of “Religion” or various religions was associated with roles by three 
participants.  As a concept, religion was discussed as providing social access to stratified 
segments of the North Caucasus’ population.  Islam was associated with the roles of inclusion 
and problem solving among Muslim groups.  Orthodox Christianity was discussed in the role of 
promoting tolerance and advocating for social acceptance in the North Caucasus.    
Three participants associated particular roles with The North Caucasus Federal District.  
First, the NCFD was discussed in the role as a provider of regional structure, as it formally 
defines the North Caucasus region.  Additionally, the NCFD was associated with a role as a 
container of multiple national groups, and as a device to separate non-Russian nationalities of the 
North Caucasus from greater ethnic Russian space outside of the region.  Finally, the NCFD was 
discussed as having a role of division and separation in the South of Russia, and as reconfiguring 
and changing the economic and political identity of Stavropol Kray.   
 Finally, two participants suggested roles specifically for the “South of Russia.”  This 
vernacular region was discussed as an agricultural area, as a tourist destination, and as a heavy 




Macro Identity Construct: Collective Identification  
 
To code for collective identification across the dependent variable identity markers, I 
isolated descriptive information regarding the participant’s belonging to, or exclusion from a 
social group, or territorial identity marker.  I differentiated between in-group versus out-group 
references in the interviews of each participant, according to the study’s dependent variables. 
Statements that constituted in-group references showed collective ownership, or identification.  
For example, a passage such as “We Russians are the cultural backbone of the region,” counts as 
an in-group reference, while “Islamic traditions are dangerous for Russian society” would count 
as an out-group reference, supposing said participant did not self-identify as a Muslim.    Overall 
35.1 percent of the total interview passages were coded as representing collective identification.  
Table 7.5 – Coding Scheme for Collective Identification  
ID # 
Sentences/Fragments Percentage In-Group 
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The most common identity marker to be mentioned in terms of collective identification 
was “Nationality,” which had total 42 participant references.  21 participants cited their 
nationalities with in-group references, and 21 participants identified other nationalities in out-
group references.  The fact that this identify marker was so commonly invoked in collective 
identification suggests that nationality is a construct by which participants clearly defined and 
separated social groups.  In addition, participants collectively identified with nationality much 
more frequently than other social identity markers, such as Native Language (18 participants 
referencing), Religion (18 referencing), and Citizenship (11 referencing).  It is also important to 
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note that participants were as likely to reference their own national groups, with in-group 
references, as they were to describe other national groups, with out-group references.   
 
Figure 7.3 – Major In-Group/Out-Group Identity Markers coded for in Collective Identification  
 
 
 I coded 40 instances of collective identification related to the dependent variable 
Kray/Oblast/Republic.  As was the case with “Nationality,” participants tended to reference their 
perceptions of krays, oblasts, or republics as both in-group and out-group collective identity 
markers. The interviews of 22 participants featured “Kray/Oblast/Republic” as out-group 
markers, thus refereeing to “other” groups and territories to identify collective traits, ownership, 
or characteristics.  “Kray/Oblast/Republic” was the most common dependent variable to be used 
for out-group collective references.  However, 18 interviews cited krays, oblasts, or republics for 
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for collective identity, as well as defining and understanding lines between participants’ own 
identity groups and other groups.   
 “North Caucasus,” as a vernacular region, was the next most commonly cited dependent 
variable for collective identification.  In total, 28 participants used it to describe collective traits.  
However, while “Nationality” and “Kray/Oblast/Republic,” had been referenced in both in-group 
and out-group examples, collective identity references for “North Caucasus” were almost 
entirely in-group, with 27 participants.  Only one participant referenced the “North Caucasus” in 
an out-group sense.  This trend suggests an overall agreement regarding a cohesive ownership 
and in-group affinity to the North Caucasus as an identity marker, at least in a vernacular sense, 
which is perhaps not surprising as all of the interviews took place in the region, and all of the 
participants had lived in the region for at least some time.  However, because participants were 
free not to associate with the North Caucasus, the tendency to claim the region with in-group 
references suggests that there is an overall vested interested in the region, felt collectively by its 
young adult population. 
 Similar to “North Caucasus” the dependent variable “Russian Federation” was also 
commonly referenced in terms of in-group collective identity, as coding revealed 20 in-group 
collective identity references with zero out-group references.  Again, participants likely had no 
reason to describe Russia at the federal scale in terms of out-group identity, as all of the 
participants could logically associate with the Russian Federation as an identity marker.  
However, the fact that “Russian Federation” was mentioned 20 times shows that just over half of 
the participants noted a federal scale sense of collective identification, while just under half of 
the participants either focused on finer scales, or chose to reference non-territorial identity 
markers.  It also should be noted that, although “Russian Federation” is a formal region, with 
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potential for all participants to claim it in a collective sense, more participants preferred to 
reference “North Caucasus” in their interviews.   
 The next most commonly referenced dependent variable for collective identity was 
“City/Village/Aul,” with 18 total references.  As was the case with “North Caucasus” and 
“Russian Federation,” most of the references were in-group, as only one participant referenced a 
city (Stavropol) as an out group collective reference.  This trend to view local, formalized 
territories in terms of in-group collective identity suggests that lived experiences in localized 
contexts are much more often a trigger for inclusive context, than exclusive understandings.  By 
keeping the focus on cities for in-group examples, participants showed that their local 
geographies were important for collective understandings for territorial identity.   
 The non-placed variables “Native Language,” “Religion” and “Citizenship,” were the 
next most commonly referenced markers of collective identification.  In total, 18 participants 
referencing Native Language, with 12 in-group passages and 6 out-group passages.  I coded 15 
total passages that referenced Religion in a collective sense, with 9 in-group and 6 out-group 
passages.  Citizenship was referenced 11 times in a collective sense, with 6 in-group and 5 out-
group references.  For each of these three identity markers, there were both in-group and out-
group references, however, in-group references were more common for all three variables.  
Because these three constructs are firmly defined, and multiple groups exist in the study area, I 
had expected these variables to be used for both in-group and out-group examples of collective 
identification.   
 The final two dependent variables, “Federal District” and “South of Russia” were the 
least commonly coded for collective identity.  Eight passages referenced a Federal District in 
terms of collective identity, with six passages describing it for in-group collective identity, and 
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two for out-group.  The South of Russia was mentioned only as an in-group marker for collective 
identity, and it appeared in 5 passages.  Although these two dependent variables appeared 
sparingly throughout the interviews, participants overwhelmingly referenced 
Kray/Oblast/Republic when referencing and describing their understandings of collective 
identity at the regional scale.   
 
Theory-Based Construct: Territoriality and Problem Solving  
 
To code for territoriality and problem solving across the dependent variable identity 
markers, I isolated descriptive information regarding the participant’s references to objectives, 
action, or reaction to particular policy, and reference to positive outcomes versus negative 
outcomes regarding actions taken to these topics.  There were two territorial policies or 
objectives pertinent to this study in particular, “Ethno-Federalism,” and “Federal District 
Reform.”  In total, 15.2 percent of the interview transcripts pertained to participant’s perceived 
out outcomes regarding Ethno-Federalism and Federal District Reform.  Territorial policies and 
outcomes regarding ethno-federalism were coded in 33 total passages, with 13 passages 
referencing negative positive outcomes, and 20 relating to negative outcomes.  Territorial 
policies and outcomes referencing Federal District Reform totaled 14 passages, with 7 passages 
suggesting positive outcomes, and 7 suggesting negative outcomes.  
 
Table 7.6 – Coding Scheme for Territoriality and Problem Solving  
ID # 
Sentences/Fragments Percentage Territorial 
Policies/Objectives with 
Perceived Positive 




Outcomes   
V003 
9/0 12.7 Ethno-Federalism; 
Federal District Reform  




15/2 25 Ethno-Federalism; 
Federal District Reform 
Ethno-Federalism  
V005 6/0 7.4  Ethno-Federalism  
V006 4/0 7.5 Federal District Reform   
V007 2/0 12.5 Ethno-Federalism    
V008 3/0 11.1 Ethno-Federalism    
V009 3/0 17.6 Ethno-Federalism   
V010 2/0 9.1  Ethno-Federalism  
V011 4/1 26.3  Ethno-Federalism  
V013 2/0 7.4  Ethno-Federalism 
V014 5/1 20.7 Federal District Reform  Ethno-Federalism 
V015 3/1 16 Ethno-Federalism   
V016 5/0 31.2  Ethno-Federalism  
V017 1/0 5.6  Ethno-Federalism  
V018 2/0 9.1 Ethno-Federalism   
V019 2/1 12.5  Ethno-Federalism  
V020 3/1 16  Ethno-Federalism 
V021 7/2 11.7 Ethno-Federalism  Ethno-Federalism 
V022 3/0 5.6  Ethno-Federalism 
V023 2/1 5.7  Ethno-Federalism 
V024 4/0 6.8  Federal District Reform  
V025 7/2 15.3 Ethno-Federalism   
V027 
8/3 18.3  Federal District Reform; 
Ethno-Federalism   
V028 7/2 11.3 Ethno-Federalism    
V029 10/1 15.1 Ethno-Federalism   Ethno-Federalism   
V030 
9/0 20.9 Ethno-Federalism; 
Federal District Reform 
Federal District Reform   
V031 0/2 4.1  Ethno-Federalism  
V033 6/0 40 Ethno-Federalism   Ethno-Federalism   
V034 
12/2 40 Federal District Reform   Federal District Reform; 
Ethno-Federalism  
V035 4/0 5.9  Federal District Reform  
V036 5/0 8.8  Ethno-Federalism  
V037 7/1 16  Ethno-Federalism  
V038 2/2 30.8  Ethno-Federalism  
V039 4/2 15  Federal District Reform  





When discussing positive outcomes of ethno-federalism and its outcomes in 
contemporary Russia and for the North Caucasus region in particular, several themes were 
consistent in the interviews of multiple participants.  Mostly, the positive comments were related 
to territorial autonomy for non-Russian nationalities, suggesting that autonomy ultimately solves, 
or prevents, potential problems in the region.  Several participants noted that giving non-Russian 
ethnic groups official status and titular rights in republics was important than preserving non-
Russian cultures, and thus, makes the Russian Federation a more authentic multi-national state 
and more tolerant and accepting of cultural diversity overall.   
 
 
Figure 7.4 – Major Themes for Territoriality and Problem Solving   
 
 
Ethno-federalism was cited by multiple participants as leading to positive outcomes in 
terms of conflict prevention, and defining boundaries of social order that are ultimately important 
for state stability.  Participants noted that ethno-federalism policies result in clear territorial 
divisions whereby residents and citizens of the Russian Federation can understand local cultural 
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usual, or out of place.  By territorializing the perceived appropriateness of national cultures, 
customs and behaviors, both ethnic Russians and non-Russian groups are guaranteed social 
environments in which their respective cultures can be practiced officially, ideally without major 
interference from outside groups.  Such an attitude can be observed in these comments from 
Participant V004: 
I consider that separating our (Russian federal) territories creates advantages for 
some. I would like to think that there are other reasons for separation other than just 
dividing territories based on nationality. It is probably good to let people have a 
place where they can fully express their cultures.  I have got a brother in North 
Ossetia and I have been there a few times.  I have noticed that the people there are 
fully able to express Ossetian culture, which I see as a positive thing for them.  It is 
better for Russia if these places exist, where people can feel free to behave as they 
are supposed to by culture … but it is problematic when people from these places 
move to other areas, like Moscow for example … If people have separate territories, 
then they also feel led to accentuate separate cultural practices and divide themselves 
off from the rest of the greater population. Now, I see everybody connecting with 
their own national groups, which is the result I believe the system is trying to 
achieve.   
 
Participant V004’s opinions on the effects of ethno-federalism show the value of the concept in 
terms of its ability to impact perceptions on sense of place.  According to Tuan (1974), sense of 
place is an important aspect for a population’s behavior and actions because people rely on their 
own awareness of sense of place to know how to act, and to determine which behaviors are 
acceptable in certain geographies.  Through maintaining its ethno-federal system, in which 
republics and krays, whose social norms and legal systems are founded upon state-approved sets 
ethno-national standards, Russia works to formalize notions of sense of place among its various 
populations.  Therefore, constructing sets of social norms, which are formalized in specific 
territories, is understood by some people in the North Caucasus to be a positive aspect for the 
region.  In the context of the study area, it seems the formulating a strong sense of place, along 
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with an understanding that sense of place is supposed to be specific to the various ethno-federal 
territories, as breaking with local sets of cultural norms can be seen as negative.     
Finally, apparent protection and promotion of religious rights and practices was also 
noted as important positive outcomes of ethno-federalism, which were mentioned in the 
interviews particularly by Muslim participants.  When republics are designed for and controlled 
by titular nationalities, groups that also happen to be Muslim, then such a republic could have 
laws and rights provided in its republic constitution that cater to expectations and social norms 
that a majority Muslim population would find acceptable.  Islam is also reflected aesthetically in 
architecture, local art, and building facades, without any based criticism from Christian 
populations.  Additionally, in a multi-national relations sense, Islam can be used as a basis for 
problem solving, as potential conflicts among traditionally Islamic nationalities can be worked 
out in a mutually acceptable manner, based in the Koran and mutual respect for Islamic traditions 
and principles.   
While participants offered many positive comments about ethno-federalism, they tended 
to be more vocal in their interviews when suggesting potential negative outcomes related to 
ethno-federalism as a territorial strategy, as 20 passages from the interviews indicate.  First and 
foremost, several participants said that they viewed ethno-federalism as an outdated way to 
territorialize the Russian Federation.  While ethno-federalism had its time and place as an 
integral part of the Soviet system, the participants felt that dividing territories based on 
nationality was no longer necessary to maintain stability, and only worked to further separate 
citizens of Russia.  While institutionalized ways to promote non-Russian cultures as ‘in place’ in 
the territories does create a more defined sense of behavior and identity, allowing them special 
status ultimately ends up in promoting nationalism, and encouraging members of republic titular 
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groups to stay in the republics, as opposed to taking advantage of better economic opportunities 
outside, as non-Russians face greater degrees of discrimination.  In addition, having republics 
also gives Russian nationalists a basis to argue why non-Russians do not belong in ethnic 
Russian majority krays and oblasts, pointing to their republics as where the titular groups belong.  
Separating non-Russians via semi-autonomous territories also works to affirm the majority status 
of ethnic Russians in krays and oblasts, fostering a sense that non-Russians constitute an ‘other,’ 
not in place in ethnic Russian territories.   
Several participants were quick to point out that ethno-federalism is ultimately 
synonymous with inequality.  The fact that certain titular groups are favored over others, in an 
official sense, means that favoritism is a potential reality in any provincial scale territory, but 
particularly in the republics.  Territorial and political autonomy means that republics are free to 
establish localized structures of political and economic power, which according to participants, 
are typically based on ethnic networks.  These ethnically-based hierarchies of power work to 
exclude minority nationalities, thus creating an unfair class system and sometimes encouraging 
minorities to leave.  In the case of the North Caucasus, participants suggested that disadvantaged 
minority groups tend to move into Stavropol Kray from the republics, if economically feasible, 
as these groups lack economic opportunity as outsiders in the republics.  Participants also noted 
that since these power structures ultimately end up working in their own interests, they tend not 
to look beyond the republic scale for trade and development, other than to receive federal 
subsidies from Moscow/Federal Center.  Therefore, a major perceived negative outcome of 
ethno-federalism for the North Caucasus, is an overall lack of economic progress and 
cooperation, partly due to republics tendency to remain isolated.    
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In additional to ethno-federalism, federal district reform is another policy utilized by the 
Russian government, possibly to achieve various territorial objectives.  Fourteen participants 
commented on their own perceived reasoning and potential outcomes of federal district reform, 
all of which pertained to the creation of the North Caucasus Federal District in 2010.  However, 
the responses were divided as to whether or not the outcomes potentially associated with federal 
district reform would ultimately be positive or negative, as 7 passages suggested positive 
outcomes and 7 pointed out negative outcomes.   
First, the major positive outcome of federal district reform in the interviews was the fact 
that Stavropol and Stavropol Kray were becoming more diverse and multi-cultural.  While 
participants could arguably have pointed to positive or negative aspects of Stavropol’s increasing 
diversity, only one participant saw this trend as overtly negative.  Participants suggested that 
formalizing the idea of the North Caucasus through the establishment of the NCFD has led to 
greater opportunities for education and economic success for residents of the republics, as 
students and young people from the republics now consider universities and colleges in 
Stavropol to be more accessible.   
The other main positive outcome of federal district reform, cited by multiple participants, 
was that the North Caucasus was ultimately better off in terms of security as a formalized region.  
Stavropol Kray, as the only majority Russian territory, now constitutes an official ethnic Russian 
presence in the North Caucasus, whereas before the NCFD, the idea of “North Caucasus” was 
likely to be associated with non-Russian groups.  Also, having all of the North Caucasus 
republics under a common sub-federal jurisdiction, with the arguable exception of Adygea, 
means that the federal center would theoretically be able to maintain order over the region should 
conflicts arise.     
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While a more streamlined channel to Moscow was cited as a positive aspect for overall 
security and conflict prevention, several participants also cited this situation as a negative for the 
North Caucasus in terms of potential economic development.  Participants suggested that the 
official separation of the North Caucasus Federal district from Krasnodar and Sochi could 
ultimately be a negative factor in the NCFD’s ability to secure foreign investment for building 
new tourism infrastructure, or other potential high end industries currently operating in the 
region, such as solar panel technology or satellite technology.  In an economic sense, participants 
tended to see federal district reform as making all of the various NCFD territories ultimately 
more reliant of subsidies from Moscow, rather than promoting organic economic growth.   
Participants from Stavropol were also critical of federal district reform for a few reasons.  
First, they tended to see separation from Krasnodar Kray and Rostov Oblast as negative for the 
agricultural industry predominantly found in Northern and Eastern Stavropol Kray.  Similar to 
the argument for tourism in the republics, participants feared that being part of the NCFD would 
work as a detractor for investment in agriculture, and that foreign and domestic capital which 
could have ended up in Stavropol Kray, would ultimately go to Krasnodar Kray or Rostov 
Oblast, two territories which are not separated as competitors as part of the Southern Federal 
District.  Stavropol itself was also suggested to be harmed by the selection of Pyatigorsk as the 
NCFD capital, as the city is not ultimately subservient to another, smaller city within its own 
kray.   
 
Theory-Based Construct: Structure of Social Expectations  
 
I coded for structure of social expectations across the study’s dependent variables by 
isolating passages for the interviews that included references to social obligations 
responsibilities, rules, codes of behavior, institutions, social norms, duty to others or some type 
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of collective entity.  In total, 14.2 percent of the inter passages related to structures of social 
expectations, as understood in connection to the study’s dependent variable identity markers.   
Table 7.7 – Coding Scheme for Structure of Social Expectations 
ID # 
Sentences/Fragments Percentage Identity Marker/Construct (Dependent 
Variable) Referenced in Structure of Social 
Expectations 
V003 6/2 11.3 Nationality; Religion; North Caucasus 
V004 8/3 16.1 Kray/Oblast/Republic; Nationality; Citizenship 
V005 
9/0 11.1 Kray/Oblast/Republic; Nationality; North 
Caucasus 
V006 7/0 13.2 Nationality; City/Village/Aul 
V007 
3/1 25 Russian Federation; Kray/Oblast/Republic; 
Nationality 
V008 3/0 11 Nationality 
V009 2/1 17.6 Citizenship; Kray/Oblast/Republic 
V010 4/1 22.7 Nationality; Kray/Oblast/Republic 
V011 5/0 26.3 Nationality; North Caucasus 
V012 2/0 18.2 North Caucasus 
V013 3/1 14.8 North Caucasus; Kray/Oblast/Republic 
V014 3/0 10.3 Nationality; Religion 
V015 2/1 12 Russian Federation 
V016 3/1 25 Kray/Oblast/Republic; City/Village/Aul 
V017 2/0 11.1 Russian Federation; Kray/Oblast/Republic 
V018 3/1 18.2 City/Village/Aul; Nationality 
V019 2/0 8.3 Kray/Oblast/Republic 
V020 4/0 16 Russian Federation; Nationality 
V021 4/1 6.5 Religion; North Caucasus; City/Village/Aul 
V022 
5/0 9.3 South of Russia; North Caucasus; 
City/Village/Aul 
V023 4/2 11.5 Language; Religion 
V024 
5/2 11.9 Nationality; North Caucasus; 
Kray/Oblast/Republic 
V025 6/0 10.1 Russian Federation; Citizenship; Religion 
V027 4/0 6.7 Language; Kray/Oblast/Republic 
V028 7/0 8.8 Religion; Nationality; language 
V029 10/2 16.4 Religion; Kray/Oblast/Republic; Nationality 
V030 3/2 11.6 Nationality; City/Village/Aul; Religion 
V031 4/0 8.2 Kray/Oblast/Republic; Nationality 




5/2 20 Russian Federation; City/Village/Aul; South of 
Russia; North Caucasus 
V035 
6/0 8.9 Language; South of Russia; 
Kray/Oblast/Republic 
V036 5/0 8.8 Nationality; Language; North Caucasus 
V037 3/1 8 Nationality 
V038 1/1 15.4 Nationality 
V039 6/2 20 Russian Federation; Nationality 
V040 2/0 13.3 Nationality 
 
With 22 interviews associating social expectations to “Nationality,” this construct was the 
overall most commonly discussed identity marker in terms of social expectations.  Most of the 
comments referencing structure of social expectations pegged to nationality dealt with the 
perception that national groups in Russia are defined according to official standards, and thus 
group members undergo at least some degree of interaction and shared social experience with 
other members of their national groups, based on these standards.   
 
Figure 7.5 – References to Structure of Social Expectations  
 
 
While participants who discussed the social expectations of nationality were in agreement 
that groups were expected to behave in certain ways, based on their national origin, most 
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References to Structure of Social Expectations
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participants also commented that ethnic Russians also had social expectations, and in many 
cases, all other groups were often grouped together simply as non-Russians.  This binary division 
was pointed out by participants of all nationalities.  Some participants also noted that non-
Russians were expected to face discrimination, regardless of their particular nationality.  
Participants suggested that certain professions carried expectations based on nationality, and that 
social mobility overall was perhaps easier for ethnic Russians than it was for non-Russians.  
They cited examples of jobs in education and finance generally as more easily attainable by 
ethnic Russians.  Conversely, titular nationalities in the republics also were expected to have 
advantages for social mobility and career advancement based on national status, particularly 
appointed positions in local governments.   
Ethnic Russians in the North Caucasus were also cited as expected to maintain Russian 
national standards, just as ethnic Russians would do in any part of Russia.  On the other hand, 
several non-Russian participants noted that non-Russians were more likely to be Russified, and 
are ultimately expected to behave like ethnic Russians, when not in concentration with members 
of their own national groups.  Participants seemed to be in agreement that all people in Russia 
are confronted with the concept of nationality, and expected to behave according to national 
standards (stereotypes) at some point, even if only to a menial degree.  However, several 
participants noted that they believed people were expected to show off their national identities 
socially (with bright cultural expressions) in the North Caucasus, perhaps to a greater degree 
than people in other regions of Russia.  
The dependent variable with the next most coded passages pertaining to social 
expectations was Kray/Oblast/Republic, with 15.  Participants discussed both Stavropol Kray 
and various republics in terms of these territories social environments, as well as social tenancies 
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and overall expectations involving social decisions and interactions.  Overall, Stavropol Kray 
received the most attention, with most of the participants pointing out its official status as a 
majority ethnic Russian territory, while at the same time also being the most ethnically diverse 
territory in the North Caucasus region.  For example, one participant pointed out that Stavropol 
is the only territory in the North Caucasus federal district to operate solely under the constitution 
of the Russian Federation and not under an additional republic constitution.  Nonetheless, there 
seemed to be a consensus that Stavropol Kray was expected to be accessible to all of the North 
Caucasus nationalities, and that the business climate and economic opportunities are understood 
as being more fair, objective and available than in the republics.   
In addition to Stavropol, participants also discussed social expectations associated with 
Karachay-Cherkessia, Dagestan, Chechnya, and North Ossetia.  In each case, participants 
commented on the importance of local networks and power structures, mostly based on ethnic 
alliances, for social mobility and success.  Two participants noted that such connections are 
expected to be more indicative of one’s success in the republics than one’s overall education, 
talents, or abilities.  The republics’ populations are also expected to respect the cultural traditions 
of the titular groups in these territories, just as people are expected to refer to ethnic Russian 
cultural traditions in Stavropol Kray.   
Three participants cited specific social expectations for Karachay-Cherkessia.  First they 
said that expectations for violence in Karachay-Cherkessia, in their experience, were often held 
by friends and acquaintances in Stavropol Kray, suggesting that outsiders expected Karachay-
Cherkessia to be dangerous.  They also pointed out that Karachay-Cherkessia is expected to 
develop its tourism industry, based on marketing information pertaining to the republic, and the 
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belief that federal subsidies for tourism development are available more so for businesses 
operating in the tourism industry than for any other industry.    
Ten participants explained social expectations that related to the “North Caucasus” in 
their interviews.  A common theme among all of these interviews had to do with social 
expectations involving the overall demeanor of the region’s population.  In general, participants 
stated that people in the North Caucasus are expected to act in a more hot-tempered way, or be 
generally ruder than people in other regions of Russia.  Another common theme was that social 
divisions based on nationality are expected in the North Caucasus, again as opposed to regions 
outside, for example in Saint Petersburg and Northern Russia.  Four participants also commented 
on how young people especially have bad expectations in regard to their career opportunities in 
the North Caucasus, as they believe investors and businesses in other regions of Russia see the 
North Caucasus as a negative environment, and thus are less likely to do business in the North 
Caucasus than in other parts of the country, such as Krasnodar or other territories in the Southern 
Federal District.   
When I coded for social expectations regarding “City/Village/Aul,” about which seven 
participants commented specifically, I noticed some of the same themes that had been mentioned 
at the Kray/Oblast/Republic scale.  A common theme, mentioned in all seven interviews, dealt 
with the social expectation of ethnic tolerance for Stavropol.  The city of Stavropol, as a center 
of development and higher learning, is expected to be not only diverse, but culturally tolerant 
and accessible to all the people of the North Caucasus.  Non-Russian participants in particular 
voiced the expectation that Stavropol and its population are expected to exude greater degrees of 
cultural tolerance than people in cities like Cherkessk, Nalchik, or Grozny.  According to three 
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participants, businesses and institutions in Stavropol are also expected to be more open and 
objective than those in cities.   
Seven interviews also covered social expectations pertaining to the scale of “Russian 
Federation.”  First, several interviews noted that ethnic Russian culture was usually regarded as 
the standard set of cultural understandings for the country overall, although since the country is 
officially multi-national, every person should expect to practice, access, or at least be aware of 
his or her national traditions.  In other words, everyone in Russia is expected to have an 
understanding of ethnic Russian culture, along with his or own national culture, if one comes 
from a non-Russian group.  Ethno-federalism thus defines sets of national expectations for the 
country, and the titular cultures in Russian’s various territories set up and determine the cultural 
norms and expectations in those territories.  For example, Stavropol, as a Russian community, 
should maintain the same cultural expectations of other krays and oblasts, as part of an 
“imagined community” of ethnic Russian territories.   
Three participants suggested that as a multi-national country, the Russian Federation 
should expect to deal with issues that cultural diversity presents.  The two major issues brought 
up in these interviews were social and economic inequality, and conflict/instability.  The 
participants noted that the Russian state should set and hold standards for all of its citizens, 
namely in education and fairness for its labor markets.  Although such expectations are idealized, 
the reality is that Russia’s various territories are not all operating with even standards, and the 
expectation is that the Russian Federation will work toward policy and legal frameworks that 
promote the notions equality and economic development for all of its territories.   
Five participants touched on social expectations centered on “language” in their 
interviews, the major theme being that people in Russia are expected to know at least some of 
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their national languages.  Two participants went as far as to say that knowledge of their native 
language, Nogay, was considered vital for cultural authenticity, and that the expectation of being 
able to speak Nogay was in fact akin to being Nogay.  The other major expectation, mentioned in 
all five interviews, was the status of the Russian language as the lingua franca of the country, 
and while usage of Russian may be optional in some cases in the North Caucasus, everyone in 
Russia is expected to study Russian in school and at least have a working knowledge of the 
language.   
As was the case with “Language,” five participants also spoke about social expectations 
in connection to “Religion.”  Interviews brought up expectations for the North Caucasus’ two 
major religions, Islam and Christianity, but in the case of both, participants often noted that 
people in the North Caucasus are expected to associate with one or the other regardless of 
whether or not they are believers or actually practice it.  For Islam in particular, participants were 
generally in agreement that Muslims are expected to practice their religion, or at least be in touch 
with it, to a greater degree than are Christians.  A theme present in three of the interviews was 
the role of young people in Muslim groups, which, according to participants, are expected to 
reconnect with Islam after previous generations lost a sense of what it meant to be a Muslim in 
Soviet times.    
Expectations for religion which related to the overall idea of ethno-federalism were also 
present in the interviews.  Titular status was mentioned as a deciding factor as to whether certain 
religious infrastructure would be present or not.  For example, Muslims living in Stavropol, and 
ethnic Russian territory, cannot expect to have a mosque readily available for prayers and 
celebrations.   
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There were also several examples of religious expectations specifically related to 
“Nationality.”  Two Nogay participants and one Karachay participant specifically mentioned that 
members of their national groups were expected to celebrate three major Islamic holidays, and 
were expected to find and attend a mosque for those celebrations and services if possible.  Four 
participants also commented on expectations of religious groups that extend national divisions, 
for example, Muslims are expected to find common ground to settle arguments and disputes.  
Additionally, two participants suggested that Russians are expected to respect Armenians as 
Christians, thus leading to favoritism of Armenians over other non-Russian groups.     
Similar to the comments on social expectations in the North Caucasus, participants 
tended to focus on the populations overall expected demeanor in regard to social expectations in 
the “South of Russia.”  Three participants focused on the South of Russia in their interviews, all 
of which described Southern people as generally relaxed, and less focused on work than people 
in Northern and Central Russia.   Also, participants commented on expectations for the general 
pace of life, which they described as slower in the South of Russia than in other regions.  These 
differences in general attitude were also brought up as a potential deterrent for economic 
development, as outsiders may choose to avoid working in the South, based on its populations’ 
perceived lazy attitude and lack of work ethic.    
Finally, three interviews focused on social expectations specifically related to the concept 
of “Citizenship.”  These participants suggested some interesting expectations regarding various 
age groups in Russian society.  First, they spoke about changing expectations of citizenship from 
the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation, noting that older people in the North Caucasus, and 
in Stavropol Kray in particular, sometimes expected the younger generation to view citizenship 
and civic duties in a more Soviet style mindset.  For example, citizenship in Stavropol carries 
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with it the expectation of national tolerance, however, younger people are held more accountable 
to maintain this attitude and to socialize more across ethnic lines.  Also, while all three 
participants mentioned the fact that all citizens of Russia were expected to be accountable to the 
legal system of the country, two participants suggested that citizens in the ethnic Russian 
majority territories, like Stavropol Kray, were expected to fall in line with Moscow, and the rest 
of the country, to a greater degree than citizens of the republics, who live under semi-
autonomous rule.  
 
Theory-Based Construct: Affect and Feelings  
 
To code for affect and feelings, I isolated passages that referenced various emotional 
expressions to places (sorrow, happiness, pride, hate, etc.).  I then categorized the emotional 
references into positive or negative and recorded the places referenced.  I then organized the 
results into four scales, state/federal, regions, Kray/Oblast/Republic, and City/Village/Aul, to 
analyze whether or not participants chose to associate positive or negative emotions at some 
scales more than others. In total 16.3 percent of the total passages contained passages that 
expressed affectual or emotional context when speaking about places.   
Table 7.8 – Coding Scheme for Affect and Feelings  
ID # 
Sentences/Fragments Percentage  Places Referenced 
with Positive 
Emotional Response  
Places Reference 
with Negative 
Emotional Response  
V003 
5/0 7 Russian Federation; 
Southern Federal 





8/1 13.2 Stavropol Kray; 
Stavropol; South of 






















2/1 18.8  North Caucasus; 
Stavropol Kray  
V008 














2/0 29.6 Stavropol Kray; 
Russian Federation; 
North Caucasus  
North Caucasus  
V012 
2/0 17.2  North Caucasus; 
Stavropol 
V013 





6/2 18.9 North Caucasus; 
Dagestan; Chechnya; 
Stavropol; Pyatigorsk; 


















5/0 24 Russian Federation; 
Stavropol; Armenia; 
Baku  




4/0 6.5 Russian Federation; 
Stavropol Kray  
North Caucasus  
V020 
3/0 5.6 Stavropol; Stavropol 




4/2 9.6 Russian Federation; 
Moscow; Stavropol; the 





Georgia; Dagestan  
V022 
4/1 11.9 South of Russia; North 
Caucasus; Moscow; 
Stavropol Kray  
North Caucasus  
V023 
3/0 10.2 Russian Federation; 
Moscow; the South of 
Russia; Stavropol  
North Caucasus  
V024 
3/2 8.3 Russian Federation; 
Stavropol Kray  
North Caucasus; the 
South of Russia 
V025 
5/2 8.8 Karachaevsk; Stavropol 





6/0 10.9 Russian Federation; 
Karachay-Cherkessia; 
North Caucasus 
Stavropol; Sochi  
V028 
5/0 16.3 Russian Federation; 
Karachay-Cherkessia; 
North Caucasus; 
Stavropol Kray   
Azerbaijan; Moscow  
V029 


























Kray   
V033 
6/0 8.9 North Caucasus; 




















Federal District  
V036 
4/2 46.1 Russian Federation; 





5/1 12.5 Russian Federation; 
Stavropol Kray; 
Stavropol 
South of Russia; 
North Caucasus; 
Southern Federal 
District; Chechnya  
V038 




4/1 12.5 Russian Federation; 




5/0 33.3 Russian Federation; 
Stavropol; Stavropol 
Kray 
North Caucasus  






Figure 7.6 – Place-Based Affect and Feelings by Territorial Scale  
 
 
 When analyzing participants’ general scope of usage of affect and emotion to describe 
places, I noted four basic categories which grouped places and territorial constructs into scalar 
groups.  These classifications were “Regions,” which included vernacular constructs, such as the 
North Caucasus, or formal constructs like the NCFD, “City/Villiage/Aul,” which included any 
references to particular cities, or other defined urban settings, “Kray/Oblast/Republic,” which 
included all mentions of formally defined sub-federal Russian territories, and “State/Federal,” 
which counted references to the Russian Federation, or other sovereign states.  In total, I counted 
177 passages that utilized affect or emotion to describe a place in the interviews.   
 Regions, as constructs, evoked both the most varied, and highest number of affectual and 
emotional responses from participants with a total of 58, 25 of which were positive and 33 of 
which were negative.  Regional descriptions were the only scalar group about which participants 
offered more negative responses than positive.  The most commonly mentioned territorial 


























negative passages.  The “South of Russia” was the next most commonly mentioned region, with 
six positive references and four negative references.  These results suggest that, although opinion 
varied regarding positivity or negativity based on emotion, the “North Caucasus” was clearly of 
greater importance.  The “South of Russia,” while not as commonly referenced, was seen in 
more positive light.  In terms of formal regions (federal districts), participants overwhelmingly 
preferred to use negative emotions to describe the North Caucasus Federal District, as opposed to 
the Southern Federal District.  The NCFD was described negatively in six passages, while only 
one participant referenced it positively, giving it the highest ratio of negative to positive response 
emotional response of any territorial construct mentioned in the interviews. The SFD was cited 
twice with positive emotional references, and once as negative.   
 References to places at the “City/Village/Aul” scale were the next most common, with 49 
total references, 35 of them being positive and 14 being negative.  Not surprisingly, Stavropol 
was mentioned with emotional response by more participants than any other city, with 17 
positive passages versus only two negative ones.  The next most commonly mentioned city, in 
terms of affect and emotion, was actually Moscow, about which I coded four passages as 
positive and three as negative.  Next came Pyatigorsk, with two positive passages and two 
negative passages.  Several other cities, villages and auls were mentioned by single participants.  
The top three cities mentioned with emotion and affect were all politically important, severing as 
scalar capitols in the Russian Federal system, with Stavropol as the capitol city of Stavropol 
Kray, Moscow as the capital of the Russian Federation, and Pyatigorsk as the capital of the 
NCFD.   
 Krays, oblasts, and republics were mentioned with affection and/or emotion in 36 total 
passages, 35 of which were positive and 14 negative.  Stavropol Kray led the way with 23 
261 
 
passages, 17 showing positive affect and emotion and 6 negative.  Karachay-Cherkessia and 
Chechnya were next with five total passages for each republic.  Karachay-Cherkessia had four 
positive passages and one negative.  Participants described Chechnya negatively in three 
passages and positively in two.  Two participants also made general references to North 
Caucasus republics, both of which were negative, and Krasnodar Kay appeared with one positive 
passage.  The results from the City/Village/Aul scale suggest that Stavropol, a Kray, was 
understood in a more emotionally positive manner than the other the various republics in the 
North Caucasus region.   
 Finally, territorial constructs at the State/Federal scale was the least likely to be 
mentioned, as a group, but participants showed the clearest pattern of positivity and negativity at 
this scale.  In total, emotional and/or affectual references to Russia and other sovereign states 
appeared 34 times throughout the interviews, and 31 of these references were positive, as 
opposed to only three negative.  The clearest trend at this scale was participants’ overwhelmingly 
positive emotional response to the Russian Federation, as I coded 19 positive passages, without a 
single negative emotional passage.   Armenia and Ukraine were mentioned three times, all of 
which were positive.  Georgia and Azerbaijan each had two references, one positive and one 
negative in the case of each of the South Caucasus states.  The overall positive affectual and 
emotional statements to countries, compared to the more negative trend for regions, shows that 
participants preferred to engage with the more focused regional scale as a context for expressing 
discontents and identifying problems, while the positive state/federal scale tended to be seen 
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Theory-Based Construct: Civic Identity (Rossijski)/Citizenship 
 
I coded for the construct of Russian Citizenship, or a sense of civic identity (Rossijski) by 
isolating and analyzing passages that included participants’ references to participation, 
belonging, or attachment to the Russian state via economic, legal, social and/or political 
identification.  A total of 21 participants spoke specifically about citizenship or civic identity in 
their interviews, and I noticed that three main themes appeared to be present in many of them: 
Russian Citizenship as a personal factor for one’s identity, citizenship as an important factor for 
Russia’s legal framework, and citizenship as a mechanism for social or territorial control.  
Although the participants who commented on citizenship strongly stated the importance of 
citizenship, only 3.7 percent of the total interview passages dealt directly with issues related to 
citizenship in the Russian Federation.  




Percentage Thematic Identification with Citizenship/Civic Identity  
V003 
6/0 8.5 Russian citizenship as an identity factor; Citizenship as 
important for Russia’s legal framework; Citizenship as a 
mechanism for territorial control   
V004 
4/0 5.9 Citizenship as a mechanism for territorial control; Russian 
citizenship as an identity factor   
V005 2/0 2.5 Russian citizenship as an identity factor   
V006 1/0 1.9 Russian citizenship as an identity factor 
V009 2/0 11.8 Citizenship as important for Russia’s legal framework 
V011 1/0 5.3 Citizenship as a mechanism for social or territorial control   
V012 1/0 9.1 Russian citizenship as an identity factor 
V016 
1/0 6.25 Russian citizenship as an identity factor; Citizenship as 
important for Russia’s legal framework 
V018 2/0 9.1 Citizenship as important for Russia’s legal framework 
V019 1/0 4.1 Citizenship as a mechanism for social or territorial control   
V021 3/0 3.9 Russian citizenship as an identity factor 
V022 2/0 3.7 Russian citizenship as an identity factor 
V024 
3/2 9.6 Russian citizenship as an identity factor; Citizenship as 
important for Russia’s legal framework; Citizenship as a 




3/0 5.1 Russian citizenship as an identity factor; Citizenship as a 
mechanism for social or territorial control   
V027 
4/0 6.8 Russian citizenship as an identity factor; Citizenship as a 
mechanism for social or territorial control   
V028 2/1 5 Russian citizenship as an identity factor 
V031 2/0 4.7 Russian citizenship as an identity factor 
V033 
2/1 20 Citizenship as important for Russia’s legal framework; 
Citizenship as a mechanism for social or territorial control   
V035 1/0 1.5 Russian citizenship as an identity factor 
V036 1/1 3.5 Russian citizenship as an identity factor 
V037 3/0 6 Citizenship as a mechanism for social or territorial control   
   
 
The most popular overall theme I found after coding for “Civic Identity/Citizenship” 
dealt with this construct specifically as an identity factor for participants.  In total 16 out of the 
21 interviews coded for “Civic Identity/Citizenship” had passages that directly with civic 
identity.  Six participants specifically commented on the fact that they believed citizenship to be 
the foundation of identity in Russia, with most citing the fact that citizenship, thus civic identity, 
is firmly defined, while other elements of identity, like nationality for example, are more fluid 
and vary in their meaning among different populations.  Themes of homeland and scale were 
also present.  Four participants commented on the notion of the Russian Federation, as a scalar 
entity, was the easiest territorial factor for people to understand, as it represents the highest sense 
of authority over them.  Several also commented on the fact that the idea of Russia as homeland 
was important to them, and that being born into the Russian Federation was important to their 




Figure 7.8 – Major Themes Coded for Citizenship/Civic Identity  
 
 
 Nine participants’ interviews included passages on the theme of citizenship as a 
mechanism for either social, or territorial control in Russia.  Five participants mentioned scalar 
relations in Russia’s federal structure, and noted that while Russian citizenship applies to 
everyone in the Russian Federation, not all citizens are equal, referring to residents of 
autonomous republics.  They mainly spoke about federal control over the North Caucasus 
republics, and the importance of having a vertical system of power to prevent corruption in sub-
federal territories.  These comments applied to titular groups in particular, as members of these 
groups could have special status in republics that they would not have as residents of krays or 
oblasts.  However, the other four participants who spoke on this sub-theme noted that Russian 
citizenship did constitute a measure of equal rights for citizens everywhere in the country, with 
one participant noting that Russian citizenship is possible more important for non-Russians than 
for ethnic Russians, as citizenship guarantees members of these group a collective stake in the 


























 Finally, six participants commented on the importance of citizenship for Russia’s legal 
framework.  They noted that Russia’s legal system is ultimately based on the constitution of the 
Russian Federation, which applies to all Russian citizens, and suggested the importance of 
thinking about the laws of Russia as applicable anywhere in the state, thus creating an 
expectation that citizens of Russia can live a similar life, at least in a legal sense, anywhere in the 
Russian Federation.  Four participants also commented on the legal rights provided to national 
groups in Russia, suggesting that Russian citizenship, by definition, is an inclusive construct.  
They also suggested that cultural diversity is both guaranteed and promoted vis-à-vis the 
country’s legal structure, and therefore should be understood as part of what it means to be a 
citizen of Russia. 
 
Theory-Based Construct: Ethno-National Identity/Nationality (Nationalnost)  
When coding based on the construct of ethno-national identity, I isolated participants’ 
references to language, ancestry, religion and peoplehood, or any other elements related to ethnic 
or national senses of belonging.  I then grouped the responses based on eight common sub-
themes, applicable to ethno-national identity as a construct, which emerged as major points and 
commonly discussed elements in the interviews.  These sub-themes were social mobility, 
national traditions, language, sense of community, religious beliefs, political power/alliances, 
perceptions and stereotypes, and shared history.  In total 14.8 percent of all interview passages 
dealt directly with ethno-national identity and were applicable to at least one of the eight 





Table 7.10 – Coding Scheme for Ethno-National Identity 
ID # Percent Sentences/Fragments Ethno-National Sub-Themes Discussed   
V003 8.4 4/2 Religious beliefs; national traditions; language   
V004 
16.2 9/2 Language; Religious Beliefs; Shared History; 
National Traditions    
V005 
11.1 7/2 Language; Religious Beliefs; National Traditions; 
Sense of Community 
V006 
18.9 7/3 Language; Religious Beliefs; Political 
Power/Alliances   
V007 18.8 3/0 National Traditions 
V008 29.6 6/2 National Traditions 
V009 29.4 5/0 Shared History; Sense of Community; Language 
V010 13.6 2/1 National Traditions  
V011 15.8 3/0 Shared History  
V012 27.3 2/1 Political Power/Alliances  
V013 11.1 3/0 Perceptions and Stereotypes   
V014 20.7 5/1 Sense of Community; Political Power/Alliances    
V015 20 4/1 Social Mobility 
V016 18.8 2/1 Social Mobility 
V017 11 2/0 Social Mobility  
V018 13.6 2/1 Sense of Community; Social Mobility  
V019 8.3 2/0 Social Mobility 
V020 4 1/0 Sense of Community 
V021 7.8 6/0 Political Power/Alliances  
V022 11.1 4/2 Social Mobility; Sense of Community   
V023 9.6 5/0 Religious Beliefs; Social Mobility   
V024 8.5 4/1 Social Mobility; Political Power/Alliances    
V025 
11.9 7/0 Language; Religious Beliefs; National Traditions; 
Social Mobility 
V027 5 3/0 Social Mobility 
V028 
12.5 8/2 Social Mobility; Language; Religious Beliefs; 
National Traditions  
V029 
15.1 9/2 Language; Religious Beliefs; Social Mobility; 
Perceptions and Stereotypes   
V030 
13.9 6/0 Language; Sense of Community; National 
Traditions   
V031 8.2 4/0 Social Mobility; National Traditions  
V033 26.7 3/1 National Traditions; Social Mobility  
V034 17.1 4/2 National Traditions; Sense of Community 
V035 
8.9 6/0 Language; Social Mobility; Sense of Community; 
Perceptions and Stereotypes 




18 8/1 Social Mobility; Language; Political 
Power/Alliances; National Traditions   
V038 23.1 3/0 Social Mobility; Perceptions Stereotypes   
V039 17.5 5/2 Language; Social Mobility  
V040 13.3 2/0 Social Mobility; Sense of Community 
 
 
 Of all the comments and passages about ethno-national identity from the interviews, the 
sub-theme that participants mentioned the most when talking about issues of nationality was how 
the construct applies to one’s social mobility.  In total 19 of the participants commented on this 
particular sub-theme in their interviews, and 12 of them indicated that the nationality as a 
concepts was important in contemporary Russia based on its significance for social mobility.  
Networking and job placement were mentioned by 10 participants, with their overall consensus 
being that hiring networks and job expectations can be influenced by one’s national identity.  
These participants noted that in Stavropol, certain jobs, such as teachers, or bankers, tended to be 
done by ethnic Russians, and that non-Russians could possibly face discrimination in certain 
career fields.  Conversely, in the republics, and increasingly in Stavropol Kray, business 
networks run by people who network based on their belonging to particular national groups often 
tend to hire and promote people of the same group.  Therefore, one’s nationality could 
potentially affect his or her social mobility in the North Caucasus, depending on his or her 
employment goals.  Eight participants who commented on social mobility also noted that one’s 
ethno-national identity would mostly likely be a secondary factor in his or her employability, 




Figure 7.9 – Major Themes Coded in Regard to Ethno-National Identity 
 
 
 The next most commonly discussed sub-theme in relation to ethno-national identity was 
the practice of national traditions, about which 13 participants commented.  Ten participants who 
mentioned national traditions also noted that they believed people tended to practice traditions to 
a greater degree in the North Caucasus than in other parts of Russia.  These interviews suggested 
that people tended to show off their ethno-national cultures and allegiances in public, particularly 
younger people belonging to non-Russian groups.  Demonstrations of traditions mentioned 
included dancing in public parks, gathering to cook traditional foods in the forest, or at parks, 
and playing loud music specific to one’s ethnic group from cars.  However, three participants 
also brought up the Cossacks, and compared their public displays of national traditions to those 
done by the non-Russian groups.  Russian national traditions were also discussed, but they 
tended to be mentioned along with social norms or default ways to behave.  For example, four 






























(jellied meat) as usual fare for Russia, while likening foods such as shashlik (shish-kabobs) or 
plov (a rice dish) to non-Russian groups.   
 Another important aspect regarding national traditions, particularly among non-Russian 
participants, was the importance of practicing one’s national traditions for reasons of cultural 
preservation.  Eight participants commented on this idea, six non-Russians and two ethnic 
Russians.  All of them noted that national traditions were being practiced less and less, and that 
few young people seemed to care about them as much as the older generations.  Several 
participants suggested that as intraregional migration levels increase in the North Caucasus, and 
more and more non-Russians find themselves living in Stavropol Kray, separated from their 
greater ethno-national communities in the republics, that these individuals tend to lose touch with 
their traditions very quickly. The two Russian participants suggested that since the North 
Caucasus, and Stavropol Kray in particular, were becoming more culturally diverse, it was 
difficult to get a true sense of classical Russian culture there.  One noted that Russians in 
Stavropol actually have a unique set of national traditions, which reflect transculturation between 
traditional Slavic elements and pieces of the cultures indigenous to the North Caucasus that 
Slavic people tend to find attractive such as food ways for example.     
 Twelve participants commented specifically on the importance of their native languages 
in the interviews.  In each case, the basic idea was that speaking one’s native language defines 
his or her potential audience for communication.  Ten of these participants, including three 
ethnic Russians, discussed the increased importance of non-Russian native languages for 
identity.  Because the Russian language is the lingua franca of the North Caucasus, and the 
default language used in education and other institutions, non-Russians very often speak  Russian 
at a native or near native level.  Since ethnic Russians rarely have the need, or even the 
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opportunity to learn non-Russian languages, speaking such languages becomes a very clear 
method to include or exclude persons from one’s social circle, or interaction.  Three ethnic 
Russian participants commented on their disappointment in regard to the general sloppy usage of 
the Russian language, not only among non-Russians, but ethnic Russians as well, saying that 
they took pride in their native language, just as non-Russians would in their languages.   
 The next mostly commonly discussed sub-theme related to ethno-national identity was a 
sense of community that is supported and maintained by socialization with members of one’s 
ethno-national group.  Ideas relating to this sub-theme were fairly straight forward and 
consistent, with the basic trend being that people of same nationality tend to socialize with one 
another, and thus form bonds and social circles that work to reinforce their sense of ethno-
national identity.   A large factor in this sub-theme was family structure.  Because family is 
generally considered to be important in the North Caucasus, especially among non-Russian 
groups, social activities often center around spending time with one’s relatives and extended 
family for holidays and general recreation.  Another major theme for non-Russian groups, which 
was particularly evident in the interviews of several Armenian and Nogay participants, was the 
importance of marrying someone of the same ethno-national group.  Intermarriage works to 
widen one’s social circle, but keep the scope within his or her ethno-national community and 
potentially strengthening his or her sense of ethno-national identity.    
 Religion and religious beliefs were discussed by eight participants in terms of ethno-
national identity.  These participants all mentioned the fact that religion and nationality are 
connected ideas in Russia and in the North Caucasus, and that people very rarely practice a 
religion other than commonly observed faith of their ethno-national groups.  For example, the 
majority of ethnic Russian participants in the project identified themselves as Orthodox 
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Christian, and the rest as atheists or of no religion.  No ethnic Russians self-identified as 
Muslims.  Likewise, no Karacahys, Nogays, Dargins, Lezgins, etc., self-identified as Christians.  
Therefore, pegging nationality to a particular religion tends to influence one’s social circle, as 
well as language and national traditions.  Participants often noted that they practiced national 
traditions on religious holidays, especially Muslim participants.   
 Six participants discussed connections between ethno-national identity and political 
power and alliances.  All of these interviews were contextualized in the North Caucasus, or 
specific republics.  The general consensus was that when officials have the ability to appoint, or 
support people for other offices, they almost always do so according to the officials’ own ethno-
national group.  All six participants cited examples from republics, including Dagestan, 
Karachay-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia.  In the less diverse republics, like Karachay-
Cherkessia, the two titular groups, Karachay and Cherkess were described as having a clear 
political advantage over other groups.  In Dagestan, as much more ethnically diverse republic, 
participants described more localized political power structures based on ethno-national ties and 
sharp divisions with the republic-wide government.  Additionally, three participants noted that 
they believed such power networks, centered particularly on non-Russian ethno-national groups, 
were becoming prominent in the local governments of Stavropol Kray.  Two of them mentioned 
Dargin-based networks in Eastern Stavropol Kray specifically.   
 Four participants spoke specifically on the sub-theme of perceptions and stereotypes 
based on nationality in the North Caucasus, as well as wider Russia. Three of the interviewed 
featured comments centered on disproportionate representations of non-Russians by the media, 
in association with negative behavior, specifically crime.  Two of the participants who spoke 
about stereotypes said that they believe they had been given an advantage, been disadvantaged, 
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or had been evaluated in a social context based solely on their perceived ethno-national identity.  
The other two said they believed that profiling based on ethno-national groups happened 
frequently in the North Caucasus, and that they expected to be profiled at some point in their 
lives.   
 Shared history of ethno-national groups was also a sub-theme addressed by four 
participants.  These participants argued the importance of understanding nationalities in the 
North Caucasus in historical context because their histories are what make them authentic and 
distinct from other groups.  One Russian participant argued that understanding ethnic Russian 
identity is only possible by looking at pre-Soviet histories, as what it originally meant to be 
ethnic Russian has been lost.   
 
Theory-Based Construct: Region as Brand 
 
To code for “Region as Brand,” I isolated passages in which participants made references 
to characteristics that they viewed as being ascribed to the study area, or parts of the study area 
in a regional context.  This construct is based on the work of Vainikka (2012), who suggests that 
state-sponsored discourses work to establish notions of economic identity, thus “branding” a 
region with a particular identity, which can be crucial for attracting foreign direct investment, or 
for establishing a specific role for a region in the overall context of the state.  In the coding 
scheme, I classified regional context in terms of four constructs: North Caucasus, North 
Caucasus Federal District, South of Russia, and Southern Federal District.  In total, I coded 19.9 






Table 7.11 – Coding Scheme for Region as Brand  
ID # Percentage  Sentences/Fragments Regional Context Discussed    
V003 12.7 7/2 North Caucasus 
V004 
11.8 8/0 South of Russia; North Caucasus; Southern 
Federal District; North Caucasus Federal 
District   
V005 
13.6 9/2 North Caucasus  
V006 13.5 7/0 North Caucasus  
V007 18.8 2/1 North Caucasus  
V008 22.2 4/2 South of Russia; North Caucasus 
V009 23.5 4/0 North Caucasus 
V010 
22.7 3/2 North Caucasus; North Caucasus Federal 
District 
V011 15.8 3/0 North Caucasus  
V012 36.4 2/2 North Caucasus  
V013 
25.9 5/2 North Caucasus; North Caucasus Federal 
District   
V014 
20.7 6/0 North Caucasus; North Caucasus Federal 
District  
V015 28 5/2 North Caucasus  
V016 12.5 2/0 North Caucasus  
V017 11.1 2/0 North Caucasus  
V018 9.1 2/0 North Caucasus  
V019 16.7 3/1 North Caucasus  
V020 
12 3/0 North Caucasus  
V021 12.9 8/2 North Caucasus  
V022 18.5 10/0 The South of Russia; North Caucasus  
V023 
17.3 7/2 North Caucasus; North Caucasus Federal 
District; South of Russia;   
V024 
15.3 9/0 North Caucasus; North Caucasus Federal 
District  
V025 45.8  North Caucasus 
V027 
15 25/2 North Caucasus; North Caucasus Federal 
District 
V028 27.5 7/2 North Caucasus; South of Russia 
V029 8.2 18/4 South of Russia; North Caucasus 
V030 
18.6 6/0 North Caucasus; North Caucasus Federal 
District 
V031 16.3 6/2 North Caucasus  




34.3 12/0 North Caucasus; North Caucasus Federal 
District;   
V035 
32.9 20/2 South of Russia; North Caucasus; North 
Caucasus Federal District   
V036 10.5 6/0 North Caucasus  
V037 
16 8/0 North Caucasus; South of Russia; Southern 
Federal District; North Caucasus Federal 
District  
V038 23.1 3/0 North Caucasus  
V039 25 8/2 North Caucasus  
V040 26.7 4/0 North Caucasus  
 
 
As I expected, due to the nature of the question prompts utilized in the interviews, the 
North Caucasus, in a general or vernacular sense, was the most commonly discussed region with 
31 participants commenting on it.  Throughout the transcripts, there were 18 separate descriptors 
which appeared in multiple interviews, which participants used directly in relation to the North 
Caucasus.  The most common way to describe the region was “multi-national,” as 22 participants 
tended to note the ethnic and cultural diversity of the region in this fashion.  The next most 
common descriptor was “unstable,” with 14 interviews referencing the region’s political 
instability.  Twelve participants described the North Caucasus as “underdeveloped,” suggesting 
that it lagged behind other regions of Russia in terms of its economic landscape and 
business/employment opportunities for its residents.  On a related note, the next most common 
descriptor was “tourist destination,” noting a major theme of regional development for the North 
Caucasus.  Ten participants noted the “tough mentality” of North Caucasus residents, and eight 
described the region as “traditional.”  Seven participants described the North Caucasus as a 




Figure 7.10 – Regional Constructs Coded According to Region as Brand  
 
 
Several more descriptors were used to describe the North Caucasus region in five or 
fewer interviews. Five participants called the region “dangerous.” “Beautiful” (in terms of 
nature) and “non-Slavic” were each used to describe the region four times.  Participants referred 
to the population of the North Caucasus as “rude/ill-tempered” three times, and also described 
them as “dissatisfied” in three interviews.  The region was also described three times as a 
“physical transition zone” between mountains and steppe lands.  Finally, four descriptors 
appeared in two interviews a piece, including as a “cultural transition zone,” as “nationalistic,” as 
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Figure 7.11 – Major Descriptions of the North Caucasus  
 
 
 The North Caucasus Federal District was discussed by 11 participants, noting seven 
descriptors multiple times.  Although fewer chose to comment on this construct, several 
participants were eager to give their opinions on the NCFD and explain the logic, or lack of 
logic, behind its establishment, and the themes presented in the interviews do suggest that 
participants were aware of some of the stated intentions of the NCFD, notability in terms of 
economic strategy.  Eight of the 11 participants described the NCFD as “unstable,” as term that 
was also used to describe the North Caucasus in a vernacular sense.  Seven described the NCFD 
as a “tourist destination,” while six interviews also called it a region of “high economic 
potential.”  The theme of development continued for the NCFD, with five participants describing 
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four participants simply noted it as “new.”  Finally, two participants described the NCFD as 
“under control.”   
 
Figure 7.12 – Major Descriptions of the North Caucasus Federal District   
 
 
The vernacular region “the South of Russia” was discussed by five participants, with five 
descriptors cited in multiple interviews, again mostly having to do with the region’s economic 
characteristics.  Like the North Caucasus and NCFD, participants described the South of Russia 
as a “tourist destination,” and three participants called the region “hospitable.”  Two participants 
also described the South of Russia as having a “good climate.”  Additionally, two participants 
described the residents of the South of Russia as “lazy,” suggesting that people in the region 
were used to relaxing.  Three participants also described the region as “agricultural,” a term that 





















































Figure 7.13 – Major Descriptions of the South of Russia 
 
 
 The least commonly discussed region coded for region as brand was the Southern Federal 
District, about which four participants commented.  Since none of the interview participants had 
been residents of the SFD since the creation of the NCFD in 2010, they mostly referenced the 
SFD in comparison to other regional constructs.  I coded four descriptors that appeared multiple 
times in relation to the SFD.  Three participants described the SFD as “agricultural,” and three 
described it as a “tourist destination,” fitting the tendency for participants to discuss regions in an 
economic sense.  However, two additional descriptors appeared for the SFD, which were not 
present for any of the other region as brand constructs.   Two participants described the SFD as 
“wealthy,” and two described it as “Slavic,” hinting toward the general idea that the SFD 
basically retained a majority ethnic Russian population, and a positive economic landscape when 


















































Figure 7.14 – Major Descriptors of the Southern Federal District  
 
 
Overall, some participants tended to suggest both agreement and disagreement with some 
aspects of how regions are being branded around the study area.  Some of the most discontent 
came primarily from Russian participants who were uncomfortable with formal separating, via 
federal districts, of the “South of Russia” and the “North Caucasus.”  Participant V022 offed the 
following comment: 
I like the part of Russia that is generally considered the South.  I find that I tend to 
like Southern people better to be around than those in other parts of Russia.  
Therefore, the fact that I was born in the South of Russia is probably the most 
important place-based factor for my personal understanding of identity.  The North 
Caucasus is part of the Russian South.  I think that the South has a little bit wider 
scope, it would include places like Krasnodar Kray, Rostov, and Astrakhan.  The 
North Caucasus is smaller, but it fits into the South of Russia and is really only 
considered as different because of the new federal districts.  In the South and the 
North Caucasus, one would encounter similar landscapes, people, and economic 
activities.  The separation between them seems like it was done for administrative 
reasons, with new capitols and new government.    
 
Doubts in the necessity of a regional brand, as exhibited by Participant V022, suggests that it is 
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and correct.  This example falls in line with what Felgenhauer (2010) calls “symbolic 
regionalization,” where regional ambiguity is removed through the addition of symbols to 
regional landscapes, and regions are reified their symbolic meaning becomes routine.  The new 
capitol referred to by participant V022 is Pyatigorsk, which was designated as the capitol of the 
NCFD in 2010.  Another example that points to the desire of the state to symbolically regionalize 
the NCFD is the renaming of state institutions, such as changing the name of Stavropol State 
University to North Caucasus State University.  Because the state has a monopoly on the 
branding of its institutions, symbolic changes to the landscape, via rebranding these institutions, 
constitutes as means by which to educate the population and reify state approved regional 
understandings.      
 
 
Construct from Survey Data: Perceived Media Coverage 
 
To code for participants’ perceptions of media coverage and themes featuring the study 
area/its population, namely their opinions regarding their feelings in regard to accuracy of 
coverage for political and economic processes in the North Caucasus, I analyzed their responses 
to interview question number 5, as well as any other comments in which participants addressed 
mass media in the interviews.  I asked the participants to determine whether or not coverage was 
accurate by saying that it was generally mostly accurate, somewhat accurate, or inaccurate.  In 
total 31 participants chose to comment on media coverage of the North Caucasus, and coded 






Table 7.12 – Coding Scheme for Perceived Media Coverage  
ID # 
Percentage  Sentences/Fragments Perceived Coverage of North Caucasus as 
mostly accurate/somewhat 
accurate/inaccurate  
V003 7 4/1 Somewhat accurate  
V005 2.5 2/0 Somewhat accurate 
V006 13.2 5/2 Inaccurate  
V007 18.8 1/2 Inaccurate 
V008 14.8 2/2 Somewhat accurate  
V010 13.6 3/0 Somewhat accurate  
V011 10.5 2/0 Somewhat accurate 
V013 18.5 3/2 Somewhat accurate 
V014 6.9 2/0 Somewhat accurate 
V015 16 4/0 Inaccurate  
V016 18.8 3/0 Somewhat accurate 
V017 22.2 2/2 Somewhat accurate 
V019 25 3/3 Somewhat accurate  
V020 
8 2/0 Mostly accurate  
V021 6.5 5/0 Somewhat accurate 
V022 14.8 4/4 Inaccurate   
V023 9.6 3/2 Somewhat accurate 
V024 11.9 5/2 Somewhat accurate 
V025 10.2 4/2 Somewhat accurate 
V027 6.7 4/0 Somewhat accurate  
V028 6.3 4/1 Somewhat accurate 
V029 19.2 14/0 Somewhat accurate 
V030 6.9 1/2 Somewhat accurate 
V031 8.2 4/0 Somewhat accurate 
V033 6.7 1/0 Inaccurate  
V034 25.7 7/2 Somewhat accurate  
V035 11.9 8/0 Somewhat accurate  
V036 7 4/0 Somewhat Accurate  
V037 10 5/0 Somewhat Accurate  
V039 5 2/0 Mostly Accurate  




 Most of the participants who voiced their perceptions on the accuracy of media coverage, 
as it relates to the North Caucasus, said that they believed coverage was somewhat accurate.  In 
283 
 
total, 24 participants agreed coverage was not completely reliable.  The most popular theme 
among this group of participants appeared in 16 interviews, which stated that the media coverage 
available to the population, whether television, print or electronic, was at least somewhat 
selective with the particular events covered.  Of these 16, seven of the participants said that they 
believed that the media actively hid information when necessary for security reasons, and two 
described general coverage on the North Caucasus as “hushed,” or “cleaned up.”  Eight 
participants, who said that media coverage was somewhat accurate, also noted that the North 
Caucasus was generally presented with negative examples, and that positive coverage was 
generally rare.  Two participants also claimed that they believed the North Caucasus was 
presented negatively to be shown as an example for other regions of Russia.  Finally, two 
participants noted that accurate information on events in the North Caucasus was always 
available, but that one had to actively search for such coverage.   
   
 
Figure 7.15 – Accuracy Assessment of North Caucasus Media Coverage 
 
 
Five participants said that they believed media coverage of events and processes in the 
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North Caucasus was often sensationalized, and used to send messages and examples to other 
parts of the country.  Three participants noted that, having spent time outside of the North 
Caucasus, people in other regions of Russia often viewed the North Caucasus as more dangerous 
and politically unstable than they noticed it to be through everyday life.  Finally, two of the 
participants who said coverage was inaccurate noted that inaccuracies and omissions of content 
were necessary to preserve security in the region.   
 Only two participants said that they believed coverage of economic and political 
processes and events in the North Caucasus to be mostly accurate.  One of these participants said 
that she considered coverage to be fairly close to what she observed through lived experience, 
and that in her opinion, the media basically just reports events as they happen, how they happen.  
The other participant who said coverage was mostly accurate did note that the media could be 
selective from time to time, but that in most cases, the coverage was fairly in line with the events 
that occur in the North Caucasus.   
 Some particularly interesting comments on perceived media content and coverage came 
from participant V029, a non-Russian man living in Stavropol.  His take on the presentation of 
events and process in the North Caucasus provides insight on many themes of the study, such as 
ethno-national relations, inter-regional relations and power distributions, and the regional 
branding of the North Caucasus by the state.  According to the participant: 
In my opinion, mass media probably covers about 70 percent of the events that could 
really matter for the North Caucasus.  However, I think there is a lot censorship 
applied when it comes to how these events are portrayed.  This would include 
official censorship and also self-censorship.  Of course, most of the coverage we get 
on the North Caucasus is negative, but I am actually not against that aspect of the 
process.  I think that a lot of bad things do happen here, and it is necessary to show 
the rest of Russia what is going on.  Citizens in other parts of Russia should be aware 
of what is going on everywhere in the country.  I do want to say though that I feel 
that non-Russian people, especially from the North Caucasus, are overrepresented 
when it comes to reporting on crime.  I feel as though, despite the fact that non-
285 
 
Russians actually commit an overall small proportion of crimes in Russia, the faces 
that are put on television and shown as criminals tend to non-Russian faces more 
often than not.  This kind of presentation is especially true when events are covered 
in Moscow.  The media makes sure to include the fact that someone is of a North 
Caucasus national group, if he or she is accused of a crime.  If a criminal is of a 
Slavic nationality, his or her nationality is never emphasized.  This kind of 
discrimination in the media, I think, works to support the idea of a divided Russia 
and Caucasus.  I believe statistics show that 2 or 3 percent of any national group 
probably has criminal tendencies, but the amount of coverage that is selected to air 
showing groups from the Caucasus is unfair.  There is an anti-North Caucasus 
agenda and bias in the media. 
 
Drawing on Faucault (1969) and Hakli (2001), the conception of state produced knowledge and 
its dissemination though discourse, in this case by the quasi state-operated media in the Russian 
Federation, it is clear that residents of the North Caucasus, such as participant V029 are aware of 
discursive themes that couple perceived traits in associated with groups of people and the North 
Caucasus region.  Hakli (2001) suggests that because state-produced knowledge foregrounds 
some issues and backgrounds others, knowledge regarding the North Caucasus has become very 
thematic, or “branded,” as Vainikka (2012) has termed such processes.  The “anti-North 
Caucasus agenda and bias” mentioned by participant V029 can be seen as purposely constructed, 
or at least supported, by the state.  This set of discursive power relations relates to Faucault’s 
(1969) notion of meta-power focused on exclusion.  By paring the region, and at least some of its 
population, with negative discursive themes, the North Caucasus can be socially excluded from 
other parts of Russia’s meta-geography, based on the fact that the discourse has framed the 
region as different (in a negative sense) than the surrounding areas.  In a formal sense, we can 
understand the separation of the North Caucasus from the Southern Federal District as justified 
socially though this discursive branding of the North Caucasus as negative.  While the North 
Caucasus is discursively excluded, the Southern Federal District can be seen as discursively 
286 
 
included in terms of its place in the order of Russia’s meta-geography.  The South remains more 
like the rest of Russia, while the North Caucasus is understood to be different.   
 The idea of the media shaping opinions on the North Caucasus for the Russia-wide 
audience and for populations abroad was evident in several interviews.  However, the comments 
made by participant V034 were particularly interesting as he clearly identified several themes 
and their outcomes in regard to the framing of the North Caucasus region to outsiders.  
According to participant V034: 
I do not think that people really take mass media at face value.  I feel that it is 
obvious to most people in Russia that the facts and process that are reported are done 
so under the influence of the people who present them.  Mass media is a tool though 
that can shape regional opinions.  In reality, most people in Russia, or outside of 
Russia, are not going to travel to the North Caucasus personally to see what goes on 
here.  They see explosions and violence from the North Caucasus presented on 
television.  People all over the world see the North Caucasus portrayed as a 
dangerous region.  If someone in America knows anything about the North 
Caucasus, what is the first description of this regions that comes to mind for them?  
It is ‘danger.’  Stavropol gets connected to the narrative of danger because it is 
territorially connected to the places that get a lot of bad attention, like Chechnya and 
Dagestan.  Even if I invite relatives from up North to visit me in Stavropol, they tell 
me… “you are crazy for living in the North Caucasus… do you understand how 
dangerous your region is?” I feel like the “North Caucasus” exists conceptually to 
present an example of danger.  Physically speaking, the mountains do not end in 
Stavropol, they go all the way to the Black Sea.  However, you do not hear about 
danger when the media mentions the Black Sea.   One hears about vacationing and 
skiing.  Tourism is money for all of the Caucasus region, including the North 
Caucasus.  Really, tourism is the only way that this region can make any meaningful 
money on its own, without aid from the federal center.  What I am saying is, 
coverage of the North Caucasus is selective and opportunistic.  Places that are 
chosen for tourism development are not likely to have negative events covered there.   
 
These comments by participant V034 clearly demonstrate his awareness of state-produced 
knowledge, and the effects that its dissemination has had opinions of the North Caucasus outside 
of the region.  It is important to note his final comment about “places chosen for tourism,” 
because it highlights how certain areas are selected for omission when it comes to negative 
information.  Competing themes and elements of branding for the North Caucasus are definitely 
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present in popular discourse on the region, as understood by the participants in this study.  Two 
themes highlighted here, security and tourism, seem to be two major elements in the constructive 
regionalization process of the North Caucasus.   
 
 
Construct from Survey Data: Inter-Regional Viewpoint  
 
When coding for passages that pertained to inter-regional view point, particularly 
participants perceived relationship between the North Caucasus and Russia’s Federal Center 
(Moscow/Federal Government), I isolated any passages containing references to, or comparisons 
between the North Caucasus and the Federal Center.  While coded passages in this section of the 
scheme came from all portions of the interviews, they were particularly abundant in the answers 
participants gave to questions 4, 5 and 6.  In total, 15 participants commented in regard to their 
personal views toward the relationship between Moscow and the North Caucasus, with such 
comments constituting 4.5 percent of the total interview transcript texts.   
 
Table 7.13 – Coding Scheme for Interregional Viewpoint  
ID # Percentage Sentences/Fragments  Inter-Regional Themes Discussed   
V005 
4.9 4/0 North Caucasus is a security risk; North 
Caucasus depends on federal money 
V006 5.7 3/0 North Caucasus is a security risk 
V014 13.8 4/0 North Caucasus as a security risk  
V017 16.7 3/0 North Caucasus as a security risk 
V021 3.9 3/0 North Caucasus as a security risk 
V022 5.6 3/0 North Caucasus depends on federal money 
V023 17.3 7/2 North Caucasus depends on federal money 
V024 5.1 3/0 North Caucasus as a security risk 
V025 10.2 6/0 North Caucasus depends on federal money 
V027 16.7 10/0 North Caucasus depends on federal money 
V028 
6.1 8/0 North Caucasus is a security risk; North 




12.3 9/0 North Caucasus depends on federal money; 
North Caucasus is a security risk 
V030 16.3 5/2 North Caucasus depends on federal money 
V031 6.1 3/0 North Caucasus depends on federal money 
V033 13.3 2/0 North Caucasus used as an example 
V036 3.5 2/0 North Caucasus depends on federal money 
V037 2 1/0 North Caucasus depends on federal money 
  
Coding for inter-regional viewpoint revealed two major themes, which appeared in 
multiple interviews.  First, 12 of the 15 participants who commented on the relationship between 
Moscow and the North Caucasus discussed the fact that the North Caucasus received subsidies 
from Moscow, in the form of money for development and security measures.  Participants tended 
to view this influx of money to the region from the federal center in a variety of ways.  The most 
common sub-theme related to the subsidies had to do with development of the tourism industry.  
Three participants comment specifically on the federal push to develop tourism is the republics, 
and especially in Karachay-Cherkessia, and that tourism was really the only viable option.  They 
also commented that since the North Caucasus was considered dangerous to outsiders, that 
federal money and the promotion of the North Caucasus among Russia’s domestic tourist 
markets was the only viable way forward.  Four participants also suggested that federal subsidies 
were a way to pacify otherwise problematic groups, particularly young people in the republics, 
who according to participants, would be unemployed should the subsidies and the localized 





Figure 7.16 – Major Themes Coded According to Interregional Viewpoint  
 
 
 Along with federal subsidies, the other common theme brought up in coding for inter-
regional viewpoint was that the Federal Center tended to view the North Caucasus as a security 
risk.  Participants suggested a variety of reasons why Moscow would pay close attention to the 
North Caucasus.  The most common sub-theme dealt with the North Caucasus as a border 
region, which was pointed out by five participants.  They cited examples such as the 2008 
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the Chechen conflicts as events that would justify a 
strong security presence from the Federal Center in the region.  Four participants mentioned that 
the North Caucasus was potentially susceptible to outside influence, as many of its inhabitants 
could hold factors like their religion or nationality in higher regard than citizenship in the 
Russian Federation.  Several participants also suggested that the North Caucasus was resource 
rich, and thus constituted a valuable region for Russia, which Russia should feel it needs to 
protect.   
One area that is particular important for North Caucasus/Federal Center relationship in 
terms of constructive regionalization is tourism, as it appears to be the North Caucasus’s major 
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avenue for economic development. I found anecdotal evidence in the interviews that would 
suggest the success of various attempts at regional branding, association with the North Caucasus 
Federal District and the tourism economy in particular.  According to participant V027, who 
identified herself as an employee working in the tourism sector in Karachay-Cherkessia: 
The relationship between the federal center and the North Caucasus region is vital.  
In my profession, working in tourism, I believe we would see no development 
without the financial support from the federal center.  As someone who works in the 
tourism industry, I can tell you that we cannot develop, as an industry in Karachay-
Cherkessia, without some type of major outside investment.  Politically, I believe 
that development money has to be brought in collaboratively among the various 
scales of federal power.  The ideas and policies of the Republic, Federal District, and 
Federal Center have to be aligned.  Tourism is an extremely competitive industry, 
and unless we have beautiful facilities, we cannot hope to compete with other 
regions of Russia, nor with places outside Russia.  I had very high hopes for 
development in Sochi … that the preparation for the Winter Olympics would also 
bring development money for the entire North Caucasus region.  Most of all, I 
expected us to get some badly needed improvements with infrastructure, fixing 
roads, building new roads, and also some attention to a couple of ecological issues 
we have.  So far though, none of these improvements have been made in Karachay-
Cherkessia.  However, there is still some time, and I really wish that we would see 
some positive attention.  Tourism is really all we have, especially in the cities and 
villages here in southern Karachay-Cherkessia.  Without tourists, we have nothing.  I 
believe that the best time for our industry was when I was very young, still in the 
Soviet period.  Many people came from all over the USSR for their holidays.  After 
the collapse, our industry fell, and in my opinion, has never really recovered.  I 
believe that if we were connected to Sochi by a nice road, one that would allow 
beach vacationers to come here as part of their holidays, it would really rejuvenate 
our economy in Karachay-Cherkessia.  However, a project like such a road can only 
be ordered by the federal center.   
 
These comments show that the relationship between the North Caucasus is clearly of critical 
importance for economic development in the region.  However, it also suggests the awareness of 
an important power relationship.  As Participant V027 alludes in her comments, entities at the 
federal level have the ability to decide how much money and which kinds of resources will be 
allocated systemically to the North Caucasus.  She also points out her belief that tourism is the 
only viable economic option for her area, further suggesting the North Caucasus’s dependence 
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on the federal center, and thus a perceived de facto lack of regional economic autonomy.  Again, 
the concept of region a brand is evident, as a perceived coupling of the North Caucasus and 
tourism is clearly present.   
 
 
Construct from Survey Data: Stavropol Kray’s Place in the North Caucasus 
 
The final section of the coding scheme was Stavropol Kray’s place in the North 
Caucasus.  To code for this section, I isolated passages whereby participants discussed 
characteristics of Stavropol Kray that identified Stavropol Kray as either unique from, or 
congruent with, other territories in the North Caucasus Federal District.  Interview question 
seven was specifically designed to explore this section of the coding scheme, however, any 
applicable comments from throughout the interview transcripts were coded for Stavropol Kray’s 
place in the North Caucasus.   In total, 37 of the interviews contained comments relating to this 
section, with 32 of the interviews discussing unique themes for Stavropol Kray, eight interviews 
focusing on congruent themes, and 3 that offered both congruent and unique themes.  The total 
percentage of transcript passages coded for Stavropol’s Place in the North Caucasus was 11.8.   
 
Table 7.14 – Coding Scheme for Stavropol’s Place in the North Caucasus 
ID # 
Percentage  Sentences/Fragments  Congruent 
Themes for 
Stavropol Kray in 
the North 
Caucasus Federal 
District   
Unique Themes for 
Stavropol Kray in the 
North Caucasus Federal 
District 
V003 
5.6 4/0  Ethnic Russian territory; 
Transition Zone  
V004 4.4 3/0  Ethnic Russian territory 




11.3 4/2  Ethnic Russian territory; 
most ethnically diverse 
NCFD territory   
V007 




14.8 4/0 Similar social 
mentality  
Most ethnically diverse 
NCFD territory  
V009 
17.6 3/0  Most ethnically diverse 
NCFD territory 
V010 
13.6 3/0 Similar social 
mentality  
Ethnic Russian territory  
V011 
15.8 3/0  Ethnic Russian territory; 
Most ethnically diverse 
NCFD territory; Steppe 
landscape/unique physical 
environment   
V012 




14.8 2/2 Similar social 
mentality; similar 




17.2 3/2 Similar quality of 
life 
Most ethnically diverse 
NCFD territory 
V015 
16 4/0  Steppe landscape/unique 
physical environment   
V016 12.5 2/0  Ethnic Russian territory  
V017 
11.1 2/0  Steppe landscape/unique 
physical environment; 
Ethnic Russian territory 
V018 
4.5 1/0  Most ethnically diverse 
NCFD territory 
V019 





20 3/2 Similar physical 
environment; 
similar quality of 






14.3 9/2  More developed; 
transition zone; Most 
ethnically diverse NCFD 
territory  
V022 
7.4 4/0  Most ethnically diverse 
NCFD territory  
V023 5.8 3/0  Ethnic Russian territory  
V024 
8.5 5/0  More developed; Ethnic 
Russian territory  
V025 
10.2 4/2 Similar physical 
environment  
More developed   
V027 
8.3 5/0  More developed; Most 
ethnically diverse NCFD 
territory 
V028 
2.5 2/0  Steppe landscape/unique 
physical environment 
V029 
17.8 11/2  Most ethnically diverse 
NCFD territory 
V030 
7 3/0  Ethnic Russian territory; 
More developed; Most 
ethnically diverse NCFD 
territory 
V031 
12.2 6/0  Most ethnically diverse 
NCFD territory 
V033 20 3/0  Ethnic Russian territory 
V034 
20 7/0  Most ethnically diverse 
NCFD territory  
V035 
1.5 1/0  Most ethnically diverse 
NCFD territory 
V036 
10.5 2/4  Most ethnically diverse 




8 4/0  Most ethnically diverse 
NCFD territory 
V038 7.7 1/0  Ethnic Russian territory 
V039 
15 4/2  More developed; 
Personable Social 
Climate 





 In the interviews that suggested congruent qualities between Stavropol Kray and the other 
territories of the North Caucasus Federal District, three major themes were mentioned by 
multiple participants.  Five participants suggested that the general population of Stavropol Kray 
had a similar social mentality to people in other NCFD territories.  Examples for this similar 
social mentality included, similar manners, approach to social situations, and an overall tendency 
to work slowly.  Next, four participants said that people in Stavropol Kray enjoyed a similar 
quality of life to residents in other NCFD territories, noting similar housing, and access to similar 
goods and products.  Finally, two participants commented on the mountains in Southern 
Stavropol Kray as evidence that the mountainous republics of the NCFD and Stavropol Kray 
share as similar cultural landscape.   
 
Figure 7.17 – Major Congruent Themes Coded According to Stavropol’s Place in the NCFD   
 
 
Although some participants clearly saw similarities between Stavropol Kray and the other 
NCFD territories, many more cited qualities for Stavropol Kray that theyclaimed made it a 
unique territory in the NCFD.  I found six themes that described Stavropol Kray as unique, and 
that appeared in multiple interviews.  The most commonly discussed theme was Stavropol 
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that, while the other NCFD territories are also quite diverse, they tend to feature several major 
groups per territory, with the exception of Dagestan, which has many more.  However, due to 
increased migration patterns in the NCFD, namely non-Russian groups moving to Stavropol 
Kray, one might find representatives from all of the various North Caucasus ethno-national 
groups in Stavropol Kray, making in not only the most diverse NCFD territory, but also the most 
inclusive.  However, 14 participants also noted that Stavropol Kray was unique due to the fact 
that it was the only majority ethnic Russian territory in the NCFD.   
 
 
Figure 7.18 – Major Unique Themes Coded According to Stavropol’s Place in the NCFD   
 
 
 Six participants commented on Stavropol Kray’s steppe landscape as being a unique 
quality of the territory, compared to the more mountainous landscapes of the NCFD republics.  
Six participants also noted that Stavropol Kray, in their opinion, was more economically 
developed than the other territories of the NCFD.  Finally, two more socio-cultural themes were 
mentioned by two participants each.  One of these themes was the idea that Stavropol Kray has a 
more personable overall social climate, and that one is not as likely to be treated with disrespect, 
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theme had to do with Stavropol Kray as a cultural transition zone, referring to the shift from 
majority ethnic Russian populations to majority non-Russian populations in the republics, and in 




Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
In this research project, my aim has been to approach the concept of regional identity in 
the North Caucasus by focusing on participant data and opinions in regard to the perceived 
importance of potential markers of regional identity, power relations within Russia’s federal 
structure, and territorial aspects of regional definitions as they are understood by various socio-
cultural groups in the North Caucasus.  I approached these concepts in order to examine how 
notions of regional identity are articulated in the contemporary North Caucasus, and whether or 
not there were significant differences in how these ideas were viewed by the various socio-
cultural groups in the region.  This project shows some possible points of comparison between 
the opinions of people in the study area, versus trends derived from empirical census data.  I 
believe the results could be interesting for geographers and other social scientists researching 
issues of identity in post-Soviet space, as the findings provide a snapshot into participants’ views 
regarding the importance of identity markers in the North Caucasus, along with group-based 
composite visual representations which illustrate general trends in the territorial salience of 
identity markers.   
In addition, the methodology I developed is potentially useful for researchers who 
address issues of “identity and place,” or “identity and region,” because it presents a means by 
which to gather knowledge from a particular population at a level that is deeper than state 
statistics, or other broad statistical sources that may be lack an appreciation for territorial nuance.  
I gathered quantitative and qualitative empirical data from the local population to address four 
major research questions, focusing on regional definitions and perceived levels of regional 
cohesiveness, perception and importance of socio-cultural and place-based markers of identity, 
the roles of ethnic Russian and non-Russian groups in constructing regional perceptions of the 
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North Caucasus, and the region’s perceived role within the meta-geography of the Russian 
Federation.  Through the analysis of surveys, interviews, and a participatory mapping exercise, I 
was able to uncover many significant differences in the perception of identity markers and 
constructs among the various ethno-national and religious classification in the region.  
Participants also offered insights into their understandings of how state policies directed at 
promoting regional identity through the constructive regionalization of the North Caucasus 
would potentially impact the study area.  Finally, interview data analysis revealed collective 
trends in regional description, along with the roles and qualities associated with Stavropol Kray 
and the North Caucasus republics, and how North Caucasus regional identity is understood at 
both the inter-regional and intra-regional scales.   
 
Research Question 1: How do People in the North Caucasus Recognize and Define this 
Region? 
 
The first major goal of this project is to analyze and assess the extent to which people in 
the study area recognize the North Caucasus, in terms of its status as a region, and whether or not 
understandings of regional identity are contested among various subsets of the local population.  
Understanding how local people view and identify with their environments and living places is 
beneficial for understanding regional political policy and how regions might or might not be 
useful territorial devices in promoting state-sponsored agendas for security, economic 
development, and overall identity building, what I have referred to in this project as constructive 
regionalization.  As suggested by Paasi (2003), power relations, as well as potential rifts caused 
by contested notions of identity, can be analyzed though examining a population’s understanding 
of identity of the region, which is classified by the state, in comparison to said population’s 
regional consciousness, which is based on lived experience.  Assessing congruence between 
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regional consciousness and identity of the region is important for explaining whether or not a 
region can perform integrated roles in the greater state, or why a local population may exhibit a 
lack of trust (Bourdieu, 1998) for the identity of a region and therefore resist the state’s attempts 
at constructive regionalization.  In the case of the North Caucasus, the state defined identity of a 
region is represented by the formally defined North Caucasus Federal District.  Therefore the 
extent to which participants selected the borders of the NCFD and its territories in their personal 
opinions, a reflection of their regional consciousness, points to whether or not their regional 
consciousness is in agreement with the identity of a region.   
 
 
Findings on Research Question 1a  
 
Research Question 1a states “Do participants have a cohesive understanding of their 
region territorially, or do different socio-cultural groups disagree on the boundaries and the 
particular sub-federal territories that should be included in its definition?”  To expound on the 
topic of regional definition, the first question I wanted to explore was whether or not the various 
socio-cultural groups, mainly ethno-national and religious ones, in the study area agreed on the 
territorial extents of the North Caucasus Region, as well as the region’s composition of sub-
federal territories (specific krays and republics).  In addition to these socio-cultural variables, I 
also used participants’ self-expressed levels of association with several placed-based identity 
markers as a point of comparison. The main technique in my methodology that let me approach 
this question was the participatory mapping exercise (Chapter 4, Table 7.3), specifically Map 2, 
which asked participants to identify the territorial extents of the North Caucasus region by 
outlining a template map.  Visual comparisons of perceived extents of the North Caucasus were 
generated via ArcMap 10.3 mashups, while statistical analysis/significance testing regarding 
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perceived composition of the specific territories of the North Caucasus region was conducted via 
a Chi-Square test.  The independent variable groups tested were Russians versus Non-Russians, 
Christians versus Muslims, and participants who identified strongly versus weakly with the 
place-based identity markers “Russian Federation,” “North Caucasus Region,” and “Federal 
District.”   
Based on the visual analysis of the composite maps generated by each independent 
variable groupthere is evidence that each group generally recognizes the NCFD and its territories 
as the “North Caucasus,” suggesting overall congruence between identity of a region and 
regional consciousness.  My assertion is based on the fact that in every composite map, the 
borders of the NCFD are clearly visible, and its territories are selected with a much greater 
frequency than the territories currently formalized in the Southern Federal District.  Although 
there were definitely some significant differences among the various groups in terms of 
territorial selection, the overall trend toward territorial selection congruent with the NCFD was 
present in each case.   
While general agreement upon the NCFD as the most common definition of the North 
Caucasus region is certainly present, there were some statistically significant differences in the 
North Caucasus’s composition of territories which could suggest potential disagreement.  The 
results suggest that religion is an important identity marker for understanding the North 
Caucasus, as Muslim participants showed a significantly wider composition of territories for the 
North Caucasus than did Christians, especially for Krasnodar Kray and Adygea.  Christians were 
therefore more likely than Muslims to correlate the NCFD with the North Caucasus.  The results 
also showed a significant difference between participants who ranked the “Federal District” 
highly and those who gave it a low ranking, signifying that strong conceptual association with 
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the NCFD does correlate with a participant’s propensity to view the territorial composition of 
three region in state-formalized terms.  I believe this difference is important because a similar 
comparison involving the “North Caucasus Region,” in a non-formal sense, did not show 
significant disagreement regarding territorial comparison.  Affiliation with the NCFD therefore 
does seem to be correlated with one’s propensity to see this formalized definition as congruent 
with the North Caucasus region in general.       
Again, while the borders of the NCFD appear clearly in every composite map produced, 
those participants who selected territories outside of the formalized definition tended to indicate 
Krasnodar Kray and Adygea most often.  Although this trend was only statistically significant 
for Muslims versus Christians, the pattern appears to be present in nearly every comparison set.  
Krasnodar is likely included for several reasons, namely proximity to the NCFD, physical 
geographic similarities, and economic similarities.  The inclusion of Adygea, a majority Muslim 
republic, within the North Caucasus by Muslims is interesting, as this trend furthers the idea that 
the idea of the North Caucasus is generally an important identity factor for Muslims living in the 
study area.  This trend is also important because it emphasizes links between territorial and 
religious senses of identity, which I have argued in previous chapters, can be critical for 
understanding one’s own sense of place and community in the contemporary Russian Federation.  
Also, the fact this perceived difference in the North Caucasus’s territorial composition occurs 
across religious, rather than ethno-national lines, echoes the sentiment of several interview 
participants that religion may be a stronger factor of identity for people in the North Caucasus 
than one’s ethno-national identity, in terms of one’s own sense of belonging in the North 




Findings on Research Question 1b 
 
Research question 1b states “Do participants recognize the North Caucasus as a unique 
region, fundamentally different than the rest of Russia?”  Having found evidence that the 
formalized definition of the NCFD agrees with most participants’ personal conceptions of the 
North Caucasus and its composition, it is also important to explore how participants view the 
North Caucasus in terms of its uniqueness as a region, along with their thematic understandings 
of the North Caucasus, and whether or not they tended to view the region in a generally positive 
or negative light.  To analyze the uniqueness of the region, along with overall participant 
opinions and feelings regarding the North Caucasus, I relied mostly on the qualitative interview 
portion of the dataset.  Trends in these data did indicate several themes that participants 
discussed, which fundamentally differentiated the North Caucasus from other regions of Russia.  
When coding the interview data for passages dealing with participants’ senses of affect or 
feeling in terms of place-based identity markers, identity markers at the regional scale were 
mentioned more often than at any other scale (Figure 7.6).  Participants were also more negative 
in regard to regional place-based identity markers than to those at the local, provincial, or federal 
scales.  Looking specifically at the North Caucasus, participants spoke more negatively about the 
region than about any other place-based marker.  The NCFD scored the next most negative 
responses.   
As participants described the North Caucasus Region, the most common theme that set it 
apart from other regions of Russia, was the North Caucasus’s multi-national demographics.  
Most of the interview participants hinted on this characteristic in one way or another, most 
pointing out positive aspects of the North Caucasus’s multi-ethnic landscape.  However, some 
participants noted their belief that the NCFD was more non-Russian than Russian, and that 
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migration patterns were trending toward the out migration of ethnic Russians from the region, 
and the in migration of non-Russians from the NCFD republics into Stavropol Kray.  Several 
non-Russian participants also noted this trend.  Nonetheless, there was overwhelming agreement 
among all of the participants that the North Caucasus’s ethnic composition is a unique 
characteristic, which sets the North Caucasus apart from the other regions of the Russian 
Federation.   
Two other negative themes about the North Caucasus that were common among 
interview participants (Figure 7.11) were the instability of the region, along with its economic 
underdevelopment.  Those who discussed instability tended to do so in relation to either the 
region’s ethno-national population, or its religious diversity.  The belief that many groups and 
their members might have conflicted priorities when it comes to social action, or political 
allegiance was often expressed.  None of the participants mentioned actual threats of violence 
while speaking on the theme of instability, but rather cited ethno-national affiliations as basis for 
socio-economic discrimination.  Both ethnic Russian and some non-Russian participants 
expressed the belief that members of non-Russian ethno-national groups tended to favor their 
own group members when in positions of power, or hiring authority.  Participants gave examples 
from Dagestan and Karachay-Cherkessia.  They claimed that ethnic favoritism was often the 
norm in the republics, and such behavior was likely to make its way into Stavropol Kray as more 
and more non-Russians migrated in, received higher education, and established themselves in 
Stavropol Kray’s power structure.  Participants suggested that Krasnodar Kray, which had been 
very similar to Stavropol Kray in terms of its geographic, demographic, and economic qualities, 
was not likely to see this type of ethnic-cronyism take hold, due to the fact that Krasnodar Kray 
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remained in the Southern Federal District, as opposed to the NCFD.  This particular type of 
corruption seemed to be understood as a unique factor of the North Caucasus.   
Concerning the North Caucasus’s population, themes that appeared also tended to be 
negative.  When compared to perceived qualities in other regions of Russia, participants 
described people in the North Caucasus as “traditional,” as having a “tough mentality,” “rude,” 
“ill-tempered,” “dissatisfied,” and “materialistic.”  Conversely, when speaking about the South 
of Russia, participants tended to describe the population as “friendly,” “warm,” and “hospitable,” 
although possibly also “lazy.”  Tone and attitude of the conversations also tended to change 
when participants described the “South of Russia,” versus the “North Caucasus.”  Most of the 
positive comments regarding the North Caucasus were directed at its economic potential and its 
natural beauty, as participants noted that they believe the region to be “resource rich” and a good 
“tourist destination.”  
Previously, I suggested that in the case of the North Caucasus, if residents of the region 
can understand the specialized economic role that their region has taken on, and believe that 
efforts at constructive regionalization will create economic opportunities, they should be 
motivated to remain in the region as opposed to seeking opportunities outside.  Based on 
interview data, it appears that tourism is the most commonly acknowledged economic strategy 
that can lead to the region’s eventual economic success, other than drawing revenue in the form 
of aid from the Federal Center.  This idea is consistent with general development discourse on 
the North Caucasus Federal District, namely regarding its status as a special economic zone for 
touristic development, a policy aimed at attracting foreign direct investment to the NCFD to 
promote and fund infrastructure and promote regional branding.  In light of Russia’s current 
relationship with its traditional tourist markets abroad, namely Turkey and Egypt, combined with 
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the fact that tourism in Crimea is now considered a domestic market, I believe that the future of 
the tourism market in the North Caucasus, primarily by domestic tourists, may have a bright 
future, and merits future research in terms of how this market and its developmental potential 
impacts North Caucasus regional identity and constructive regionalization.    
 
Findings on Research Question 1c  
 
Research question 1c states: “Do participants recognize specific places (cities) as identity 
markers, based on association with the North Caucasus?”  According to overall survey data 
results (Figure 4.1), participants tended to associate more strongly with places at the local level, 
cities/villages/auls, than with any other dependent variable identity makers, except “Russian 
Federation” and “Native Language.”  The fact that local scale geographies hold this high degree 
of importance prompted me to inquire as to which city’s participants felt best exemplified the 
North Caucasus Region.  On the surveys, I asked participants to write in the three cities that did 
so (Table 4.3).  The results overwhelmingly favored two cities in particular: Stavropol with 232 
selections, and Pyatigorsk with 212.  The next 13 most commonly listed cities, which included 
Grozny, Makhachkala, and Cherkessk, were all located in the North Caucasus Federal District, 
and tended to be either Republic capitols, or mountain cities in Southern Stavropol Kray or the 
Republics.  Krasnodar, with 8 mentions, was the highest ranked among non-NCFD cities.  
While there were a few outliers, participants overwhelmingly showed collective 
agreement that the cities best exemplifying the North Caucasus region were located in the 
NCFD, and more specifically in Southern Stavropol Kray and the Republics.  I believe this 
pattern is important for two main reasons.  First, there is a clear association with mountainous 
terrain and representation of the North Caucasus Region.  Even the cities not located in the North 
Caucasus Federal District that appeared on the list, such as Sochi for example, tended to be 
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located in close proximity to the Caucasus Mountains.  The second important theme in city 
selection is that cities in Northern Stavropol Kray were seldom mentioned in terms of 
exemplifying the North Caucasus.  Such cities, such as Ipatovo, which was mentioned only once, 
tend to be predominantly agrarian and majority ethnic Russian in their demographics.   
Although Stavropol likely is over represented, due to the fact that it was a major data 
collection site, the city does correlate with the themes of the mountains and ethno-national 
diversity.  As I have suggested in previous chapters, Stavropol’s reputation as “Gateway to the 
Caucasus” can refer not only to is physical location, but as a transition zone between Russian and 
non-Russian peoples.  I believe the fact that it was so commonly listed by participants, along 
with other cities that meet these two criteria, shows that the local population also sees Stavropol 
in this way.  The fact that Pyatigorsk was ranked second in the list is also significant because 
Pyatigorsk is the capitol of the North Caucasus Federal District.  Based on the fact that many 
participants pointed out Pyatigorsk’s newfound political status in the interviews, it is clear that 
this city is now clearly important in terms of a North Caucasus regional consciousness, which 
also suggests that the region’s population acknowledges the city’s political legitimacy.    
 
Research Question 2: How strongly do participants associate with specifically defined 
territorial (ethno-federal) constructions as identity markers: Russian Federation, Federal 
District, Kray/Oblast/Republic? 
 
 The ethno-federal structure of Russia is an extremely important factor when approaching 
issues of territorial identity throughout the Russian Federation, and especially in the North 
Caucasus.  As I discussed in chapters I and II, constructing and administering territories with 
varying degrees of political autonomy, based on preferential treatment for the titular nationalities 
in various territories, is an internal geopolitical policy utilized by the Soviet Union which has 
been carried over into contemporary Russia. Thus, emphasis on territorial status, pegged to 
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notions of ethno-national identity remains a major markers of identity in Russia, as this study’s 
findings suggest.  Russia’s ethno-federal structure is complex, and there are many scales that 
hold place-based markers of identity with which they local population may choose to associate.  
To address this part of the study, I chose to address participants’ perceptions regarding three 
formalized territorial scales, the federal scale, the federal district scale, and the provincial scale, 
each of which plays a role in both the ethno-federal system, and in constructive regionalization.   
 
Findings on Research Question 2a 
 
 Research question 2a states: “Are there significant differences regarding how strongly 
various socio-cultural groups associate with the identity markers “Russian Federation,” “Federal 
District,” and “Kray/Oblast/Republic?”  To address this element of the project, I examined both 
survey data and qualitative interview data, which indicated that there were indeed differences in 
the levels of association across place-based identity markers by some independent variable 
groups, and that “Russian Federation,” “Federal District” and “Kray/Oblast/Republic,” were 
actually understood quite differently in terms of affect and feeling by interview participants.  The 
general trend in the data was for participants to associate more strongly with “Russian 
Federation,” then with “Kray/Oblast/Republic,” and finally with “Federal District” (Figure 3.1).   
In terms of the coding results for affect and feelings across these identity markers, 
reactions to the “Russian Federation” were overwhelmingly positive.  Stavropol Kray was 
mentioned positively in 73 percent of the coded passages, Karachay-Cherkessia was mentioned 
favorably in 75 percent of its coded passages, and passages for Dagestan were 50 percent 
positive and negative.  Federal districts were viewed in less positive terms overall.  While the 
Southern Federal District received 67 percent positive comments, only 14 percent of the passages 
regarding the North Caucasus Federal District were positive (Figure 7.7).  When looking deeper 
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into how the various independent variable groups identified with “Russian Federation,” “Federal 
District,” and “Kray/Oblast/Republic,” there were indeed some interesting trends in overall 
group preference in regard to these three dependent variables.  The results of the Kruskal-Wallis 
analysis indicated significant differences in preference levels for across several independent 
variable groups in the study, for each of these place-based markers of identity.   
 In terms of significant differences in preference for the “Russian Federation,” participants 
who indicated that they practiced their national traditions showed significant preference for this 
federal-scale identity marker, compared to participants who did not actively practice their 
national traditions (Figure 3.13).  This difference was the only one that was significantly 
different for “Russian Federation,” across the various independent variable group categories.  
Based on the fact that “Russian Federation” was so highly ranked in preference overall, and that 
there was general agreement across independent variable groups in regard to its importance, and 
considering with its very positive favorability in the interview data, “Russian Federation” was 
probably the most important overall identity marker for participants in this project.  However, the 
one significant difference in preference, which suggests a connection to and awareness of the 
practice of national traditions, suggests that the “Russian Federation,” as a marker of identity, 
plays an even more significant role in the identity constructs of those participants who 
considered themselves actively involved in cultural practice.     
 Perceptions of importance regarding “Kray/Oblast/Republic,” showed the most 
significant differences among independent variable group categories, among the three major 
identity markers related to ethno-federalism and constructive regionalization.  As was the case 
with “Russian Federation,” those participants practicing their national traditions favored 
“Kray/Oblast/Republic,” significantly over those who did not practice, suggesting that identity 
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markers at the provincial scale, along with the federal scale, are considered important by 
participants who felt in touch with the practice of cultural traditions.  However, perhaps more 
interesting were the significantly higher preferences for “Kray/Oblast/Republic” by Muslims 
over Christians, Non-Russians over ethnic Russians, and Native speakers of non-Russian 
languages over native Russian speakers.  These trends clearly show stronger preference for 
provincial scale identity markers by minority groups.  Throughout the previous chapters, I have 
made mention to ethnic Russians as the “state-bearing nation” in the context of the North 
Caucasus, meaning that ethnic Russians have perceived political and national legitimacy at all 
potential scales of territorial identification in Russia, from the Federal scale down through the 
local.  The fact that minority groups significantly prioritize identity markers as the provincial 
scale suggests the effectiveness of Russia’s ethno-federal structure in creating a sense of 
territorial belonging for non-Russian peoples at the provincial scale.  These results suggest that 
although non-Russians, Muslims, and speakers of non-Russian languages are not necessarily less 
likely draw on the “Russian Federation” as an identity marker than ethnic Russians, these 
minority groups’ collective results clearly show priority for more localized territorial identity 
markers in their collective sense of identity.   
 “Federal District” is the third identity marker that is important for addressing ethno-
federalism and identity and constructive regionalization.  Unlike “Kray/Oblast/Republic,” only 
one pair of independent variable group categories differed significantly as to the importance of 
“Federal District” for identity.  I observed this significant difference between Muslims and 
Christians, with Muslims holding the concept of “Federal Districts” in higher regard than 
Christians.  I believe that it is important to note that religion here played a significant factor, 
more so than ethno-national groups, further echoing what several interview participants 
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suggested regarding the dynamics of religion and identity in the North Caucasus region.  The 
argument they made, which seems to agree with the survey data, is that Islam constitutes a more 
important factor of identity for Muslims in the North Caucasus than these groups’ nationalities.  
Because all of the territories in the North Caucasus Federal District are majority Islamic, with the 
exceptions of Stavropol Kray and North Ossetia-Alania, one could argue that the North Caucasus 
Federal District constitutes Islamic Space.  Significant preference for the “Federal District” by 
Muslims over Christians clearly shows collective opinion for the outcome of federal district 
reform in high regard.  These results also support that idea that it may actually be more useful to 
focus on religious identity when studying difference in the contemporary North Caucasus, rather 
than taking a purely ethno-national focus.   Referencing Murdoch (2006),  if we understand 
regional identities to be social constructions and products of discourses, reified through relations 
with other territories and identities via power dynamics and geopolitical strategies, then we must 
point out that though constructive regionalization (in the form of Federal District Reform) the 
Russian Federation has created a tangible identity marker for Muslims with the North Caucasus 
Federal District, while at the same time separating Islamic populations from the Southern Federal 
District.  The results of this project support the fact that Muslims, as a group, are conscious of 
“Federal Districts” as markers of identity.    
 
 
Findings on Research Question 2b 
 
Research questions 2b states “Do participants respect official state territorial guarantees 
and borders based on titular-status (autonomous ethno-national rights) when associating group 
salience with territory?”  Several data trends and statistical results from throughout the project 
suggest that the participants were indeed conscious of territorial affiliations and titular status in 
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North Caucasus region, as well as the perceived intention of the ethno-federal system to create an 
ethno-national sense of belonging in certain territories as a pursuit toward security and stability.  
First, the fact that non-Russians significantly preferred provincial level territories as identity 
constructs, compared to Russians, shows a scalar territorial understanding of belonging.  A sense 
of belonging and collective ownership in provincial level territories, namely republics, is an 
outcome that seems very much in line with the guarantees included in the constitution of the 
Russian Federation, and with the attitudes that participants provided in interviews.  Second, 
when looking at the collective composites of Map 1 and Map 4, which asked participants to 
outline areas where their native languages were spoken and national traditions were practiced, 
the overall tendency was for members of titular ethno-national groups to concentrate their 
responses heavily on republics, or areas with presumed autonomous or entitled status.   
It is appropriate to view the ethno-federal system as a means by which the Soviet Union 
and Russian Federation have utilized notions of territory to solve problems (Sack, 1983).  I 
broached the subjects of both Ethno-Federalism and Federal District Reform with interview 
participants, and based on the coding matrix, determined that the participants were more familiar 
with the concept of ethno-federalism, along with its perceived outcomes.  The empirical 
evidence I gathered shows that participants are both aware of, and generally respectful of the 
territorial divisions in question.  While general opinion on whether or not such outcomes were 
generally positive or negative for the study area, 60 percent of the participants who spoke on 
ethno-federalism did so in negative terms.  However, all of the participants were aware of the 
basic premise of the system, being that certain ethno-national groups are given autonomous or 
favored status in various sub-federal territories.  They also generally agreed that this system had 
impacted the cultural landscape of the North Caucasus, and that cultural divisions are very 
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noticeable among the various territories in the North Caucasus Federal District.  Therefore, 
acknowledgement and respect for the system was clearly present via qualitative data.  The major 
criticism of the ethno-federal system in negative interviews tended to relate to inherent social 
inequalities created via its structure.  Again, namely the promotion of ethno-national networks of 
power, manifested in business and government, which create an advantage for members of a 
particular group in term of their potential for socio-economic mobility.  However, participants 
who spoke positively about the ethno-federal system tended to praise its use in promoting 
authentic cultural diversity by creating official environments where non-Russian cultural norms 
could be accepted and practiced without the perceived social discrimination that non-Russians 
could encounter in ethnic Russian majority krays or oblasts.   
Concerning the perceived salience of ethno-national groups with the various sub-federal 
territories in the study area, perhaps the best evidence in this study of whether or not a group’s 
collective sense of identity is centered can be seen on the ethno-national groups’ composite maps 
concerning perceived use of native language (Map 1; Figure 6.5) and perceived practice of 
national traditions (Map 4; Figure 6.6).  Overall, I observed that for non-Russian groups, and 
titular groups in particular, territories with official status for these groups were always visually 
outstanding in the composite maps.  For example, Dargins and Lezgins, two groups with official 
status in Dagestan, both selected a wider scope than just Dagestan, including more area for 
traditions (Map 4; Figure 6.15) than language (Map 1; Figure 6.14).  In fact the responses from 
these two groups, and each of whom has official status in Dagestan, looks remarkably similar, 
showing affiliation with Stavropol Kray namely.  Ingush responses tended to show a similar 
pattern, with Ingushetia heavily selected, with tighter selection for language than traditions.  
Karachays were fairly consistent between Maps 1 (Figure 6.11) and 4 (Figure 6.12), but felt 
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more strongly about language.   Nogays, who do not have a single republic in which they claim 
titular status, did not concentrate their responses in any given territory for either map.   
Ethnic Russians showed a clear difference between there perceived salience of language 
versus cultural traditions.  The composites show that ethnic Russians were more comfortable 
selecting krays and oblasts than non-Russian republics, although they still claimed all of the 
former Soviet territories for language to some degree (Figure 6.20).  However, in the ethnic 
Russian composite map for perceived salience of cultural traditions, there is a very obvious break 
between krays/oblasts and republics (Figure 6.21).  The composite maps of ethnic Russians 
suggest that, as a group, ethnic Russians are collectively aware that krays and oblasts are 
associated with their cultural norms, whereas Russian language, the regional lingua franca, is 
understood to be in use throughout the study area.  
 While there were clear indications that titular groups claimed territories where they had 
titular status, there were no cases where the groups selected these territories and nowhere else.  
The maps generated according to census data tend to be much neater, and focused according to 
ethno-federal lines.  It is clear that an appreciation for and awareness of the guarantees made 
under the ethno-federal system exists, but the critical commentary and willingness by ethno-
national populations suggests that young people in the study area may be looking outside and 
beyond these traditional territorial divisions as a basis of identity.  In the case of non-Russians 
especially, composite maps showed a much broader perceived reach concerning salience of 








Research Question 3: How are issues of civic nationalism and associations with civic and 
ethnic Russian culture viewed in the North Caucasus? 
 
Ethnic Russians, as the overall most prevalent ethno-national group in the North 
Caucasus, enjoy a prioritized status for their native language.  Russian language has official 
status throughout the Russian Federation, along with titular non-Russian languages in some 
republics.  Therefore, Russian constitutes the main language of education, and also inter-ethnic 
communication.  Expanding to view the entire Russian Federation, ethnic Russian cultural traits 
are certainly constitute the dominant form of ethnic expression in the country, and are present to 
at least some degree throughout the Russian Federation.  Ethnic Russian dominance, as I have 
suggested previously, can be understood through Brubaker’s (1995) work on “state-bearing 
nations.”  Therefore, since the trappings of the Russian state often correlate with, or in some 
cases promote, ethnic Russian cultural elements, such as language, religion, and heritage, one 
might expect that strong associations with Russian citizenship and Russian ethno-national 
identity are often closely related.  However, in this study, my findings suggested that where this 
is an obvious relationship between these concepts, participants did actually treat ideas of 
citizenship and ethno-national identity quite differently.   
Levels of perceived salience of Russian language throughout the North Caucasus 
provided interesting insight into the status and importance of its distributions.  Ethnic Russians 
indicated Russian language to be salient everywhere in the study area, and most salient in 
traditionally ethnic Russian majority territories, the various krays and oblasts (Figure 6.20).  
These results clearly show that ethnic Russians expect to find their language in use throughout 
the entire study area, and thus may communicate with local populations throughout the entire 
North Caucasus region.  This trend demonstrates the civic importance of the language when 
compared to the areas in which ethnic Russians indicated ethnic Russian traditions to be salient.  
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In regard to ethno-national understandings of Russian language, the data showed that the 
language was recognized as more salient than Russian national traditions in non-Russian 
republics (Figure 6.21), suggesting that there were some ethnic Russians who made a clear 
separation between territorial salience of language as opposed to other ethno-national identity 
markers.  Accordingly, participants who strongly associated with the Russian language as an 
identity marker showed a significant tendency to claim its salience in a greater number of 
territories in the study area, as compared to participants who claimed a weak association with the 
language.   
Perhaps one of the more interesting trends in the entire dataset was that citizenship in the 
Russian Federation was more highly prioritized as an overall marker of identity than one’s 
nationality, along with fact that the Russian Federation, as a place-based identity marker, was the 
overall most highly ranked in the study (Figure 3.1).  These trends indicate that participants held 
federal scale territorial associations and an overall inclusive sense of citizenship to be more 
important than identity markers that would have indicated identity trends pointing to more 
nationalist or regionalist leanings.  Citizenship was also ranked significantly higher as a marker 
of identity by participants who did not claim to actively practice their national traditions, when 
compared to those who said they did practice national traditions (Figure 3.9).  This trend is 
potentially meaningful because it suggests citizenship as a logical basis for identity for people in 
the North Caucasus who do not choose to engage actively with ethno-national identity, as 
opposed to other, more exclusive ethno-national markers such as language or religion.   
Finally, when comparing how participants qualitatively addressed their attitudes toward 
“nationality” versus “citizenship,” and interesting trend was evident in regard to “social 
expectations” being discussed in relation to the two concepts.  Results from interview data 
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showed that participants were much more likely to talk about social expectations in relation to 
“nationality” than to “citizenship” (Figure 7.5).  Participants were therefore more concerned with 
defined definitions pegged to their own ethno-national groups, or to other groups, versus 
expectations that existed simply according to membership in the Russian state.  Such 
expectations were described as socially important, especially for non-Russians living outside of 
the Republics in terms of respect for titular populations and cultures, as well as the treatment of 
people potentially behaving outside of local and accepted sets of social norms. Concern for 
ethno-national expectations is logical, considering that such expectations are a central tenant of 
Russia’s ethno-federal system.    
 
Findings on Research Question 3a 
 
Research question 3a states “How strongly do people in the North Caucasus associate 
with socio-cultural identity markers, and are there significant differences in how the various 
socio-cultural groups in the study are associate with these markers?”  The overall preference for 
association with socio-cultural markers of identity in the study showed “Native Language” as the 
overall most important maker, followed by “Religion,” and “Nationality” respectively (Figure 
3.1).  In general, participants tended to treat the concepts of native language and religion with 
minimal disagreement, but showed many different views as to the importance, and overall use of 
nationality in contemporary Russia.  For example, some participants felt that the concept of 
nationality was important as an institution, because of government statistics, but then claimed 
that as a marker of identity it has relatively little meaning on one’s social status.  A common 
reason for why nationality matters was that political and economic hierarchies are often seen as 
being structured around ethno-national hierarchies.  Participants made this claim especially in the 
case of the republics, but they often also asserted that ethno-national hierarchies had been 
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becoming increasingly more important in Stavropol Kray since the establishment of the North 
Caucasus Federal District.   
In terms of association with individual socio-cultural identity markers, non-Russians 
preferred three markers significantly over ethnic Russians.  First, “Religion” was ranked at 
significantly higher by non-Russians when compared to ethnic Russians (Figure 3.2), noting that 
not all non-Russians in the participant group were of traditionally Muslim nationalities, notably 
Armenians and other Slavic groups. Since non-Russian groups overwhelmingly tend to belong to 
churches that fall outside of the Russian Orthodox realm, these communities of believers have 
the opportunity to ostensibly view their faiths in a minority context, thus logically leading to 
strong association with religion.  It is interesting, however, that association with “Nationality” 
did not differ significantly among ethnic Russians and non-Russians, as did “Religion.”  This 
trend follows some of the sentiments given by interview participants that religion is becoming an 
increasingly more important means of group identification and association in the North 
Caucasus, especially among non-Russian communities.   
Non-Russians also favored two place-based markers of identity significantly over ethnic 
Russians: “North Caucasus” (Figure 3.3) and “Kray/Oblast/Republic” (Figure 3.4).  These two 
markers of identity are important for non-Russians because they each constitute a context in 
which ethnic Russian culture can be considered out of place, or possibly outside established sets 
of cultural norms.  The North Caucasus, especially since its rescaling via the establishment of the 
North Caucasus Federal District, is now officially a non-Russian majority territory.  Republics, 
as previously mentioned, often espouse titular rights and legal frameworks that favor various 
non-Russian ethno-national groups over others in their sub-federal contexts.  It is logical that 
non-Russian groups would prioritize these two place-based identity markers.  However, another 
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noteworthy trend from the data is that association with the “Russian Federation,” the federal-
scale marker of place identity, did not differ significantly between ethnic Russians and non-
Russians.  Therefore, trends from this study suggest that people in the North Caucasus, 
regardless of ethno-national persuasion, use the “Russian Federation” as a strong marker of 
identity, but non-Russians also feel strongly about regional and local scale markers, and do so to 
a significantly higher degree than ethnic Russians.   
When comparing preferences of identity markers between Muslims and Christians, data 
trends indicated that Muslims felt significantly more strongly in favor of association with several 
markers of identity.  Muslim participants ranked “Nationality,” “Native Language” and 
“Religion” significantly higher than Christian participants in the study (Figure 3.21 - Figure 
3.23).  Muslims also prioritized the following place-based identity markers significantly higher 
than Christians: “Federal District,” “North Caucasus,” “South of Russia,” and 
“Kray/Oblast/Republic” (Figure 3.24; Figure 3.27).  These preferences are perhaps not surprising 
because in most of the interviews I conducted, religion was a rather important theme.  
Participants said that one’s religion could constitute a necessity for social access among some 
groups in North Caucasus.  Islam was associated with the roles of inclusion and problem solving 
among Muslim groups, as described as a way that individuals from different traditionally Islamic 
nationalities could potentially resolve disputes.  Orthodox Christianity was discussed in the role 
of social tolerance and promoting culture.   
There were also some noteworthy trends that resulted from analyzing the Map 3 results 
from Christians and Muslims, by which these two groups indicated their perceptions of territorial 
salience in regard to their religions.  Map 3 results from Christians who ranked “Religion” high 
in importance tended to more selectively include the study area’s krays and oblasts, more so than 
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did the maps from Christians who ranked “Religion” with low importance (Figure 6.48 and 
Figure 6.49), signifying a greater degree of collective association between religious Russian 
Orthodox Christians and traditionally ethnic Russian majority territories as salient for their faith.  
In a similar trend, Muslims who claimed to actively practice Islam were more likely to prioritize 
the North Caucasus Republics on Map 3 than non-practicing Muslims (Figure 6.54; Figure 6.53), 
suggesting engagement with an identity marker leads to a more specifically defined territorial 
perception of its salience.      
Another strong trend in the data came from comparing identity marker associations 
between participants who claimed to be active participants of their national traditions, versus 
those who claimed not to actively practice.  Those who claimed to practice national traditions 
significantly prioritized “Native Language,” “Religion,” “Nationality,” “Russian Federation,” 
“Kray/Oblast/Republic,” “City/Village/Aul” and “South of Russia” over non-practicing 
participants (Figure 3.10; Figure 3.16).  While perhaps not surprising, this trend does again 
suggest a link between levels of engagement and group consciousness, this time in terms of the 
practice of national traditions, and the tendency to favor many markers of identity.   
 
 
Findings on Research Question 3b  
 
Research question 3b states “Is the North Caucasus region perceived to be changing in 
terms of its Civic Russianness: is it becoming more or less culturally Russian?”  The importance 
of ethno-national diversity in the North Caucasus cannot be understated, as it was a theme that 
appeared consistently throughout the study.  There is little doubt that the demographic changes 
going on within the North Caucasus Federal District suggest a per-capita decline of its ethnic 
Russian population, paired by a rise in the overall non-Russian population, in particular Dargins 
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and other traditionally Muslim nationalities from Stavropol’s bordering republics.  Stavropol 
Kray was in fact the territory claimed as salient most often by both Christians and Muslims 
(Figure 6.46; Figure 6.47), suggesting that groups across the socio-cultural spectrum of the North 
Caucasus see the territory as a comfortable marker of identity.      
Interview participants seemed generally aware of the fact that an increasing number of 
non-Russians are migrating from the republics to Stavropol.  The City of Stavropol's official 
population is 355,066, according to the 2010 All Russia Census and the city is growing while the 
proportion of ethnic Russians to non-Russians is shrinking.  Although, ethnic Russians showed a 
clear break between majority ethnic Russian krays and oblasts and majority non-Russians when 
mapping their perceptions of where Russian national traditions are territorially salient (Figure 
6.21), suggesting that Stavropol Kray is clearly perceived to be the most salient place for ethnic 
Russian culture in the study area.  Nonetheless, non-Russians commonly see better economic 
opportunities in Stavropol and Stavropol Kray, and value educational opportunities in Stavropol, 
and tend to view it generally as a good place to live.   
Stavropol Kray is also geographically advantageous as a migration destination, as it is 
located close to republics.  Therefore, access and travel back and forth is easy, which tends to be 
especially important for students.  Interview participants also mentioned their knowledge of 
various non-Russian communities in Stavropol that reflect the ethno-national groups of the 
republics.  Having an established base community in Stavropol is seen as a positive for young 
people from the republics when they first arrive, and is believed to lead to more migration from 
rural areas in the republics, where levels of education and knowledge of the Russian language 




Findings on Research Question 3c  
 
Research question 3c states “Do ethnic Russians in the North Caucasus have a regional 
identity variation of a state-bearing nation?”  Although ethnic Russians do constitute a 
potentially great example of a state-bearing nation, according to Brubaker’s (1995) work, the 
results from this project did not show clear indications that ethnic Russians in the North 
Caucasus perceived themselves, or their cultural, as state-bearing.  I think the best evidence to 
argue for ethnic Russians as state-bearing is the importance of Russian language.  As I 
mentioned previously, Russian language, as a lingua franca, is very important for projecting 
ethnic Russian cultural hegemony in the North Caucasus.  In addition, the data gathered from 
participants in this study suggest that ethnic Russians do overwhelmingly see their native 
language as an important marker of identity.  Russia, as a nationalizing state, has constructed 
legal policies and frameworks, such as official language status for Russian language, that 
encourage an overlap between civic-Russian and ethnic Russian culture.  In Russian, this 
difference is understood a Russki (ethnic Russian) versus Rossiski (Russian citizenship).  A 
common theme for non-Russians regarding the practice of national traditions involved support of 
national traditions for the purposes of cultural preservation.  As a state-bearing nation, ethnic 
Russians arguably do not have to be as involved, or as diligent, in performing specific elements 
of their culture, as ethnic Russian cultural norms and traditions are dominant.  Russian language 
and cultural norms are at least present and expressed via media and state institutions throughout 
the entire country.   
In regard to ethnic Russians’ perceived salience of cultural traditions in the study area, 
responses from ethnic Russians on Map 4 (Figure 6.21) demonstrate that as a group, ethnic 
Russians showed a conscious perception that their traditions diminish in salience outside of 
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traditionally ethnic Russian territories (krays and oblasts).  However, this visible break on the 
map, which again emphasizes the idea of Russian versus non-Russian space, clearly includes 
Stavropol Kray as a place with a high degree of salience for Russian national traditions.  These 
strong perceptions of ethnic Russian cultural salience in Stavropol Kray suggest that ethno-
national territorial status may be relevant in forming group perceptions of identity markers in a 
territorial sense, rather than a purely regional understanding.  Therefore, it is clear that ethnic 
Russians would not likely be comfortable claiming the entire North Caucasus as salient for their 
ethno-national traditions, with boundaries seemly indicated according to ethno-federal lines 
between krays and republics.  When examining ethnic Russian’s composite from Map 2 (Figure 
6.26), the consensus group defining of the North Caucasus region included Stavropol Kray the 
collective North Caucasus regional definition, at roughly the same level of selection as republics 
like Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria (Figure 6.28).  Ethnic Russians do understand 
their group’s national traditions to be salient in the North Caucasus, but markedly more salient in 
Stavropol Kray than in the republics.   
General understanding of the ethno-federal system in interview data showed that 
participants understood the purpose of ethno-national autonomous status for republics is to 
promote non-Russian cultures, and create an environment in which Russian national traditions do 
not automatically constitute the basis for social norms and understanding, as might be expected 
of a state-bearing nation.  I did not observe a sense that any of the interview participants 
considered ethnic Russian culture to be expanding into defined non-Russian areas.  The 
perception that non-Russian cultural elements are becoming ever-present in Stavropol Kray was 
very evident however.  Non-Russian populations, who have lived according to the break in 
Russian/non-Russian cultural norms that is reified via ethno-federalism, were generally 
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perceived by interview participants as lacking desire to adjust to social norms in Stavropol Kray, 
where ethnic Russian culture is supposed to stand as the basis for cultural norms.     
Among the interview participants, there was also a sense that ethnic Russians in 
Stavropol and the rest of the North Caucasus tended to practice unique sets of traditions and 
conduct their lives differently than ethnic Russians outside the region.  According to interview 
data, a general perception exists that Stavropol Russians have a unique set of traditions, 
reflecting transculturation between non-Russian cultures from the North Caucasus and Slavic 
cultural elements.  Such an attitude, reflecting notions of transculturation among members of a 
state-bearing nation, perhaps works in favor of regional understandings of identity showing up as 
variations in the greater sense of ethnic Russian consciousness.  The idea that Stavropol Russians 
are unique culturally is important because shows a scalar break in identity for the state-bearing 
nation.  Therefore, if the political motivations to include Stavropol Kray in the North Caucasus 
Federal District were to keep the North Caucasus “Russian,” one may choose to question the 
exact understandings of what it means for Stavropol Russians to be Russian, as opposed to being 
Russians from the North Caucasus.  Interview participants who were not originally from the 
region, or who had migrated out of the area and back again often commented on this same 
observation, claiming that they noticed a North Caucasus style of behavior and mindset that had 
more to do with the regional setting than with a particular ethno-national or religious group.  
This mindset was described as “traditional,” “tough,” “Ill-tempered,” and “materialistic” (Figure 








Research Question 4: How do people in the North Caucasus view policies aimed at 
constructive regionalization? 
 
As I have previously discussed, participants in this study were aware of the aims and 
perceived outcomes of Russia’s ethno-federal policies and structure.  When considering and 
discussing the rescaling and formalizing of the North Caucasus region via the establishment of 
the North Caucasus Federal District, participants were also acutely conscious of the changes and 
impacts of this policy.  First, the overall results from analyzing responses for Map 2, which 
asked participants to indicate the perceived territorial extents of the North Caucasus region, show 
a very clear collective awareness of state-formalized borders for the region.  Each of the 
independent variable groups in question (Table 7.3) produced a collective composite that 
highlighted the borders of the North Caucasus Federal district, and included areas within the set 
of sub-federal territories of which the NCFD is comprised.  While I do not have a basis for 
comparison regarding how participant would have completed the cognitive mapping exercise 
before 2010, I believe that such a strong emphasis on the NCFD boundaries, as the most agreed 
upon definition of the region, would have been unlikely.  Regardless of such speculation though, 
the results of Map 2 clearly demonstrate evidence of an overall understanding of the regions 
composition and territorial extents, based upon the state’s formalization of the NCFD.   
Association between the “North Caucasus” and the “North Caucasus Federal District” 
falls in line with Agnew’s (2005) theory on the “classic sovereignty regime,” whereby state 
instructions, which hold a high degree of political authority, distribute information and meaning 
across more localized scales of power.  Therefore I believe it is clear that exposure to definitions 
of the North Caucasus specifically as the NCFD has had an important on collective 




Findings on Research Question 4a  
 
Research question 4a states How do participants regard ethno-federal governance and the 
state’s efforts to re-scale the North Caucasus, specifically though Federal-District Reform? 
Viewing perceived importance of place-based markers of identity allows a means by which to 
gauge the general attitude of participants concerning the popularity and utility of specific 
territories within Russia’s overall meta-geography.  For examining rescaling, regional-scale 
markers of identity that apply to the North Caucasus, both in formal and vernacular senses, are 
critical in determining whether or not participants accepted, and or valued, state-sponsored 
formal definitions of the North Caucasus.  When considering the overall importance of regional 
scale markers of identity, “Federal District,” a formal marker, received a slightly higher ranking 
than “The South of Russia,” or “The North Caucasus,” both of which are vernacular markers 
(Figure 3.1).  This result suggests that the Federal District, as an identity marker, has meaning to 
participants within the greater meta-geography of the Russian Federation, and that participants 
were more likely to prioritize formally defined territories, as opposed to vernacular concepts, 
when considering identity.      
The Federal District also has meaning that is reified though the changing status of cities.  
Several participants expressed disappointment that Pyatigorsk had become the capitol of the 
NCFD, instead of Stavropol.  Additionally, Pyatigorsk was the second most popular choice 
among participants when they were polled on three cities they believed to be most indicative of 
North Caucasus culture, finishing ahead of touristic and cultural attractions such as Yessentuki, 
Caucasian Mineral Waters, Narzan, Dombay and many others (Table 7.3).  Changes in the power 
structure among cities was noticed, and lends credibility to the idea that formalizing the 
definition of the North Caucasus via the establishment of the NCFD has indeed had an impact on 
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local definitions of the region itself.  Formal separation of the NCFD as the North Caucasus is 
important because other areas, which the state does not want to be defined as part of the North 
Caucasus, are therefore protected from this moniker.  There was a general sense among 
participants that the formation of the NCFD resulted in defined regional understanding, in that 
the South of Russia and the North Caucasus are now separate entities in a formal sense.   
 
Findings on Research Question 4b  
 
Research question 4b states: “Do Participants see Stavropol Kray as different from other 
territories in the North Caucasus, and if so, how?”  Since its formation in the late 1700s, both 
Stavropol and Stavropol Kray have played a role in the geopolitics of Russian power and 
relations among non-Russian lands and peoples in the Caucasus.  Therefore, Stavropol Kray’s 
current proximity to other territories, a situation cemented by Soviet territorial policy, has come 
to have major impact in post-Soviet geopolitical discourse. With its status as the only ethnic 
Russian majority territory in the North Caucasus Federal District, Stavropol Kray continues to 
play the role as a stronghold of Russian culture and power in the region.  To what degree 
Stavropol Kray remains traditionally Russian, as opposed to the North Caucasus, is perhaps the 
most important element of regional stability for the region, and also a key to success for the 
overall policy of federal district reform in Russia.   
One of my major goals in this project has been to test if and how Stavropol's Caucasus 
identity is consistent among its local population.  To address this issue, I relied on qualitative 
interview data concerning participants’ perceptions on the place of Stavropol Kray within the 
North Caucasus (Table 7.13).  In the interviews, participants provided both congruent themes, 
linking Stavropol Kray to the other territories in the North Caucasus Federal District, and unique 
themes, which suggested major territorial or social cultural differences between Stavropol Kray 
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and the other territories.  After coding the interview data, the results indicated that there were 
arguments for both congruence and uniqueness, however, the tendency for participants to point 
out differences was much greater than indicating similar themes.   
Participants were approximately 4.2 times more likely to focus on unique themes for 
Stavropol Kray in the North Caucasus (Figure 7.18) than on congruent themes (Figure 7.17).  
The most commonly addressed unique themes dealt with Stavropol Kray’s ethno-national 
characteristics.  Participants commonly mentioned that Stavropol Kray was the most ethnically 
diverse territory in the North Caucasus Federal District, and this focus on ethnic-diversity 
appeared slightly more often than mentioning the territory’s ethnic Russian majority.  In both of 
these tendencies, it is clear that participants are aware of the ethnic-differences between 
Stavropol Kray and the other territories.  Changing ethno-national dynamics of Stavropol Kray 
were also mentioned, as numbers of non-Russians in Stavropol and Stavropol Kray were 
perceived to be increasing.  In the city, a common idea was that young people from the republics 
could access universities in Stavropol.  In Stavropol Kray, several participants noted that, 
particularly in the eastern Stavropol Kray, land and houses are viewed as both favorable and 
accessible for non-Russian migrants, and the overall economic development and conditions in 
Stavropol Kray are viewed as more objective, being less based on ethno-national connections 
when compared to conditions in the republics (Dagestan and Chechnya in particular).  Therefore, 
the interview data showed an overwhelming sense that the population dynamics of Stavropol 
Kray are changing, mostly due to non-Russians migrating in.  These trends were understood as 
having the effect of diversification in Stavropol Kray, which is seen as unique because migration 
is seen in terms of republic to Stavropol Kray, not republic to republic.  Stavropol Kray’s 
diversity is increasing when the diversity of the republics are not, which makes Stavropol Kray 
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unique among the NCFD territories because it serves as a transition between majority Russian 
areas to the north and west, and the majority non-Russian territories of the NCFD.   
When participants commented on Stavropol Kray’s physical environment and landscape 
in terms of congruence with the other territories in the NCFD, they were three times more likely 
to focus on differences.  Although some participants did choose to focus on the mountainous 
areas in southern Stavropol Kray as a commonality, most said that the steppe areas in northern 
Stavropol Kray constituted a unique landscape, absent from the other NCFD territories.  Steppe 
characteristics were seen as significant because of the economy in such areas is focused on 
agriculture, while mountainous areas tended to be associated with tourism.  However, again 
referencing ethno-national differences, steppe areas were described as ethnic Russian dominant, 
while the population becomes increasingly more ethnically diverse in the cities in southern 
Stavropol Kray, namely in Stavropol itself.   
Map 2 results clearly showed Stavropol Kray as being selected as part of the North 
Caucasus region.  In addition to being the overall most selected territory to be considered part of 
the region, it was also the most commonly selected by the majority of the study’s independent 
variable groups more often than any other territory.   Visual comparison for all of the composite 
maps in Chapter 6, relating to the composition of the North Caucasus region, shows that 
Stavropol Kray is clearly understood to be part of the North Caucasus in a collective sense.  
There is however some variation of selection within the territory itself, although it appears to be 
quite minor.  For example, some participants  and independent variable groups, such as Muslims 
for example (Figure 6.31) were somewhat apt to select areas of Southern Stavropol Kray as part 
of the North Caucasus while omitting the largely majority Russian and steppe environments 
found in northern Stavropol Kray.  This trend was visible in all of the composite maps regarding 
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the North Caucasus region.  The trend is also consistent with interview data, as participants who 
argued that Stavropol Kray was different than the other NCFD territories largely pointed to 
differences in ethno-national demographics and landscape in northern Stavropol Kray.    
 
Findings on Research Question 4c  
 
Research Question 4c states “How do participants view the North Caucasus as compared 
to other regions of Russia, or in terms of its relationship with the Federal Center?”  Participants 
demonstrated a consistent opinion that the North Caucasus tends to be defined in a negative light 
by other regions of Russia.  These perceived negative associations were mostly associated with 
the North Caucasus as being corrupt or dangerous, and with the region being presented as and 
overall security risk.  Russia-wide media coverage on the North Caucasus was mostly considered 
to be only somewhat accurate by the research participants (Figure 7.15).  Therefore, the general 
consensus among participants was that there is disproportionate coverage of negative events in 
the North Caucasus, such as reports on crime, violence, or possibly terrorism, rather than 
coverage of positive events.  The North Caucasus has a role in the regional discourse of Russia, 
whereby it is presented somewhat as an ‘other.’  The region constitutes a problem, or set of 
problems, which can be fixed with a top down approach, consistent with the ideas of vertical 
power and federal district reform.   
Interview data revealed two major themes in regard to the relationship between the North 
Caucasus and the Federal Center (Figure 7.16).  The general agreement is that the North 
Caucasus region depends on federal subsidies for economic development, along with the idea 
that the North Caucasus region is understood as socially unstable and as a security risk.  In terms 
of political and economic media coverage, participants tended to expect that some events would 
be omitted from broadcasts, or held back due to security reasons.  Participants were also in 
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general agreement that the North Caucasus region is presented as dangerous and problematic in 
the media.  The interview participants that had spent time outside of the North Caucasus, namely 
in Moscow and Saint Petersburg, noted that telling people they were from the North Caucasus 
promoted curiosity about safety and security.  Non-Russian ethnic groups were also understood 
as being presented as a security risk.  This idea was particularly emphasized by interviews with 
non-Russian participants.   
 
 
Concluding Remarks and Potential Impacts  
The Russian state’s policies of constructive regionalization clearly demonstrate the desire 
to formalize understandings of the North Caucasus region, and by doing so support order in the 
region that can be maintained and managed.  Data analysis from this project also suggests that 
participants in the North Caucasus are aware of goals and desired outcomes of the constructive 
regionalization process, and are conscious of the discursive role that the North Caucasus plays in 
Russia’s meta-geography.  The belief in various unique aspects of the North Caucasus, such as 
ethno-national diversity, perceived geopolitical instability, and a path to economic development 
that depends on attention and support from the federal center were expressed very clearly by the 
participants in this study.   
The idea that the North Caucasus should be considered a zone of transition between both 
ethnic Russian and non-Russian cultures, as well as between Russian Orthodox Christian and 
Islamic space, was also a major factor in how participants understood the North Caucasus.  After 
spending time in the North Caucasus, as well as in several territories in the Southern Federal 
District and Central Federal district, I believe that participants’ suggestions regarding a way of 
life in the North Caucasus that is unlike traditional ethnic Russian territories were accurate. It is 
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clear though that participants from all sub-groups in the region acknowledged that diversity was 
perhaps the main overall cultural trait of the North Caucasus, and that association with the 
Russian Federation, as well as with regional scale identity markers, was important for 
understanding the North Caucasus.   
Finally, the policies of federal district reform and ethno-federalism have had, and will no 
doubt continue to have, impacts on future demographic trends in the region, as Stavropol Kray 
continues to receive migrants from the other North Caucasus Federal District republics, and as 
young people from all over the North Caucasus Federal District leave the region in search of 
better economic opportunities, particularly those in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Rostov-on-Don 
and Krasnodar.  From a development standpoint, the sentiment was clear that Stavropol Kray’s 
future is with the other North Caucasus Federal District territories in terms of federal attention, 
rather than with traditionally ethnic Russian majority territories that remained in the Southern 
Federal District.  The development of the region on the whole is widely believed to depend on 
the political will from the federal center, and federal subsidies coming to the North Caucasus.  
Whatever the future holds for the North Caucasus, this region plays an important role in the 
meta-geography of Russia and remains an important marker of identity for the people living in 
this extremely diverse region. Within the region itself, territorial constructs rank highly among 
the major markers of identity.  Just as they were in Soviet times, defined markers of identity 
remain important for the North Caucasus population to make sense of its place within Russia, 
and to navigate the complex landscape in this extremely diverse and fascinating region.   
Looking beyond this project, research techniques such as those used in this study are 
important because they present the opportunity to illuminate cultural, social, economic, or 
political nuances that are potentially run contrary to official statistics or state-produced 
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discourses.  As noted by the works of Foucault (1991) and Hakli (2001), states have a monopoly 
on official statistics and how they are represented.  These sets of statistics in turn can be used to 
produce discursive representations, employed vis-à-vis geopolitical discourse to advance state 
agendas (Ó Tuathail, 2006).  In the case of the North Caucasus, the state has the power to define 
and represent the region, which I have argued has been done to promote various discourses on 
security, ethnic relations, and economic development, all of which have an impact on 
populations both within and outside of the North Caucasus region.  The methodology I have 
conducted, along with the results of this project, show nuanced spatial opinions of the local 
population in regard to the composition and territorial extents of the North Caucasus.  Therefore, 
I believe it constitutes one technique by which to test the effectiveness of geopolitical discourses 
in terms of regional definition.  For example, referring back to Figures 4.30 through 4.33, the 
results suggest that Christian populations are significantly more apt to accept the state-produced 
definition of the region, the boundaries of the North Caucasus Federal District as compared to 
Muslims in the study area.  In cases such as this one, identifying rifts in opinion may be useful to 
a number of actors, who may choose to consider changes in policy, outreach, or discursive 
representation depending on how they might evaluate the importance of the rift.   
Individual and group perception is important because people make decisions based on 
that which they believe to be true.  Because these beliefs may run contrary to official statistics, 
knowing what local populations actually perceive to be true is arguably important for 
understanding their behavioral outcomes.  Migration decisions could be facilitated via the belief 
that a destination is friendly, or beneficial to one's cultural, ethnic, or religious group, such was 
the case with the maps and interview data provided by Dargin participants, and several other 
groups, who perceived their ethnicity to be salient in a much wider territorial scope than Russian 
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census data would suggest.  Geographers who study migration may choose to utilize the 
techniques in this study to evaluate potential migration destinations among potential migrant 
groups, in order to identify patterns their overall understandings of their desired destinations in 
terms of a number of variables based on cultural transition, safety and security, economic 
potential and so on.   
Gaining knowledge from local populations may uncover identity differences within 
groups that were previously thought to be cohesive, thus gaining insight into intra-group 
variations of opinions.  For example, activists in the broader Armenian community could be 
interested in the omission of Nagorno-Karabakh, in terms its being a place where Armenian 
ethnic traits are salient, by most of the Armenian participants in this study.  Such information 
may be of use to political and electoral geographers, particularly those working in contexts of 
democracies, in comparing and contrasting the importance of political issues within a particular 
voting bloc, in terms of where said issues are perceived to be placed.  Identifying rifts within an 
established group may cause researchers to consider rescaling or questioning the validity of 
group in question in regard to its cohesion.  Such information could also impact the policies of 
state officials and grassroots activists in terms of policy, outreach, and dissemination of 
information.      
Empirical research, such as that which I have conducted in this study, provides a glimpse 
in time, which has the potential to serve as a point of comparison for future work.  In regions 
where political geographies are dynamic, understanding where certain traits, populations, and or 
beliefs exist in a territorial sense may prove to be useful in understanding changes in the map.  
For example, the study map used for the template in this project, which was accurate for 2013, 
would arguably need to be revised for a repeated study in 2016, after Russia’s annexation of 
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Crimea from Ukraine.  An example for future research might be to compare ethnic Russians’ 
territorial perceptions of Crimea on an updated map, which would label the peninsula as part of 
the Russian Federation.   
On an ending note, I feel that using the techniques presented in this project provide a 
chance for validation in territorial problem solving.  The main theme is local belief in 
comparison with official statistics.  Any research problem that deals with a social variable or 
identity marker in territorial context may potentially have something to gain from gathering local 
opinions via variable preference, cognitive mapping, and qualitative analysis.  From a security 
perspective, the techniques demonstrated in this project could be applied in terms of identifying 
territory where a certain population feels safe, or under threat.  From an economic perspective, 
the methodology could be applied to analyze where people perceive services to be available, or 
goods to be accessible.  From a political perceptive, it could be applied to test the territorial 
salience of variables related to voting and governance.  It is my hope that other geographers and 
social scientists will be able to use this project, its findings, and the methods I have conducted, to 
further understandings of regional identity, as well as how they might choose to approach spatial 
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